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Ab s t r a c t
The four essays within this study investigate a series of issues recently emerged 
in monetary theory and policy. While the common theme is the empirical evaluation of the 
effects of structural change and institutional reforms, the perspective from which I study 
this problem markedly varies across the chapters.
The first two chapters of the thesis are more closely related. In the first chapter, I 
derive and estimate interest rate reaction functions for the G-3 economies and four 
inflation-targeting countries, to assess whether policy behaviour in these economies has 
significantly changed in recent years. Contraiy to a commonly stated view, some 
interesting differences emerge amongst the policy rules followed by the central banks in 
the G-3 economies. Furthermore, the adoption of inflation targets and the move to greater 
central bank independence in the second group of countries do not seem to have 
significantly altered the way in which monetary authorities react to final policy objectives.
In the second chapter, I apply the same econometric methodology to an optimal 
interest rate rule derived for four former ERM -now EMU- countries. The existence of the 
exchange rate constraint pemiits to draw, inter alia, some empirically testable hypotheses 
about the effects of fiscal policy credibility on interest rate determination. My findings 
show that some of the economies faced, on their road to EMU, remarkable costs in 
achieving nominal convergence with Germany, mainly due to the presence of concerns on 
the sustainability of their fiscal stances.
The third chapter conducts an empirical investigation on the leading indicator 
properties of broad monetary aggregates for future inflation in the euro area. Using 
aggregate data for the area, I first test for Granger non-causality of M3 on prices, and then 
estimate a series of forecasting equations for inflation. My findings suggest that the 
information content of monetary aggregates, but also of the term spread and the output 
gap, is helpful for forecasting the behaviour of future inflation in the area. To this purpose, 
however, the joint use of information obtained from monetary models as the one adopted 
in this exercise, and from other, more “structural” models of the euro area, appears a 
superior forecasting strategy.
Finally, chapter four adopts a time-varying VAR perspective to obtain a tentative 
attribution of observed fluctuations of the bilateral real exchange rates between the USA, 
the UK and Italy, to shocks in relative productivity levels and the fiscal position. A 
Kalman filter approach is employed to assess the changing contributions of each of these 
variables, and of shocks to the monetary stance, to the behaviour of real exchange rates 
over the last 130 years. While confirming the relevance of fiscal shocks in triggering 
observed deviations of the exchange rate from PPP, the study finds little evidence in 
favour of persistent productivity effects on the real exchange rate. Moreover, the exchange 
rate regime in place plays a substantial role in determining how shocks aie transmitted to 
the real exchange rate.
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Introduction
1. Motivations
In recent years, the role played by policy institutions has become a centrepiece of 
macroeconomic theory. The literature on the political economy of monetary policymaking 
has repeatedly argued that the strategic interactions between mai'kets and institutions 
strongly affect economic performance and social welfare. Furthermore, changes in the 
institutional settings of monetary policy, like the adoption of fixed exchange rate 
mechanisms and inflation taiget regimes, and the move towards greater central bank 
independence, have been extensively discussed by numerous theoretical contributions.
A first aim of this thesis is to bridge the substantial gap existing between some of 
the theoretical predictions elaborated during this intense debate, and the apparent lack of 
empirical validation that has often accompanied their emergence as normative guidelines 
for policymakers.
For instance, I shall derive and then estimate simple monetary policy rules for 
three groups of central banks: the G-3 economies, four countries that have recently 
adopted inflation targets, and four former ERM economies, now integrated into EMU. For 
the first group, I shall assess whether the observed conduct of monetary policies can be 
defined according to a recently emerged par adigm, whereby short-term interest rates have 
been long set to stabilise inflation expectations, with little, or no, concern for output 
stabilisation. For the second group of economies, I will evaluate whether the adoption of 
inflation targets and the move to greater central bank independence have significantly 
altered the way in which monetary authorities pursue final policy objectives. Finally, I will 
conduct a similar exercise on four EMU countries, to investigate the extent to which the 
existence of external constraints, like the ERM and the well-known fiscal convergence 
criteria, have affected central banks pursuit of domestic policy objectives.
The process of monetary unification in Europe, recently completed with the 
establishment of the European System of Central Banks, appears to raise a number of 
interesting questions. I shall devote the last chapter of this thesis to understanding, from an 
innovative perspective, the extent to which real and monetary shocks determine 
fluctuations in the real exchange rate. If real shocks turn out to have persistent effects on
the real exchange rate, the relative desirability of fixed exchange rate systems and 
monetaiy unions, and of the recent proposal of dollarisation for some developing and 
transition economies, would have to be considered under a different, more critical 
perspective.
Finally, the third chapter will investigate the extent to which information about 
the behaviour of monetary aggregates can be helpful in predicting future inflation in the 
euro ai'ea. In addition, I shall evaluate the relative ability of monetary and “structural” 
models of euro area inflation in predicting future price developments.
Overall, I believe that this empirical research successfully addresses a number of 
relevant methodological issues, and unveils some relevant features concerning the role of 
structural and institutional change in modern macroeconomics. What follows is a brief 
description of the stmcture of the thesis, and of the way in which the single chapters will 
investigate the issues just sketched.
2. Thesis Structure
First Chapter: Interest Rate Rules and Policy Shifts in OECD Economies
In recent years, the theoretical literature on credibility, central bank 
independence, and monetary policy rules has greatly developed. Some genuine effort has 
been produced towards a deeper understanding, inter alia, of the way in which policy 
institutional settings affect economic performance. In addition, many contributions have 
stressed that the effectiveness of monetary policies depends on the way in which 
interactions between policy (and political) institutions and society as a whole are shaped.
The first chapter of the thesis aims at contributing to this (so far) chiefly 
theoretical debate, by providing some empirical evidence about the past effects of 
monetaiy reforms on the conduct of monetary policy. The goal is to study the 
consequences that institutional changes like the introduction of inflation targets, or the 
granting of a more independent status to the central bank, have had on the way in which 
policymakers react to the state of the economy. More in detail, we assume that the 
historical conduct of monetaiy policy in a number of countries can be effectively 
summarised by simple policy mles, which can be generated as a result of conventional 
optimising frameworks. It is further assumed that the behaviour of central banks in several 
OECD countries can be described according to a simple relationship between the policy
instiTiment -usually a call money rate- and expected inflation and a measure of the 
business cycle. We thus check whether the reaction of monetary authorities to the state of 
the economy, as exemplified by such simple relationship, has radically changed during the 
past two decades.
We carry out such investigation by estimating interest rate reaction functions over 
the period 1970-1997, for the G-3 countries, and over 1980-1997 for a group of economies 
that have recently adopted an inflation-targeting framework (New Zealand, Canada, 
United Kingdom, and Sweden). We subsequently assess the stability of estimated 
equations and parameters, having two, closely related, aims. For the former group of 
countries, we want to check whether interest rate policies have undergone significant 
shifts in the past years. In the latter group, whether the introduced policy reforms have had 
any consequence on central banks’ attitude towards inflation and cyclical conditions.
The above rules are usually derived in a context in which the central bank is 
assumed to face a given trade-off between inflation and output variability. It is then 
natural to think of a significant shift in the weight the rule assigns to, say, inflation as 
opposed to output stabilisation, as a change in the policymakers’ -or the public’s- relative 
preferences towards such final objectives. Alternatively, one can imagine such change as 
generated by some relevant institutional reforms, like the ones above mentioned, which 
may have significantly altered the emphasis on inflation control. In either case, structural 
instability displayed by the estimated equation and parameters can be overall interpreted 
as a signal of underlying structural change. Furthermore, the behaviour of estimated 
parameters over time can illustrate the extent to which the relative emphasis placed on 
alternative final objectives has changed during the period under investigation.
The horizons, over which policy mles as ours are estimated, are usually long. 
They span periods in which overall economic change makes models with time-invariant 
policy mles and macroeconomic stmctures not particularly robust. This is why we employ 
an appropriate Kalman filter technique and the Structural Time Series Approach to 
generate the regressors we use in the recursive estimation of our policy mles. That is, we 
assume that agents have limited infoiTnation about macroeconomic variables. In particular, 
we hypothesise that the central bank and the private sector formulate their expectations 
about future inflation and output using only information available up to the time in which 
such expectations are formed. This way, our model allows for a fairly simple but essential
learning process as regards inflation expectations, and for a flexible but not restrictive way 
of characterising central bank’s information about the economy.
The key findings of our exercise can be summarised into two points.
First, although interest rate reaction functions for the G3 appeared overall stable 
over most of the sample we study, significant differences in the estimated parameters 
showed up when the models were re-estimated over a shorter period. In addition, contrary 
to the view according to which an implicit inflation targeting “attitude” can be found in all 
G-3 countries’ observed policy conduct, we found evidence of a much more differentiated 
picture. Overall, it is only since the 1990s that estimated interest rate mles in these 
countries begin to look like the ones some research on inflation-forecast targeting has 
recently illustrated.
Furthermore, we found very little evidence supporting the view that central bank 
independence and the adoption of inflation targets have a substantial impact on central 
banks’ conduct. While some signs of stmctural instability and parameter shift were easily 
detected in our estimated reaction functions, the timing of such changes did not always 
coincide with the announcement and/or the introduction of the reforms. We inteipret this 
as a sign that institutional reforms, in the historical contexts we study, were brought in 
simply to consolidate gains in terms of lower inflation, or simply reflected a possible 
earlier shift in collective preferences towards the relative costs of inflation.
Second Chapter: Interest Rate Rules and Policy Credibility from ERM to EMU
In the same vein as the previous chapter, here we wish to evaluate the path 
followed by monetary policies throughout Europe in the process of monetary convergence 
towards EMU. More in detail, we ask ourselves how the nominal convergence achieved 
amongst the former EMS countries was affected by the presence of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism. In addition, we attempt a broad assessment of the way in which the required 
convergence in budget positions across countries has affected the response of national 
monetary authorities to final domestic objectives.
We thus estimate and evaluate interest rate reaction functions -similarly to what 
we did for the G-3 and inflation-targeting economies- for four key European countries; 
France, Italy, h el and and Belgium. Our estimation sample -1980Q1-1997Q2- covers the
whole period spanned by the EMS. It is then interesting to understand how the 
convergence of national Central Banks’ -or the public’s- preferences towards 
Bundesbank’s anti-inflationary attitude took place. Similarly, given the relevance 
attributed by the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact, to fiscal 
consolidation, we wish to evaluate how such additional constraint affected Member States’ 
macroeconomic conditions on the road to EMU.
We provide some empirical evidence supporting the view that the historical path 
followed by monetary policies in the former Members of EMS to achieve nominal 
convergence with Germany was far from uniform. We show that the process itself bore 
significant shifts to the way in which monetary policy authorities reacted to domestic 
objectives. In addition, we allow our theoretical model to take into account the possibility 
that the credibility of the fiscal stance explicitly affected interest rate policies adopted in 
the EMS countries. With imperfect credibility, an unsustainable fiscal position in principle 
may induce markets to believe that the central bank will need to loosen its anti-inflationaiy 
stance (and, ultimately, the country’s exchange rate commitment) in the future.
If unbalanced fiscal policies were to affect market perception of the probability of 
loose interest rate policies in the future, the optimal policy rule would directly target such 
perception. By consequence, and with reference to the policy rules analysed in the 
preceding chapter, the policy instrument would be explicitly reacting to a measure of the 
exchange rate risk, other than to final output and inflation objectives. The significance of 
the coefficient attached to this measure, proxied by the adjusted spread between long-term 
interest rates, in an estimated interest rate reaction function, would then signal the extent 
to which inflation and output stabilisation were sacrificed in the attempt to stabilise the 
exchange rate within the ERM band. In addition, the evolution of the way in which the 
central banks were reacting to the spread and to other regressors, and an assessment of the 
stability of estimated reaction functions, would illustrate further aspects. For example, it 
would show the extent to which the adoption of a tougher exchange rate commitment 
since late eighties (the “hard ERM”), and the varying commitment of national authorities 
to programs of fiscal consolidation, affected short-teim interest rate determination.
Estimated interest rate reaction functions for the countries in our sample show 
that budget policies had severe effects in further constraining the behaviour of monetary 
authorities. In all countries, monetary policy stances seem to have been often motivated by 
the need to respond to changes in the credibility of the country’s exchange rate position
within the ERM band. Interestingly, during the “hard ERM” phase, in France, Belgium 
and Ireland, the importance of the long yield spread tends to decrease as severe efforts of 
fiscal retrenchment were undertaken. In such countries, the ERM turbulence in 1992-93 
does not appear to have significantly affected interest rate policies, probably thanks to the 
largely achieved macroeconomic stability. On the contrary, for Italy, well-founded 
concerns surrounding its macroeconomic policies at the eve of Stage Three of EMU, 
appear to have severely constrained interest rate determination.
Third Chapter: Assessins the Information Content o f Euro Area Monetary Assreeates
Economic theory suggests that money can play two roles in a monetary policy 
strategy. In standaid inflation-forecast and monetary targeting regimes, the behaviour of 
monetary aggregates can be usefully monitored by the central bank to obtain information 
about future inflation. Monetary authorities adopting money growth as an information 
variable assume that past and cuiTent monetary developments contain useful information 
about current and future price developments.
On the other hand, in standard regimes of monetaiy targeting, the money stock is 
seen to provide for a nominal anchor to the whole economic system, and to inflation 
expectations in particular. Consistently with the view that inflation is, ultimately, a 
monetaiy phenomenon, the announcement of a target for the growth of some broad 
monetary aggregate helps the private sector forming expectations about future nominal 
variables.
It is thus clear that, for a monetary policy strategy aiming at using monetary 
aggregates, either as an inteimediate target (nominal anchor role) or as an information 
variable (leading indicator role), the identification of the statistical properties of the 
money-prices relationships is critical.
Well before the start of Stage Three of the European Monetary Union, a number 
of empirical contributions have then addressed some of the above issues, from a number 
of perspectives. Using aggregate data for the euro area over the period 1980-1998, we 
devote the first part of this chapter to conduct a series of tests on the null hypothesis that 
money does not Granger-cause prices. The study is carried out within the context of a 
cointegrated VAR system. Subsequently, the leading indicator properties of M3 are 
investigated within the so-called Pstar framework. In other words, we try to assess the
information content, and more specifically the predictive power, of the real money gap 
(actual minus equilibrium real money balances), but also of the output gap and a measure 
of the term spread, for future inflation. Finally, we perform a number of forecast 
encompassing tests, aimed at compaiing the predictive ability of our forecasting model 
vis-à-vis that of a model in which developments in the money markets do not play any role 
in forecasting inflation.
The main conclusions of our analysis are as follows. First, there is very little 
empirical evidence against the null of Granger non-causality of M3 aggregates on prices 
for the euro area. Second, our forecasting model shows the existence of a reasonably 
strong positive association between the real money gap and future inflation up to five-six 
quarters ahead. However, the output gap and, to a lesser extent, the real interest rate or the 
term spread, tend to display similai- predictive ability. This is in line with some influential 
recent findings for the US, and allows concluding that standard Pstar models are likely to 
forgo the rich information content of variables other than the real money gap. Finally, 
detailed forecast encompassing tests suggest that information from "monetary" models 
like ours and that from more “structural” models of the euro area should be systematically 
and jointly used to study future price developments.
Fourth Chapter: Time-Vai-yins Perspectives on Real Exchange Rates, Productivity Levels 
and Government Spendins
An extensive body of contributions has clarified that exchange rates do tend to 
deviate from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Although a more decisive disentangling of 
the reasons of such behaviour will need to resort to further advances in econometric 
theory, the main findings of the recent empirical literature on real exchange rates can be 
summarised as follows. First, PPP does appear to hold, but only in the very long run: both 
in its absolute and relative versions, PPP fails to hold. Second, the observed departures of 
the exchange rate from PPP are more persistent than traditional, flexible-price models of 
the exchange rate would predict.
This chapter aims at providing some empirical evidence as to the origins of the 
observed deviations of the exchange rate from PPP. The question of whether PPP holds, 
and the related one about the mean-reverting properties of the nominal exchange rate, yet
deserve exhaustive empirical work, but our focus here is different. With our study, we 
wish to shed some light on the nature of the movements of the real exchange rate.
Thus far, the existing empirical evidence has provided limited support to the idea 
that sustained divergences in government spending and sectoral productivity patterns 
might be at the root of persistent fluctuations of bilateral real exchange rates. Moreover, 
the persistence of deviations of the nominal exchange rate from PPP appears to critically 
depend on the exchange rate regime in place. That is, during periods of floating exchange 
rates, persistent fluctuations of the real exchange rate seem to be more common than under 
fixed exchange rates. Also, maiket distortions -in the fonn of pricing-to-market behaviour 
or similar market segmentation practices- may prevent perfect goods arbitrage, and make 
the dynamics of relative prices diverging from that of nominal exchange rates.
Against this background, we then seek to attribute the observed movements of the 
real exchange rates between the USA, UK, and Italy, to some of the causes above 
summarised. That is, we try a tentative attribution of the shocks to the real exchange rates 
to existing divergences in the fiscal stance, differential productivity levels, and significant 
differences in monetary conditions.
There are two main novelties in our study. First, following some recent advances 
in Bayesian approaches to the estimation of Vector Autoregressions, we employ a time- 
varying methodology. We apply such techniques to estimate an unrestricted VAR 
comprising the bilateral real exchange rate, a measure of productivity differentials, an 
indicator of the relative fiscal stance, and the ratio between real ex-post interest rates in the 
two countries. We then decompose the total residual variance of each VAR equation into 
stochastic contributions attributable to innovations in each endogenous variable. By 
applying a Kalman filter technique to the system’s estimated parameters and variances, we 
decompose the total variance of the real exchange rate equation into contributions that are 
allowed to change over time. The particular state-space representation we adopt for our 
models enables us to impose the least restrictive assumptions on the dynamic structure of 
the system; VAR coefficients are simply assumed to be stationary white noise processes. 
This way, our model is able to pick up the changing influences of the monetary regime, of 
productivity shocks, and the fiscal and monetary stance, on the real exchange rate, over 
time. We further avoid imposing any particularly stringent structure for the identification 
of the shocks, by using Generalised Impulse Responses to examine the dynamic response 
of the real exchange rate to shocks in each of the remaining vaiiables of the system.
The second novelty of this study is represented by the data we use. We apply our 
approach to a long historical set of annual observations spanning the last 130 years and 
obtained from a variety of sources. The bilateral real exchange rates between the USA, 
UK, and Italy are analysed across all international monetary regimes (classical Gold 
Standard, Bretton Woods, the post-1973 floating and the EMS) these countries were 
involved in during the sample period.
The main results we obtain can be summarised as follows. First, we find very 
little evidence in favour of shocks to relative productivity levels as having persistent 
appreciating effects on real exchange rates. Such result, though not valid across all the 
sub-sample estimates we obtain, appears to be overall quite robust. Second, we find some 
stronger evidence in favour of shocks to the relative fiscal position of a country as 
triggering substantial real exchange rate fluctuations. Third, estimates conducted within 
single exchange rate regimes suggest that the response of real exchange rates to shocks in 
the other variables appears to critically depend not just on the international monetary 
arrangements historically in place, but also on demographic and technological factors.
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Forward-Looking Interest Rate Rules and Chapter 1 
M onetary Policy Regim e Changes 
in  OECD Econom ies
'"Every model is an oversimplification. Economies do change over time. Econometric 
equations often fa il subsample stability tests. Econometric problems like simultaneity, 
common trends, and omitted variables are ubiquitous in nonexperimental data. The Lucas 
critique warns us that some parameters may change when policy does. Yet what are we to do 
about these problems? Be skeptical? O f course. Use several methods and models instead of  
just one? Certainly. But abandon all econometric modelling? I think not. The criticisms o f  
macroeconometrics are not wrong, but their importance is often exaggerated and their 
implications misunderstood. These criticisms should be taken as warnings -a s  calls fo r  
caution, humility’, and flexibility o f mind- not as excuses to retreat into econometric nihilism. 
It is foolish to make the best the enemy o f the moderately useful."
Blinder (1998), p. 8,
1. Introduction
In recent years, the theoretical literature on credibility, central bank 
independence, and monetary policy rules has enormously expanded. Some common 
scepticism -not always fully justified- about the stabilisation effects of fiscal policies, has 
often translated into a genuine effort towards a deeper understanding, inter alia, of the 
way the institutional setting of monetary policy affects economic performance. In 
addition, such aim has often coincided with the need to clarify the general idea that the 
effectiveness of economic policies depends on the way interactions between policy (and 
political) institutions and society as a whole aie shaped.
Some of the findings of this burgeoning reseaich have greatly contributed to an 
improved knowledge of both the normative and positive aspects of policy design. In an era 
of important monetary reforms, like the establishment of a single monetaiy authority in 
Europe, the benefits of such efforts are invaluable, and eminently practical\ After having 
stressed the importance of price stability as the dominant goal of monetaiy policy, and of 
central bank independence as a guarantee against sub-optimal policy outcomes (Persson 
and Tabellini, 1999), the attention of the literature (and of central bankers) has recently re­
focused on optimal policy rules. Remarkable effort has been devoted to envisaging the 
optimal solution to the classical policy problem: choosing the conect instmments and time
‘ Although some scholars’ apparent dissatisfaction with the way policy design is actually implemented appears 
emblematic. See Svensson (2000b), for example.
paths to maximise the assumed policy objective function, subject to constraints on the 
economy’s behaviour and policy institutional setting^.
The present study aims at contributing to this (so far) chiefly theoretical debate, 
by providing some empirical evidence about the effects of monetary reforms on the 
conduct of monetary policy. Our goal is to study the consequences that institutional 
changes like the introduction of inflation targets, or the granting of a more independent 
status to the central bank, have had on the way in which policymakers react to the state of 
the economy. More in detail, we assume that the historical conduct of monetary policy in a 
number of countries can be effectively summarised by simple policy rules^, which can be 
generated as a result of more or less articulated optimising frameworks^. We further 
assume that the behaviour of central banks in several OECD countries can be described 
according to a simple relationship between the policy instrument -usually an overnight 
interest rate- and expected inflation and a measure of the business cycle (Clarida, Gali, and 
Gertler, 1998). We thus check whether the way monetary authorities react to the state of 
the economy, as exemplified by such simple relationship, has radically changed during the 
past two decades. In addition, we seek to test whether major events in some countries’ 
recent monetary history, like the introduction of inflation tai'gets and central bank 
independence, have significantly affected authorities’ behaviour. We carry out such 
investigation by estimating interest rate reaction functions over the period 1970-1997, for 
the G-3 countries, and for a group of economies that have recently adopted an inflation- 
tai’geting framework (New Zealand, Canada, United Kingdom, and Sweden). We 
subsequently assess the stability of estimated equations and parameters, having two, 
closely related, aims. In the former group of countries, we want to check whether interest 
rate policies have undergone significant shifts in the past years. In the latter group, 
whether the introduced policy reforms have had any consequence on central banks’ 
attitude towards inflation control and cyclical conditions.
Interest rate policies are in practice complex decisions, relying on a multitude of 
indicators and models (Bank of England, 1999; Vickers, 1999), and by nature related to 
events not always captured by relatively simple econometric models. Nonetheless, there is 
now a wide consensus (Amato and Laubach, 1999; Batini and Haldane, 1999; Peersman 
and Smets, 1999; Geriach and Schnabel, 1999) on the fact that the class of simple policy
’ Taylor (1999) collects a significant number o f the most influential contributions in the area. See also McCallum (1999). 
 ^The prime reference here is Taylor (1993).
See, again, the essays contained in Taylor (1999), and Svensson (1997b)
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mles examined here generates stabilisation properties very close to those displayed by 
optimal feedback mles. It is then reasonable to think that stability analysis conducted on 
estimated forward-looking interest rate rules as the ones we examine, can provide some 
indications about changes that eventually took place in the actual conduct of monetary 
policies.
More precisely, the above rules are usually derived in a context in which the 
central bank is assumed to face a given trade-off between inflation and output variability. 
It is then natural to think of a significant shift in the weight the mle assigns to, say, 
inflation as opposed to output stabilisation, as to a change in the policymakers’ -o r the 
public’s- relative preferences towards those final objectives. Alternatively, one can 
imagine such instabilities as generated by some relevant institutional reforms, like the 
ones above mentioned, which have significantly altered the emphasis on inflation control. 
In either case, stmctural instability displayed by the estimated equation and parameters 
can be overall interpreted as a sign of underlying structural change. Furthermore, the 
behaviour of estimated parameters over time could illustrate the extent to which the 
relative emphasis placed on alternative final objectives has changed during the period 
under investigation. Although the latter task is better undertaken by explicitly assuming 
time-varying DGPs for the model’s parameters -as we do, in a very different context, in 
the final chapter- some interesting evidence could be provided even in a less complex 
context.
There is, however, a serious element of caution to be borne. The horizons over 
which policy rules like ours are estimated, are usually long. They span periods in which 
overall economic change makes models with time-invariant policy rules and 
macroeconomic stmctures not particularly robust. Aside from model and parameter 
uncertainty, and considerations related to Lucas’ critique, one of the dangers of such 
empirical exercises is to forget that alternative exchange rate regimes, financial 
innovation, and changes in the underlying structure of the economy, have fundamental 
influences on policy rules. This is why we employ an appropriate Kalman filter technique 
and the Stmctural Time Series Approach (Hai'vey, 1989; K m  and Nelson, 1999) to 
generate the regressors we use in the recursive estimation of our policy rules. That is, we 
assume that agents have imperfect information about economic variables. In particular, we 
hypothesise that the central bank and the private sector formulate their expectations about 
future inflation and output using only information available up to the time in which such
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expectations are formed. The result is that our model allows for a fairly simple but 
essential learning process as regards inflation expectations, and for a flexible, unrestrictive 
way of characterising central bank’s information about the economy. This is probably why 
our estimates, while broadly confnming findings from previous studies, yield some 
innovative results as regards parameter estimates. In addition, results from sub-sample 
estimation of the same model, and structural stability analysis, tend to confirm that the 
properties of estimated policy rules should be carefully evaluated. That is, substantial 
caution should be adopted when observed policy behaviour is employed as a benchmark 
for optimal policy design.
The key findings of our exercise can be summarised into two points.
First, although interest rate reaction functions for the G3 appeared overall stable 
over most of the sample we study, significant differences in the estimated parameters 
showed up when the models were re-estimated over a shorter period. This was particularly 
evident in the US case. In addition, contrary to the view (Claiida, Gali and Gertler, 1998, 
for example) wherby an implicit inflation targeting “attitude” can be found in all G-3 
countries’ observed policy conduct, we found evidence of a much more differentiated 
picture. Overall, it is only since the 1990s that estimated interest rate rules in these 
countries begin to look like the ones some research on the inflation-forecast targeting 
approach has recently illustrated.
Furthermore, we found very little evidence supporting the view that central bank 
independence and the adoption of inflation targets have substantial impact on central 
banks’ conduct. While some signs of structural instability and paiameter shift were easily 
detected in our estimated reaction functions, the timing of such changes did not always 
coincide with the announcement and/or the introduction of such reforms. Estimated 
interest rate policy rules in Canada and New Zealand, and to a lesser extent in the United 
Kingdom and Sweden, did not display substantial instability in correspondence of such 
changes. We interpret this as a sign that those institutional changes, in the historical 
contexts we study, were brought in simply to consolidate gains in terms of lower inflation, 
or simply reflected a possible prior shift in collective preferences towards the relative 
costs of inflation.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 lays out the simple benchmark 
framework used to derive the optimal policy rule we subsequently estimate. With the help 
of such benchmai'k model, we examine in Section 3 some of the major issues in the recent
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literature on optimal policy rules. In Section 4 we illustrate our results for the US, Japan 
and Germany, highlighting important and, so far, downplayed, differences amongst 
monetary policies in these countries. Section 5 turns to the inflation targeting experiences 
of New Zealand, Canada, United Kingdom and Sweden. In Section 6 we draw some 
conclusions.
2. Forward-Looking Interest Rate Rules in a Simple Benchmark Model
As we mentioned in the Introduction, the seaich for an optimal solution to the 
policy problem has produced an impressive amount of studies. As exhaustive surveys of 
this huge literature are now readily available (Persson and Tabellini, 1999; Clarida, Gali 
and Gertler, 1999; Christiano and Gust, 1999)^, we avoid getting through all single aspects 
of the issue, and focus on major points, with the help of a simplified theoretical model.
The key point of all recent analyses of monetary policy is the assumption that 
some nominal frictions allow interest rate changes to affect real variables in the short run. 
The nominal rigidities postulated by the most recent optimising models for the evaluation 
of monetary policy vary considerably. However, the two main strands attribute such 
frictions to stickiness in price-setting behaviour (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999), or to 
rigidities in the money market (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1997).
Interest rate policy is forced to take adequate account of forecasts about chosen 
final objectives such as inflation and output. The most intuitive reason for this is that 
policy actions affect the final goals only with some lag. First, it is now universally 
accepted that the response of real variables, like output and employment, to a monetary 
impulse materialises with a substantial lag. Second, changes in such variables in turn will 
influence the price level after additional time.
However, these are crucial, but still somehow traditional (Blanchard, 1990; 
Walsh, 1998) aspects of monetary policy evaluation. The real innovation of the recent 
wave of inter-temporal optimising models of interest rate determination is that the 
behaviour of private agents explicitly depends on what they expect about the future course 
of monetary policy. In other words, private sector’s belief about how monetary policy 
operates affects the credibility of the policy stance, and determines the extent to which real
 ^ See also the above mentioned contributions in Taylor (1999).
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and nominal variables will respond to policy impulses. Any technology that enhances 
policy credibility will make inflation and/or output stabilisation closer to the outcome that 
one would obtain in absence of market imperfections.
The latter principle was already cleaiiy established in the pioneering analyses of 
Kydland and Prescott (1977), and Barro and Gordon (1983). What instead recent forward- 
looking policy models have made clear’ (Svensson, 1997b) is that, given the existence of 
the above mentioned lags, and the forward-looking nature of private sector’s behaviour, it 
is optimal for monetary authorities to set policy decisions accordingly. In other words, the 
policy instrument -usually a short-term interest rate- must be set in a way that the forecast 
of the objective variable, conditional on all available information and assuming unchanged 
interest rates, coincides with the policymakers’ target for that variable. Among the first to 
model the credibility problem of monetary policy in the explicitly forward-looking fashion 
we have just sketched, is Svensson (1997b; 2000a). It is then with reference to this 
theoretical set-up that we shall illustrate our simple model.
In recent years, a widely accepted macroeconomic framework has become the 
basis for the majority of monetary policy studies. A relatively broad consensus has 
emerged about the fact that traditional Keynesian macromodels, although extremely 
powerful in generating key findings, were not sufficiently microfounded. A new wave of 
models, in which aggregate relationships were explicitly derived from the optimal 
behaviour of households and firms, thus began to be developed (Walsh, 1998; Rotemberg 
and Woodford, 1999; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999).
The resulting behavioural relationships allow current aggregate values for 
macroeconomic variables to depend, inter alia, on the future course of monetary policies.
For example, let y, and y /  be the current and potential level of output^, and p, the 
price level. The following expectations-augmented Phillips curve can then be derived^ 
from the basic, two-period, household’s optimal consumption problem:
Pf ~Pt-i “ l/t ) [1]
 ^We might have equivalently assumed that y* represents the natural or NAIRU level of output.
 ^ See Bernake, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) or Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for the analytic underpinnings of all 
aggregate relationships, which we do not illustrate.
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In [1], current inflation depends on the inflation expected in the next period, and 
on current output gap^. In turn, the latter is affected by the deviations of the nominal 
interest rate from its expected value, and by a white noise shock:
2/f -  3/( = ~7 (^f [2]
Equation [2] is a standard relationship in the literature (Svensson, 1997b, 2000a). 
In line with a simple aggregate demand-aggregate supply framework, it postulates that a 
positive surprise in the interest rate level negatively affects current output. The Fisher ex 
ante pairty holds, so that
K , ' [3]
where r* is the real interest rate.
Next, we assume that monetary policy objectives involve stabilising, in each 
period, deviations of current inflation and output from respective targets n  and ÿ . One
crucial feature of these models is that the authorities’ target level of output is assumed to 
lie above the natural level (Barro and Gordon, 1983; Cukierman, 1992; Rogoff, 1985; 
Svensson, 1997a). The central bank then has a short-mn incentive to set its policy 
instrument below the level expected by the private sector, in the attempt to push output 
above its market-clearing level. The private sector, in turn, perceives the existence of such 
incentive, and adjusts its expectations accordingly. The classical result is the emergence of 
an inflation bias, which can be partially avoided only in presence of a technology that 
credibly constrains the future policy course.
It should be noted, however, that the existence of an overly ambitious output 
objective of the central bank is not strictly vital for a credibility problem to crop up. 
Substantial gains from commitment to a credible rule can emerge even in the absence of 
such distortionary preferences on the par t of monetary authorities, simply because of the 
forward-looking behaviour of private agents. A clear and credible coimnitment of the 
monetary authority on inflation control makes the overall short-run output/inflation trade-
® The early Calvo (1983) and Rotemberg (1983) models with costly price adjustment yield essentially the same 
implication.
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off faced by monetary authorities more favourable, thus reducing the size of the inflation 
bias^.
More in general, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) show that objectives like those 
sketched above can be derived directly from the minimisation of society’s welfare 
function.
To sum up, we assume with Svensson (2000a) that the central bank attempts to 
minimise interest rate changes, and the departures of the policy instrument from its 
expected value:
The above loss function reflects the fact that, since interest rate changes are a 
costly instrument of stabilisation policy** ,^ shocks ai*e never fully stabilised in the longer 
terra. Svensson (1997a) formalises this principle by assuming that authorities penalise 
deviations of the instrument from zero. In our model, instead, we do hypothesise that the 
policymaker knows the level of the interest rate consistent with the current state of 
expectations, but that he/she decides whether or not to deviate from it whenever some 
shock hits the economy.
In absence of any institutional device aimed at enhancing c red ib ility 'th e  model 
is solved by minimising [4] with respect to the policy instmment R,, subject to [1] and [2]. 
This yields:
R, = Ar - ^ 0  + [5]
where the coefficients are combinations of model parameters as follows:
 ^For more details on this tangential issue, see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), section 4.
See Goodhart (1996) for some justification. See also Goodhart (1999) for further discussions.
“ Friedman and Kuttner (1996) forcefully argue that the substantial inflation fall o f recent years has taken place in the 
absence o f such arrangements in all major OECD economies.
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In line with Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), the system is stable when 
xP(ps > /?2 , which in turn implies that > 1 , and that the expected inflation response to 
the output gap be positive in equation [8 ] below. That is, the reaction function in [5] 
produces a stabilising response of interest rates to inflation movements, as long as the 
coefficient on expected inflation is larger than one. More intuitively, optimal policy entails 
adjusting the nominal interest rate to the extent that the involved change in the real rate 
fully offsets the observed variation in expected inflation. Such condition is fulfilled, as we 
have just seen, when the costs associated with interest rate changes, p2, are not too big. It 
will be important to recall this critical condition when we evaluate the results of our 
estimation.
Similarly, central bank’s concern for direct output stabilisation is captured by the 
coefficient associated with the supply shock, which is usually proxied by the deviations of 
actual output from its potential level.
Finally, the extent to which interest-rate-smoothing considerations affect policy 
decisions is picked up by the last term in [5], and it is directly related to the perceived 
interest rate adjustment costs.
Another important point to note is that the interpretation of [5] as a testable 
reaction function calls for some caution as to the meaning to attribute to the constant term 
K - d p *. In Clarida et al7s (1998) reaction function, this is simply interpreted as the long- 
run component of the real interest rate. In our relationship, which is a very close analogue 
to what estimated in that study, the constant is a function of the real interest rate, but also 
of the inflation target and the inflation bias, as reflected by the difference between central 
bank’s output target and the potential level. This certainly calls for some caution when it 
comes to evaluating estimated parameters derived from alternative assumptions about 
central bank’s preferences.
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Under rational expectations and full information on private sector’s expectations, 
no systematic policy surprises aie possible. That is
[7]
which in turn allows us to calculate equilibrium expected inflation,
(+Ï PiXP(P^-Pi xPcps-p^ R
Pi [8 ]
and equilibrium actual inflation:
Ppi
- R
Xfdcps-p^ 
PPi
+
f-1 ZP(PS-P2
xP(ps~~p^
+
+
[9]
In [8 ] and [9], one can cleaiiy see that the classical Barro-Gordon inflation bias 
can in principle be offset by a suitable choice of the inflation tai'get (Svensson, 1997a).
A further complication of this very basic picture, however, derives from the fact 
that so far we have assumed monetaiy authorities’ preferences as fixed, and perfectly 
known to the private sector. Moreover, the authorities have full information about the state 
of the economy. In such unwarranted case, inflation and interest rates will be stationaiy 
stochastic processes. However, in what follows we allow for imperfect information as to 
central bank’s objectives, and we also assume that the latter’s ability to predict the supply 
shock is limited.
Following Muscatelli (1998, 1999), Faust and Svensson (2000), and Walsh
(1998), we let private sector’s beliefs about central banker’s relative inflation aversion to 
be represented by the a simple updating process:
[10]
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In addition, suppose that the policymaker has imperfect knowledge of the state of 
the economy (the supply shock £•,), that he/she makes inferences on it through a 
forecasting process, and that such forecast, sf, is private infoimation. In each period, then, 
private agents are uncertain as to whether the shock they observe is due to a true supply 
shock, or it simply reflects a shift in policymaker’s preferences Ki (Cukierman, 1992). 
Private sector’s perception of the interest rate rule will thus be different from [5], and will 
be articulated as
+ A i < i + px! + A3&-1 [11]
In [11], the parameters are linear functions of those in equation [5], but now 
has replaced Xu and the supply shock is only the forecast of the one on the right-hand side 
of [5]. The standard signal-extraction problem faced by private agents then translates into 
assuming that agents update their expectations about the business cycle and central 
banker’s preferences each period, by looking at past disturbances’ variances.
This mechanism allows us to conclude that, in the case of a sudden regime 
change, like the introduction of some institutional device aimed at better controlling 
inflation -inflation targets or the granting of an independent status to the central bank- we 
have two possible scenarios. If the new regime is a fully credible one, the adjustment of 
equilibrium inflation and interest rates is immediate. If the reform is instead only paitly 
credible, nominal variables will adjust gradually to the new steady state. Assuming one 
can obtain estimates for the regressors of the above relationship, significant and permanent 
changes of estimated coefficients in [11] could be easily detected. These, along with 
eventual instability of the overall equation in conespondence of major policy shifts, would 
signal either changes in policymakers’ preferences, or the introduction of some 
institutional reforms, or both'^. Clearly, the interpretation of observed shifts in our 
estimated parameters and functions has to be carefully conducted, but in general, major 
and permanent shifts in estimated coefficients can be attributed to parallel changes in 
policy preferences.
To sum up, what we aim to obtain, by studying estimated versions of reaction 
functions like [11], is an assessment of the stability of central bank’s conduct. Of course.
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we do not assume that the latter is fully described by the simple mle above illustrated. 
Although the point is not always made clear in various contributions to the field, we 
acknowledge that in practice central banks respond to a variety of indicators. They do 
gather information about the current state of the economy using a host of economic and 
econometric models (Bank of England, 1999; Vickers, 1999). Nevertheless, we believe 
that estimated versions of the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993; Geriach and Smets, 1999) or of 
our relationship in [ 1 1 ], capture the way in which monetary policies translate in a simple 
rule expressed in terms of expected inflation and output gap. We can clarify the point with 
reference to a concrete example. As is universally known (von Hagen, 1995, 1999; Issing, 
1997), Bundesbank’s announcements of annual money growth targets since 1974, 
provided agents with a reliable corridor for expectations about the future policy course. 
Although such intermediate targets were in reality missed in more than 50% of the cases, 
this did not substantially impair inflation and output stabilisation. Consequently, finding a 
stable reaction function for Germany'^ would amount to vindicate the idea that the overall 
set of operational rules adopted by the Bundesbank was stable over time, and that the 
reliance on intermediate targets did not take place at the expense of achieving the final 
objectives. On one hand, this motivates our subsequent choice (and Claiida.gf a/.’s, 1998) 
of including additional regressors to the baseline specification in [ 1 1 ].
A further possibility of instability in estimated reaction functions crops up for 
those experiences, like the US, the UK, and Canada, where the instability of monetary 
aggregates led to their early demise as an intermediate policy tai’get. Equivalently, we 
argue that in countries (Japan, and again the UK, Canada and Sweden) where links with 
benchmark foreign exchange rates (or pegs) followed a similar fate, it will be likely to 
detect similar instabilities. This is why we shall test whether variables like lagged money 
growth, leading foreign interest rates or exchange rates, significantly enter the policy rule.
What really matters when one evaluates the effectiveness and stability of policy 
rules, is their performance in terms of announced final, not intermediate, objectives. 
Should any of the above indicators enter an estimated reaction function, one would then 
conclude that the role it plays in the policy rule is similar to those played by final inflation 
and output objectives. Again, should we really find, say, a significant role for M3 growth
'■ Of course, a third possibility would be that the observed instability is simply due to changes in the underlying 
behavioural relationships between the variables o f interest. The way in which we calculate the series for expected 
inflation and the output gap, however, takes into account such possibility.
This is the case with our estimates.
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in the estimated interest rate function for Germany'"', we would conclude that the 
stabilisation of money supply in Germany took place at the expense of meeting final 
output and inflation objectives.
The key problem with the estimation of reaction functions like [11] is the 
availability of the unobserved series for expected inflation and potential output, along with 
the identification of some updating mechanisms for all expected variables. Below we 
show that one optimal, though not unique, way of solving this issue is applying the 
Kalman filter to those variables. As we will see in Section 5, some authors have followed 
alternative routes (Clarida et a l, 1998; Geriach and Smets, 1999; Favero and Rovelli,
1999). Before turning to better explain the way in which we tackled the issue, we now 
proceed to a brief discussion of the recent literature on monetary policy rules, trying to 
isolate specific empirical aspects still to be investigated.
3. Estimating Interest Rate Reaction Functions: Existing Theory and Evidence, and 
the Way Forward
3,1 Forecast-Based Monetary Policy Rules
The stabilising and welfare properties of interest rate rules, and of monetary 
policy mles more in general, have been extensively investigated in recent years. This 
surge of interest is certainly related to the experience of many countries that have chosen 
to employ inflation targets in their monetary policy strategy. As in the majority of OECD 
economies, in such countries the monetai'y authority is charged with achieving and 
maintaining price stability. In inflation targeting regimes only, the latter is explicitly 
defined in teims of a numerical objective for annual inflation. While there is no equivalent 
provision for an output target, it is widely believed that if the bank attempts to hit the 
announced inflation target on a period-by-period basis, the consequent instrument 
fluctuations would invariably involve substantial losses in terms of output variability 
(Goodhart, 1996, 1999).
Most theoretical contributions (Svensson 1997b; Amato and Laubach, 1999; 
Goodhart, 1999; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999; Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999) have
This was not the case with our estimates. Indeed, we conclude below that, in line with what found by Bernanke and 
Mihov (1997), and Clarida and Gertler (1997), Germany appears to be, at least on an implicit basis, an expected inflation 
targeting regime.
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then made clear two points. First, the forward-looking nature of private agents’ behaviour 
is such that welfare is in general maximised by stabilising Ûiq forecast of inflation around 
the appropriately chosen target, at some horizon. Second, central banks can rein in actual 
inflation by adjusting interest rates in order to stabilise those forecast: in so doing they can 
lessen output variability. In other words, interest rates must be set, in practice, to minimise 
the departures of forecast inflation at a specific horizon from the assumed target value.
The policy problem is thus partly relocated. What becomes now crucial is:
a) the choice of indicators used to formulate inflation forecasts;
b) the appropriate choice of the inflation target -whether a point, a corridor, an 
asymmetric range, and the price index on which it is defined; and
c) the horizon over which the forecast is stabilised around the target level.
The role of indicator variables for monetary policy forecasting is somehow 
studied in Chapter 3 (see also Geriach and Svensson, 1999, and Svensson and Woodford,
2000). Moreover, the issues surrounding the choice of the optimal inflation target are not 
the focus of our present investigation (see IMF (1999) for a good survey).
The European Central Bank’s monetary policy strategy explicitly ai'gues that the 
objective of price stability is to be pursued over a medium horizon (ECB, 1999). This is a 
clear recognition of the fact that attempting to hit an inflation target on a period-by-period 
basis would involve significant output losses. Of course, ECB’s (as well as US’ and 
Japan’s) policy strategy does not involve an explicit inflation-forecast approach à la 
Svensson (1997a, b)'^. However, forward-looking rules like the ones derived in the 
previous section and discussed here are quasi-optimal tools, whose validity readily 
extends to whatever institutional setting is in place (Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999; 
Bernanke et al., 1999; Batini and Haldane, 1999; Amato and Laubach, 1999; Faust and 
Svensson, 2000).
Following Batini and Haldane (1999) and Svensson (1997b), the most studied 
form of inflation-forecast interest rate rule is
See also Muscatelli (1999), Walsh (1998), and the critical remarks on ECB strategy contained in Dombusch, Favero 
and Giavazzi, (1998) and Svensson (2000b).
24
18:1
1
K; = r* -//o  [14]
can then be amended to obtain something akin to [13]. In particular, by including 
a longer lead for expected inflation, a longer lag for the interest-rate smoothing term, and 
substituting the output gap for the forecast supply shock / ,  one obtains a reaction function 
defined in terms of the policy instrument. Indeed, what we shall estimate is the following:
~}/t) [15]r=l
We estimated the above relation using simple Recursive Least Squaies. This 
seemed to comply with the need of simplifying the statistical burden of our exercise, while
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where r, is the short-term ex-ante real interest rate, r, represents its long-run 
equilibrium value, and Et/Ut+j indicates the y-period ahead inflation rate expected in time t. |
“'s:'The presence of lagged terms of the real interest rate accounts for the observed 
interest-rate smoothing behaviour of many central banks. It also allows for the possibility 
that interest rate changes might be postponed to avoid undesired disruption of the current à
level of economic activity (Batini and Haldane, 1999). The latter argument implies also 
that the presence of an output gap teim in [ 1 2 ] might not be strictly necessary to account 
for authorities’ attention towards output stabilisation. By tuning the degree of interest-rate 
smoothing and the lead in the inflation forecast, the bank can easily trade off output 
volatility for inflation volatility.
Eq. [12] can be trivially re-parameterised in terms of the nominal short-term 
interest rate;
+ + [13]
where now 7 7  = 1  + / ,  while the constant a  includes both the long-run real 
interest rate and the persistence of the inflation forecast. The simple theoretical policy rule 
derived in Section 2 ,
still providing effective means of testing the various issues at stake. An obvious 
alternative would have been using Full Information Maximum Likelihood techniques'^. 
We did run some explicit FIML estimation’^ , but the results we obtained were not 
substantially different, in nature, from those below illustrated. Our results tend to show 
that a maximum length k ~ 2  is sufficient to pick up the extent to which all central banks 
included in our study smooth interest rate. After having estimated a baseline specification 
of [15], we searched for the appropriate lead j  for the inflation forecast, using conventional 
goodness-of-fit criteria. In other words, after estimating our baseline relationship with 
/ = 4 , we attempted with alternative lead lengths, selecting for our final specification the
one best performing in terms of R-squared, regression standard errors, residuals’ stability, 
etc.
The specification above then allows us to empirically evaluate many of the issues 
the literature on optimal forecast-based policy rules has introduced. The estimated weight 
the central bank places on the expected inflation, and the lead-length of such term 
reveal: a) the degree of aggression with which the bank reacts to changes in the
inflation forecast, and b) the extent of “forward-lookingness” of bank’s behaviour. The 
parameters {j ,k,(p)  in turn capture the overall degree of inertia in interest rate policy.
Finally, a significant value for X would reflect bank’s concern over output, over and 
beyond the one showed, for the reasons earlier illustrated, by the combination of interest- 
rate smoothing terms and lead/lag parameters'^.
We found that the reaction lead to expected inflation was, in most cases, four 
quarters, but in other instances this turned out to be between two and four quarters. Batini 
and Haldane’s (1999) dynamic simulations on a calibrated model of a small open 
economy show that the optimum lead length should be between three and six quarters. 
Amato and Laubach’s (1999) similar attempt for the US economy find the optimum lead 
to be between five and eight quarters, but their basic interest rate rule involves no output 
stabilisation at the outset. Finally, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) examine the 
performance of alternative policy rules on a small simulated model of the US economy, 
finding a broad support for forecast-based rules like [15].
In addition to that, we detected a substantial amount of interest policy inertia in 
all the countries we examine, as lags of the dependent variable are always found
This point was kindly raised by R. MacDonald and S. Wren-Lewis.
Results are not shown here for sake of simplicity, but are available from the author upon request.
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significant. This too broadly agrees with Batini and Haldane’s findings. This agrees with 
Woodford (1999), who argues that in presence of a zero lower bound on nominal interest 
rates and positive costs of inflation, a central bank’s commitment to persistent interest-rate 
changes enhances social welfare.
Finally, as we have already mentioned, we explicitly tested for the possibility that 
the central bank might have responded to changes in intermediate objectives not included 
in our baseline specification [15]. The targeting of those additional variables is not the 
result of the fact that they provide information about future inflation and real activity. 
Such information is already contained in the estimated measures of expected inflation and 
potential output. In practice, changes in the policy instrument might instead be triggered 
by the desire to maintain fluctuations of the exchange rate vis-à-vis major trade partners 
within limited bounds, preventing excessive growth of domestic credit and liquidity 
aggregates, or shadowing the behaviour of some leading international interest rate. 
Cleaiiy, as changes in such variables are often collinear with those in expected inflation, 
we would expect the addition of these regressors to lower the size of the estimated 
coefficient on expected inflation.-
We now turn to discussing the existing empirical evidence on interest rate rules in 
OECD countries.
3,2 Monetary Policy Rules in OECD Countries
The extensive literature on monetary policy rules has faced a relatively hard task 
when it came to envisaging testable models of its main hypotheses. This is probably 
because there are natural limits in relating the theoretical implications of contributions on 
central bank independence and credibility -laigely of game-theoretic nature- to some 
empirical characterisation of policy behaviour. In fact, the first attempts to tackle this 
problem and translate some of the theoretical results of the political economy of 
macroeconomics (see Persson and Tabellini, 1999) into empirically testable propositions, 
produced relatively unappealing cross-sectional studies. Most often, these investigated the 
impact of institutions such as central bank independence and accountability on
Batini and Haldane (1999) extensively elaborate on this point.
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macroeconomic performance (Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991; Cukierman, 1992; 
Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996).
Subsequently, it became clear that the evaluation of observed monetary policy 
behaviour needed at the outset a clearer understanding of the various transmission 
channels of monetar y impulses (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). Following the identification 
of alternative measures to disentangle such channels, this empirical literature expanded 
along different lines.
First, many contributions have used Structural Vector Autoregressions to study 
the impact of alternative macroeconomic indicators on the policy stance, and the way in 
which policy impulses affect prices and the level of economic activity. This approach 
allows one to jointly model both the endogenous policy response and the effects it has on 
relevant macroeconomic variables, requiring relatively modest assumptions about the 
transmission mechanism. In this sense, Christiano et al. (1994), Bernanke and Mihov 
(1997, 1998), and Clarida and Gertler (1997) strongly contributed to refine such 
approach*^. They in particular led to identify the monetary policy instruments in the US 
and Germany, over different samples, and using alternative orthogonalising structures for 
the fundamental macroeconomic shocks. Their methodology has become widespread, and 
its recent application to aggregate data for the euro area (Vlaai' and Schuberth, 1999; 
Coenen and Vega, 1999; Tristani and Monticelli, 1999), testifies the flexibility of such 
approach in contexts of intense policy changes.
A subsequent strand in this broad approach used high-frequency, forward-looking 
data from financial markets to construct measures of unexpected shocks to monetary 
policy. Amongst these attempts, we signal Rudebusch (1995, 1996), and Bagliano and 
Favero (1999). The latter, in particular, derives exogenous measures of those shocks both 
in close- and open-economy contexts, and finds interesting evidence of simultaneity 
between German interest rates and the US dollar/German mark exchange rate.
A further recent study is by Favero and Rovelli (1999). In it, a model of the US 
economy , is estimated over the period 1960-1998. The output gap is first defined through 
a VAR specification, and inflation and a commodity price index are employed. In 
addition, the authors use GMM methods to estimate, over the period 1983-1998, an 
interest rate rule which allows to identify central bank’s trade-off between output and 
inflation. Their approach requires full information, rational expectations, and invaiiance of
See also Canova and de N icolo’ (1998).
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the structural model to changes of the monetary policy regime. The results are in favour of 
the common belief (Clarida et al., 1998) whereby since 1982 the Fed acted as a strict, 
though implicit, inflation taigeter. This in turn rejects the hypothesis that the output gap is 
an independent argument in the policy reaction function^^.
There are two main problems with all VAR-based analyses of policy rules, 
though. First, the results seem to critically depend on the assumptions made about the 
transmission of shocks. Furthermore, once such identification restrictions are imposed, the 
estimation usually assumes a time-invariant structure for both the transmission process 
and the estimated policy reaction to economic shocks^'. Second, as acknowledged, inter 
alia, by Christiano (1998) and Cochrane (1998), the interpretation of identified shocks and 
VAR estimated coefficients is particularly problematic in the case of policy rules. While 
VARs are ideal instruments to construct measures of monetary policy shocks for analyses 
of the transmission mechanism^^ (see also Geriach and Smets, 1995), these models aie 
much less useful when it comes to evaluating regime changes in the conduct of interest 
rate policy^^. In periods of sustained financial innovation and structural change, the timing 
of the policy response and the transmission channels themselves are crucially affected. If 
the actual policy rule is of a forward-looking nature, as we proved is likely to be, the 
estimated coefficients of a VAR become of difficult interpretation. In addition, traditional 
VAR-estimated policy mles cannot easily become subject of structural change analysis, 
which is in turn crucial to investigate the eventual presence of policy shifts. The 
development of Bayesian and time-varying approaches to the estimation of vector 
autoregressions appears a much more promising avenue of research, and some resear ch on 
their applications to the study of the transmission of monetary policy shocks is well under­
way.
Given these apparent caveats, it is no surprise that the latest strand of this 
literature has tried to deal with the issue from a single-equation, rather than from a system 
perspective (McNees, 1992, Groeneveld et al., 1996; Muscatelli and Tirelli, 1996; Clarida 
and Gertler, 1997, Clarida et al., 1998; Peersman and Smets, 1999; Geriach and Smets, 
1999; Geriach and Schnabel, 1999).
™ As we shall see below, our results stand in sharp contrast with this.
A similar severe drawback affects the interesting analysis in Broadbent and Barro (1997).
■" For some cautionary views, however, see Rudebusch (1996), Bagliano and Favero (1998) Christiano et al. (1998).
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) wisely acknowledge how this point readily extends well beyond the limits of VAR- 
estimated policy functions.
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In early studies, a key question was to devise ways of testing whether the 
adoption of inflation targets in countries like New Zealand, Canada, the UK and others, 
have had any significant effect on the overall credibility of the policy stance, or on 
economic performance. In general, results were not particularly supportive of a positive 
answer to such question, at least using data for the initial years of inflation targeting 
experiences (Freeman and Willis, 1995; Groeneveld et al., 1996; Almeida and Goodhart,
1996). More recently, the focus of many studies has shifted towards testing the ability of 
simple interest rate rules to describe actual policy behaviour (Peersman and Smets, 1999). 
Geriach and Scnhabel (1999), for example, find that a simple Taylor rule expressed in 
terms of aggregate average output gaps and inflation explains quite well the behaviour of 
average interest rates in EMU countries in 1990-98.
Clarida and Gertler (1997) estimate a reaction function for Bundesbank’s short­
term interest rate instrument, finding no apparent role for the growth of M3 in a simple 
mle expressed in terms of output and inflation objectives. Their approach is particularly 
interesting, because it represented the first explicit attempt allowing for a forward-looking 
behaviour on the part of the central bank, in so departing from conventional Taylor rules 
expressed in terms of lagged inflation^"'. Their overall conclusion is that Bundesbank’s and 
Fed policies can be characterised as following a reasonably similar pattern.
Finally, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) generalised the above approach, by 
estimating interest rate reaction functions for the G7 countries over 1980-1997, and 
innovating the measures of expected inflation and potential output used in Clarida and 
Gertler (1997). Their most general result, rapidly become a central tenet of the empirical 
literature, argues that the early 1980s marked a peculiar watershed in the conduct of 
policies in all those countries. Since then central banks appear to have turned invariably 
more aggressive in the use of interest rate changes in response to changes in expected 
inflation. More in detail, in a number of eases, and most crucially, in the US, monetary 
policy appears to have become gradually closer to a standard, though implicit, inflation 
targeting regime, in which output stabilisation concerns do not trigger systematic policy 
responses. In support to this argument, Favero and Rovelli (1999) claim that a significant 
output effect in an estimated reaction function might simply reveal that the central bank 
employs the current output gap as an indicator for future expected inflation. However, 
should this be the case, the output gap should be collinear with the adopted measure of
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expected inflation, or it should be able to anticipate inflation forecast errors. We were 
unable to find substantial collinearities between our measures of inflation and output gap 
(discussed below). In addition, the correlation with inflation forecast errors appears very 
limited and often has the wrong sign^^.
Quite clearly (see also Geriach and Smets, 1999), in all policy analyses conducted 
within the framework of simple interest rate mles like our eq. [15]^^, the results found 
critically depend on three factors. These are a) the methods used to identify measures of 
expected inflation and the output gap, b) the estimation techniques used to estimate the 
reaction function and to test them for structural breaks, c) the sample covered by such 
estimates. Since we believe that these issues radically affect the quality and inteipretability 
of our results, we shall now devote some attention to illustrating and discussing the route 
followed in the present study.
3,3 Estimating Interest Rate Rules: Robustness Issues
It is now customary to assume that, since the end of Volcker’s 1979-1982 
experiment, the growth of monetary base does not represent an adequate measure of the 
policy stance (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998; Christiano et al., 1994, 1998). This is true not 
just in the US, as Bernanke and Mihov (1997) and Clarida and Gertler (1997) have shown. 
Even when explicit money supply targets (reference values) are announced, as in 
Bundesbank’s (ECB’s) case (see chapter 3), central banks tend to react to changes in their 
final and intermediate objectives by eventually adjusting the price at which bank reserves 
are supplied to the interbank market. More in detail, while it is still controversial whether 
the policy stance can in all cases be characterised by the behaviour of a single interest rate 
instmment, the empirical literature almost universally agrees on the use of money market 
rates.
Throughout the last decade, monetary authorities have gradually increased the 
emphasis placed on repurchase operations, and correspondingly marginalised the 
traditional operations of discount window lending. Clearly, movements in money market 
rates are not exclusively triggered by policy actions, as demand conditions have some role
Clarida and Gertler (1997) employed for expected infiation and potential output forecasts from a previously estimated 
VAR model o f the German economy.
These results are not shown here for reasons o f brevity, but are available from the author upon request.
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in determining short-run fluctuations in overnight rates like call money rates. Since mid- 
1980s, the operating procedures of the major central banks are such that shocks to demand 
for bank reserves are not entirely accomodated by monetary authorities, and thus trigger 
movements in the price of non-borrowed reserves. However, central banks’s control over 
short-term money market rates critically depends on the signalling function exercised by 
various policy decisions, and these have usually greater impact at the shortest end of the 
term structure. Many recent attempts to empirically characterise reaction functions for 
monetary policy (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998) use short-term money market rates as 
the policy instrument. We follow such route, and the exact choice of the interest rate for 
each country is briefly motivated in the Data Appendix. Our use of quarterly 
observations^^ should also represent a relatively safe way of filtering noisy short-run 
movements in call money rates, as at this frequency rates’ movements should largely 
reflect authorities’ policy stance.
Apart from the above dilemmas, the key assumption of any attempt to estimate 
simple monetary policy rules is the way in which the empirical model handles inflation 
expectations and central bank’s information set. As we have seen, Favero and Rovelli
(1999) results build on general assumptions of full information, rational expectations, and 
invariance of the structural model to changes in the monetaiy policy regime. In turn 
Clarida et al. (1998) employ a quadratic trend to obtain a measure of the output gap. As 
regards inflation expectations, the authors adopt an errors-in-vaiiables approach to 
modelling rational expectations: future actual values are used as regressors instead of the 
expected values, and instrumental variable estimation is applied to account for the 
presence of forecast errors. Clearly, these choices, along with the fact that the reaction 
functions are estimated over a fixed sample, with no account for possible regime breaks 
and/or eventual structural changes, are stringent. In particular, they amount to assuming 
that:
a) Authorities, when producing forecasts of the level of economic activity, ai*e 
fully informed about future output’s DGF.
b) There is no scope for a leaining process by policymakers about changes in the 
economic system, and by private agents about central bank’s preferences. By 
consequence,
Not necessarily, though, within the class o f Taylor rules.
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c) There is a time-invariant monetary policy regime throughout the sample.
Finally, our aim is to cover periods -the eighties and nineties- during which both 
institutional and structural change, despite the assumptions held by previous analyses of 
monetary policy, was sustained. In particular’, following Stock and Watson (1999), we 
suspect that the inflation and output processes in all the countries we study have 
undergone significant structural breaks. We thus decided to explicitly test for such belief: 
its empirical validation would yet again confirm the need for a limited information 
approach to our problem.
There is now a wide range of technical contributions devoted to study trend 
breaks in unit roots and the problems associated with the endogeneity of break points^^. 
Here we limit ourselves to study whether output and inflation DGPs have undergone 
major shifts over our sample period, and leave aside the determination of the exact number 
and position of the break points. We employ the class of tests devised in Hansen (1992b), 
and Andrews and Ploberger (1994). They all belong to the broad category of Chow-type 
tests with unknown break point(s), and build upon the assessment of the significance of 
the value of the LR, Wald and LM statistics derived from recursive switching regressions. 
We use the MeanF, Sup F and the Lc variants advocated by Hansen (1992b). The first two 
tests have parameter constancy as their null against the alternative of sudden breaks, 
whereas the latter statistic is for the alternative of a smooth change. In our case, the testing 
strategy requires prior estimation of univariate models for output and inflation. We adopt 
simple autoregressive specifications including trends and constants when required, and the 
semiparametric, fully modified FM estimator of Phillips and Hansen (1990) and Hansen 
(1992a). The latter is a two-step methodology that first estimates the asymptotic 
covai’iance matrix of the system, and then provides regression parameters'^^. Tests on the 
null of parameter stability are finally canied out' '^'.
The test statistics are reported in Table 1 for all the countries we examine. In the 
case of inflation, the sample covers the years 197IQ3-I997Q4, whereas for GDP some 
data constraints for Sweden and New Zealand substantially shortened the sample we used. 
The first column of each section displays the estimated statistic for the three tests. As
Clarida et al. (1998), instead, employ monthly data.
For an extensive account o f this debate, see Stock (1994).
Additional details on the testing procedure, as well as on the results we summarise here, can be obtained from the 
author upon request.
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regards output, stability is rejected at conventional significance levels in all countries but 
Japan. In the case of inflation, the results aie even more clear-cut, with all countries 
displaying instability at very low signifieance levels. These estimates are robust to 
changes in the kernel and bandwidth parameter chosen to filter the residuals, as well as to 
alternative functional forms for the specified models.
The above results strongly support the need for a modelling approach that allows 
unobservables to be estimated according to some time-varying pattern. We thus decided to 
explicitly rely on the assumption that the private sector is imperfectly informed about the 
central bank preferences, and that the central bank is imperfectly informed about the 
permanent and cyclical components of output growth (see Orphanides, 2000). Both points 
seem more in line with a forward-looking view of the interactions between policymakers 
and private agents, while taking into aceount the limited information available to central 
banks about the working of the economic system (Blinder, 1998).
The Kalman filter and Structural Time Series techniques (STS, Harvey, 1989) we 
employ for generating the neeessary measures of expected inflation and potential output, 
represent a natural tool to take into aecount the limited infoimation and time-vaiying 
nature of the policy process.
As regards potential output and aside from the above considerations, standard 
filtering techniques like Hodrick-Prescott or Baxter-King aie usually associated with 
several drawbacks. In the former especially, the choice of the trend-smoothing parameter 
depends on the vaiiance ratio of the shocks to all stochastic components, and it is then 
highly sample-dependent, other than relatively arbitrary. An interesting approach is 
undertaken in Geriach and Smets (1999), who study the behaviour of output gaps in the 
EMU area using an unobservable-component method. Their model is however pretty 
complex, and would certainly bear substantial costs in terms of the subsequent estimation 
of reaction functions. We do however believe that Geriach and Smets’ (1999) techniques 
are broadly in line with the STS approach that we use (Hamilton, 1994; Maddala and Kim, 
1998; Kim and Nelson, 1999).
There are various advantages in using such methods. First, they provide a simple 
way of decomposing the series we observe into trend and cyclical stochastic components, 
which is particularly convenient when estimating unobservables like potential output and 
expected inflation. Second, STS models are parsimonious models that however have
Estimates were conducted by adapting a GAUSS code kindly provided by Bruce Hansen. Hansen (1992b) tabulates
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peculiarly rich ARIMA processes as their reduced forms (Harvey, 1989). Finally, this 
modelling approach (see also chapter 4) is implemented by applying a Kalman filter 
algorithm, which is a pretty natural way of accounting for a gradual learning process by 
policymakers and private agents.
The way in which we obtained measures of the two unobservables for each 
country is as follows. We estimated quarterly models for real GDP and inflation for each 
country, obtaining a decomposition of the series into trend, cycle, and irregulai* 
components.^' In the case of GDP, a convenient decomposition of the series was generated 
by applying the Kalman filter on the trend component. The latter was then computed 
based on one-step-ahead predictions of the state vector. This way, estimates of potential 
output are based only on past information, rather than on the full sample.
In the case of inflation, we simply computed one-step-ahead prediction errors 
from a univariate STS model to obtain a measure of expected and unanticipated inflation. 
This way, model’s parameters are updated only gradually, as new information become 
available. The use of the basic filter, as opposed to the smoothing algorithm (Kim and 
Nelson, 1999), guarantees that future observations never affect the calculation of the 
stochastic components.
Formally, the general class models we estimate is the following:
Z, = Tf +67^  + [16]
where Zf is either inflation or output, r and co are the trend and cyclical 
components, and g is a random shock. In turn, the trend component is specified as
T, -  r^_i+Sf_^ +
[17]
where r  represents the actual value of the trend and 5  ^its gradient.
In addition, both real GDP and inflation contained marked cyclical, non-seasonal 
components. We modelled these by estimating the series with one or two stochastic
asymptotic critical values for each o f the tests performed here.
The STAMP 5.0 software was used to estimate the STS models, through the conventional concentrated diffuse 
likelihood technique. Output and inflation were found to be 1(1), and to have significant cyclical components. For a 
similar approach to forecasting inflation in the presence o f potential structural breaks, see Stock and Watson (1999).
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cycles, as appropriate. These stochastic cycles are defined recursively as follows (Harvey, 
1989):
COS A, s i n  A^ ' K '
- s i n  A^  cosA ^
+
7 /
[18]
where Ac, 0<A^<; r i s  the frequency, in radians, the ks aie white noise
uncorrelated shocks, and /? is a damping factor.
In our case, we assumed the slope of the trends as following a stationary, first- 
order autoregressive process^^.
To see whether our models could be improved by extending the information set, 
we tried also multivariate STS specifications for the two processes. In the case of GDP, 
additional regressors did not provide a better fit than our univariate specifications. In the 
case of inflation, we examined whether lagged values of variables such as the exchange 
rate, output growth, short-run interest rates and the money supply could help to forecast 
future inflation. In all cases, the benefits of extending the models seemed to be quite 
modest. In part, this is due to the fact that the univariate representations are more 
parsimonious, while a detailed ad hoc specification search would have not led to 
dramatically different measures of expected inflation.
Figure 1 compar es our measure of the output gap with that obtained from a H-P 
filtering procedure for the USA^^. It shows that our measure differs markedly from that 
used in previous studies, and indeed that quadratic or H-P trending procedures tend to 
exaggerate the cyclical component.
Figures 2 and 3 plot our measures of (4-quarter ahead) expected inflation and 
implied ex ante real interest rates for the G-3 countries and the four inflation targeting 
economies, respectively.
We now finally turn to the illustration of our empirical findings. The reaction 
function in equation [15] is estimated for each country using simple Recursive Least 
Squares'^"'. Recursive estimates are particularly useful when, as in the present case, one
I.e., the trends were specified according to a “stochastic level, damped slope” formulation, which however did not 
yield substantial differences relative to the “fixed level, stochastic slope” case.
”  Plots o f the output gaps and expected inflation for all other countries in our sample are not presented here for space 
reasons, but are available upon request. Our estimates correspond well with descriptive accounts o f macroeconomic 
conditions in the countries under consideration. Fitting a quadratic trend, as in Clarida et al. (1998) produces a even 
more marked cyclical pattern than the H-P measure depicted in Figure 1.
Estimated coefficients are obtained computed with a GAUSS code. Stability tests are conducted using PcGive 9.1.
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needs to observe how estimated coefficients evolve over time. Moreover, we perform 
conventional structural-stability tests on the residuals of each equation, to capture possible 
signs of breaks.
We estimate the quaiterly models for the G-3 economies over samples starting in 
1970 and ending in 1997. Next, sub-sample estimates are computed, to assess whether and 
how results are affected by the dominance of particular events or regimes over specific 
periods. We do the same for the four inflation-targeting economies we chose, but in their 
case, the available output and interest rate data do not go further back than early 1980s.
The data we use are quarterly observations taken from OECD Main Economic 
Indicators and IMF International Financial Statistics, as described in the Data Appendix.
The next two sections describe our major results for each of the two groups of 
countries, starting first with the G-3 economies.
4. Monetary Policies in USA, Japan and Germany: Results from Estimated Interest 
Rate Reaction Functions
According to narrative accounts, monetary institutions in the G-3 (the U.S., 
Germany and Japan) have been remai'kably stable during the sample period. In particular, 
the relationships between political systems and monetary institutions have not undergone 
significant changes, if one excludes from this definition the German re-unification^^. As is 
well known, in the U.S. and Germany the central bank enjoys a relatively high degree of 
independence (see Cukierman 1992; Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996) and is best defined as a 
“goal independent” central bank^®, that is, a bank which is not held accountable for 
achieving a certain policy target.
Figure 2 shows that 1979 was clearly a turning point for US monetary policy, as 
real rates tend to become positive only after that date. Closer to our days, monetary policy 
during the Greenspan era has been defined as “pre-emptive monetary policy without an 
explicit nominal anchor” (Mishkin, 1997).
In the views of some scholars, German monetary policy over the eighties and 
nineties appears as a regime of “disciplined discretion” (Laubach and Posen, 1997). In
Since 1979, EMS membership might have constrained the Bundesbank’s ability to retain control o f monetary policy. 
Most discussions on the DM’s role in the EMS have concluded that the Bundesbank largely retained its independence 
(see Fratianni and von Hagen, 1990; von Hagen, 1999).
See Fischer (1995) For instance, Neumann (1996) and Clarida and Gertler (1997) argue that, while the Bundesbank 
was pursuing multiple objectives, it retained considerable flexibility as to how to achieve them, in the sense that 
emphasis sometimes shifted from one policy target to another. For a similar view see Mishkin and Posen (1997). For a 
contrasting view, stressing continuity in the Bundesbank’s use o f monetary targets, see Issing (1997).
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fact, the mid-eighties witnessed a period of generally restrictive policies, and this was 
partly due to the great variability of the exchange rate with the dollar, and to shifts in the 
terms of trade. German re-unification also created a major challenge, as the Bundesbank 
engineered a rapid increase of real interest rates in an effort to control inflation.
The overall picture for Japan is somehow less clear-cut, as financial instability 
and shai'p exchange rate fluctuations influenced interest rate management in opposite 
directions. Despite this, the picture we obtain from the estimation of its reaction function 
does yield results in line with some previous findings (Chinn and Dooley, 1997).
Results for these three countries are reported in Tables 2-4. For ease of 
exposition, we list for each country only the long-run static solutions of the model, as each 
regression contains one or two lags of the dependent variable. Asymptotic standard errors 
are reported below each estimated coefficient, and summaiy statistics of the regressions 
ar e included.
When we estimate the USA reaction function over the whole sample period 
(Table 2), we find that the coefficient on expected inflation is not significantly larger than 
one, and detect a coefficient associated to the output gap overall not very significant. 
Diagnostics tests and recursive graphs"^  ^show marked instability before 1985, culminating 
in 1979-1982’s experiment of monetary base targeting, which involved greater instability 
in money mai'ket rates. Since then, the Fed has opted for the targeting of money market 
(federal funds) rates. Goodfriend (1995), Bernanke et a l  (1999), Claiida et al. (1998), and 
many others ai'gue that this parenthesis also marked Fed’s change of attitude towai'ds the 
appropriate degree of aggression on inflation expectations.
When re-estimated over the post-1980 sample, the US reaction function confirms 
that some important changes did indeed take place. Plots of the recursively estimated 
(long-mn) coefficients and error bands are shown in Figure 4^ ,^ along with 1-step up and 
N-step down Chow tests for structural stability. Interest rates now seem to react to 
inflation expectations on a shorter horizon (a 2 -quarter horizon is found to work best post- 
1985) and with a larger coefficient than over the whole sample. These results are at odds 
with those obtained by Clarida et al. (1998)^^, as they detect an estimated coefficient on 
inflation that is much greater than one. The most likely explanation for this difference
Here shown only for a shorter sample.
These were computed using the author’s GAUSS routine and plotted using GiveWin 9.1.
Mehra (1997) estimates a somewhat atheoretical reaction function, where the Fed funds rate follows an error 
correction process and responds to the output cycle and to the interest rate on long term treasury bills. We added the 
latter variable to our equation, but could not find any significant effect.
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seems to lie in their fixed sample period, as we found that the size of our estimated 
inflation coefficient depends critically on the sample we choose. In fact, the picture 
changes again when we focus on the post-1985 sample. The equation is very stable, and 
includes a coefficient on expected inflation with a point estimate greater than unity 
(although it is not significantly larger than 1). The post-1985 reaction function seems to 
suggest that the Fed was adjusting real rates to follow the output cycle, with Figure 4 
showing a significant output gap effect by 1992. One might argue that having successfully 
clamped on inflation expectations since mid-eighties, the Fed exploited its reputation to 
implement countercyclical policies. Furthermore, the theoretical model discussed above 
suggests that in a full information context, that is, when the private sector has learned 
about the bank preferences, inflation expectations might be collinear with the output cycle. 
This might bias the estimated coefficient on inflation expectations downwards. The 
remaining interesting aspect of the post-1985 results is that they show a shorter lead on 
expected inflation ( 2  quarters) than in most of our other estimated reaction functions.
Our estimates for Japan’s reaction function -Table 3- over the whole sample 
show a not significant coefficient on the output gap, while that on expected inflation is 
significant but well below one. Furthermore, the equation performs poorly, as illustrated 
by the diagnostic tests. We tried to improve on this by including some additional 
regressors. As it turns out, the US Federal Funds rate exerts a strong influence on Japanese 
policy. As in the case of the US, however, instability in the reaction functions persists in 
the 1980-82 period. Shortening the sample to the post-1982 period results in a dramatic 
increase in the expected inflation coefficient, which suggests that central bank’s attitude 
tow aids inflation changed mai’kedly. On the other hand, the recursive estimates -Figure 5- 
show that cyclical conditions became important only after 1992. The structural stability 
tests show that there is likely to be a lai'ge break around 1986. This was probably due to 
external pressures exerted on Japanese monetary policy in relation to the G-7 agreements 
on the value of the US$. It also confinns the casual observation that Japanese monetaiy 
policy might not have been sufficiently geared towards domestic targets (see The 
Economist, July 17, 1998), and that this might have contributed to excessive deflation in 
early 1990s.
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Table 4 reports the estimated reaction function for Germany, for the full sample 
period and since 1980. The estimates for the whole sample show that interest rates reacted 
to inflation expectations (with a point estimate greater than 1) and output. The addition of 
the US Federal Funds rates marginally improves the fit of the interest rate reaction 
function"^ .^
The variable addition tests show that neither money growth nor the exchange rate 
(measured as the DM-US$ rate) seem to exert an independent significant effect on 
German interest rates. This is interesting and confirms the results in Clai'ida and Geitler 
(1997), and Bernanke and Mihov (1997). Since 1974, the Bundesbank set target ranges for 
the growth of broad monetary aggregates, but over the fifteen years preceding the stait of 
Stage Three of EMU, actual growth rates often exceeded (fell short of) the upper (lower) 
limit of the targeted band'’^  ^ This confirms most accounts of Bundesbank’s policy stance. 
Monetary targets were not the Bank’s primary objective, and discretionary undershoots 
and overshoots of the target bands were allowed where this did not impair the achievement 
of the inflationary objective.
The diagnostic tests for the estimated model show some signs of non-normality 
(and possibly ARCH) in the residuals, but this is due to the bunching of a small number of 
large residuals at the end of the 1970s.
The estimated reaction function for Germany is overall remarkably stable, with 
the estimated coefficients constant across sub-samples. Figure 6 shows 1-step up and N- 
step down Chow tests, as well as the estimated coefficient and standard error bands of the 
expected inflation and output gap regressors for the post-1980 regression'^^. This confirms 
the stability of Bundesbank’s policy rule. It also shows that the size of the estimated 
response to output gap fell after the unification shock in 1991, as the Bundesbank tried to 
offset the subsequent inflationary shock. We still find that a four-quarter lead for expected 
inflation works best for the post-1980 sample.
To sum up, two main points emerge from our estimates of the German function. 
First, the relatively good performance of the estimated interest rate reaction function 
suggests that the underlying policy objectives were remarkably stable across the whole 
sample. Second, there is some evidence supporting the view that the policy thrust turned
For a descriptive account of these effects see Mishkin and Posen (1997).
See von Hagen (1993, 1999), Issing (1997).
It is worth noting that the estimated coefficients only show the short-run effect and do not take into account the impact 
of the autoregressive component of the reaction function. However, the estimated coefficient on the autoregressive term
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gradually more conservative since mid-eighties and even more after the re-unification. 
Moreover, in line with recent work (Clarida et a l, 1998) we find that monetary policy in 
Germany reacts systematically to cyclical conditions, even though the Bundesbank’s 
declared monetary strategy (see Issing, 1997) was entirely expressed in terms of monetary 
targets.
The analysis of Germany’s monetary policy also highlights some noticeable 
differences with Fed’s policy behaviour. Although both estimated reaction functions seem 
substantially stable post-1985, the Bundesbank appears to respond more aggressively to 
movements in expected inflation than the Fed. Alternative interpretations are, however at 
hand. Mishkin and Posen (1997) label Fed’s policy as “just do it”, or “pre-emptive policy 
without a nominal anchor”. Their argument is a classical one whereby policies must act 
well in advance of a surge in inflation expectations, as the full impact of monetary policy 
on inflation takes long lags. The main drawbacks of such policy obviously lie in the 
difficulty of establishing a clear policy pattern, with all the risks that this implies at times 
when the economy is hit by major exogenous shocks. Our results partly support such 
pragmatic and forward-looking attitude for the Fed. This does not translate, however, as if 
the Fed systematically reacted to longer-term expectations, as in Bundesbank’s case. In 
fact, we found that shorter leads on the expected inflation regressor (two instead of four 
quarters) seemed to work better in the case of the US over the latter part of the sample. 
This confirms the casual observation that the Fed has chosen to signal its commitment to 
low inflation only in recent years, by reacting in advance to increases in inflationary 
expectations. Overall, Clarida et al.'s (1998) finding, of a US reaction function behaving 
as if the Fed operated according to an implicit inflation targeting framework, are only 
partly supported by our findings, and only since early 1990s.
The general conclusion is that the G-3 policy reaction functions look relatively 
different from one another. In addition, despite having overall stable monetaiy institutions, 
policy rules in the G-3 seem to have smoothly evolved along alternative lines. German 
interest rate policy appears to have become more conservative after the re-unification. In 
Japan, it seems to have been strongly influenced by external objectives, until veiy 
recently. In the US, the highly successful countercyclical monetary policy of the Fed 
seems to be purely a very recent datum. As the existing empirical literature employed full- 
sample, full-infoimation estimation techniques, our findings appear peculiarly valuable.
is quite stable, and the recursive coefficient estimates also reflect the movement in the long-run coefficient for each
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5, Policy Rules under Inflation Targeting: United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden and 
New Zealand
For most of the sample period, central banks in this second group of countries 
enjoyed limited independence in the conduct of their policies, at least in comparison to 
those of G-3 countries (see Cukierman, 1992; Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996). During the 
1990s explicit inflation targets were announced in all countries, but there are relevant 
differences between the institutional arrangements set in each experience. For instance, 
only in New Zealand (and to a slightly different extent in the UK since May 1997), the 
central bank has a legal mandate to achieve the target.
Figure 3 plots the expected inflation series and the ex ante real interest rates 
computed using our expected inflation series for the group of inflation targeting 
economies. Interestingly, in the case of Sweden, Canada and New Zealand, ex ante real 
rates appear to have turned positive well before the announcement (represented in the 
charts as a vertical solid line) or the adoption of targets. In addition, inflation expectations, 
at least in the case of the UK, Sweden and New Zealand, seem to have been somewhat 
subdued before the announced regime changes. The regime change seems to have simply 
consolidated some prior gains in terms of lower inflation.
In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England was granted operational 
independence only in May 1997. However, several changes affected UK’s monetary 
strategies in recent times. The election of the Thatcher government in 1979 signalled a 
long-lasting shift in the collective attitude towai'ds inflation"^ .^ Instead of adopting an 
institutional approach, the conservative governments tried to build a reputation for their 
commitment to low inflation policies, envisaging with the MTFS, amongst other things, a 
5-year sequence of gradually decelerating growth targets for £M3. However, the unstable 
relationship between this monetary aggregate and the final policy objectives quickly led to 
the demise of formal monetary targets. The government then adopted a more eclectic 
approach (see Minford, 1993, King, 1998), which essentially involved targeting nominal 
income growth. In the late 1980s, the exchange rate assumed greater importance as an 
indicator of monetary conditions (see Bowen, 1995), and Sterling finally entered the ERM
explanatory variable.
Alogoskoufis et al. (1992) find convincing evidence of a spectacular reverse in the political business cycle after Mrs. 
Thatcher came to power. For a more descriptive analysis, see Minford (1993) and Bowen (1995).
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of the European Monetary System in 1990. The exit from ERM following the 1992 crisis 
forced the government to put an alternative regime in place, and the post-1992 
announcement of explicit inflation targets was seen as a practical way of achieving price 
stability. However, the central bank played only the role of publicly assessing the overall 
consistency of the policy stance. The newly-elected Labour government in 1997 then 
sought to further enhance the inflation targeting framework, by granting the Bank with 
instrument independence (for a definition, see Fischer, 1995). Monetary policy decisions 
are now taken by a recently-constituted Monetary Policy Committee.
Our estimates for the UK -Table 5- show that over the whole sample period the 
coefficient on inflation expectations is not significantly larger than one. Furthermore, the 
money market interest rate seems to have reacted to both the exchange rate and money 
supply.
Given the instability in the estimated reaction function until the mid-1980s, we 
re-estimated the equation for the 1980-1996 sample, and then we further shortened the 
period to 1985-1996"^. Results show that the policy horizon became substantially shorter 
after the 1985 sterling crisis, as interest rates appear to react to one-quarter ahead expected 
inflation, and the coefficient on expected inflation becomes significantly larger than one. 
Along with this, other minor shifts in policy regimes are also apparent (Figure 7). For 
instance, the estimated coefficient on the sterling effective exchange rate was significant 
between 1988-1992, capturing both the ‘shadowing the DM’ and the ERM phases in UK 
policy (see also the behaviour of the f-ratio for the estimated coefficient). By contrast, the 
coefficient on the output gap became permanently less significant during the ERM phase, 
as domestic output objectives were sacrificed for the external objective.
These findings closely mirror the changes in policy regimes outlined above. The 
main turning point is in 1979. The more recent shifts in the estimated coefficients of the 
reaction function seem to be linked to the difficulties encountered in achieving a specific 
target rather than a lack of commitment to the goal of price stability.
Since the breakdown of M l as an intermediate target in early 1980s, until 1991 
the Bank of Canada had not committed itself to any pre-determined policy pattern, aside 
from the reiteration of a long-term goal of price stability. Neither intermediate target, not
In this and all other cases, extending the sample to include 1998 and 1999 could have helped understanding recent 
developments. However, the great interest rate instability associated with the Asian crisis could have heavily affected the 
full-sample results. We however defer the assessment of such events to some future occasion.
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time frame was apparently cast in the attempt to pursue the long-run objective, while 
various monetary and credit aggregates (including the exchange rate with the US$) were 
used in turn as information variables. In 1991, the government and the Bank set a 
sequence of year-to-year target bands for the inflation rate, to bring in a gradual reduction 
in inflation. However, the central bank was not granted a legislative mandate to achieve 
those tai'gets, nor was a procedure established whereby the bank would be held 
accountable for missing the targets. The “doctrine of dual responsibility” traditionally 
attributes the ultimate responsibility for the results of monetary policy to the Minister of 
Finance. Thus, the Bank of Canada has enjoyed only a limited degree of formal 
independence (see Cukierman, 1992; Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996). Nonetheless, the 
monetary authorities had been publicly calling for a stricter overall control on inflation as 
early as 1988, while since 1994 the degree of transparency and accountability of their acts 
has remarkably increased (Mishkin and Posen, 1997).
Our estimates for Canada over the full sample period (1975-1997) yield 
somewhat puzzling results (see Table 6). When the US Fed funds rate is added to the 
equation, both the coefficients on the output gap and on expected inflation become 
irrelevant. Clearly, as in the case of Germany and Japan, the Fed funds rate absorbs part of 
the significance of the inflation regressor. Although M l growth was the intermediate 
policy target in Canada between 1975 and 1982"^  ^ (Freedman, 1995), we could not find a 
significant role for money supply in our estimated reaction function. Furthermore, there 
ar e clear' signs of instability in the estimated function in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Once the equation is re-estimated over the post-1982 sample, we find that the 
coefficient on inflation expectations is still not significant, whereas effective exchange rate 
changes now seem to be relevant, along with the Fed funds rate.
What about the iiupact of inflation targets? The announcement of targets, which 
took place in early 1991, does not seem to coincide with a break in the behaviour of 
interest rate policy (see Figure 8). At most there seems to have been a temporary impact 
on interest rate policy just prior to the introduction of inflation tar'gets, as some signs of 
instability in the expected inflation coefficient are detected around the period 1990- 
Descriptive accounts of Canadian monetary policy in this period (Mishkin and Posen,
1997) point out that the inflation target was mainly used as guidance for expectations. 
They also stress that in several occasions monetaiy policy was in fact constrained to react
In 1982, it was officially abandoned due to innovations in the financial sector.
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to external conditions, such as exchange rate developments and the behaviour of US 
monetary policy. Our estimated reaction function seems to confirm this. Furthermore, the 
Bank has recently defined a short-mn operational target, the index of monetar y conditions 
(MCI). MCI changes include variations in a short-term interest rate and in the trade- 
weighted exchange rate. Clearly, this highlights the importance of external constraints on 
the Bank of Canada’s policy stance.
Since 1977, Sweden had been unilaterally pegging its currency, first to a trade- 
weighted basket of currencies, then switching to the ECU in May 1991. However, the 
attitude whereby this commitment to the external anchor was pursued varied significantly, 
as numerous devaluations took place (Horngren and Lindberg, 1994). To some extent, the 
Riksbank turned to a less accomodative stance towards inflation developments after 1982. 
The marginal (overnight) rate was then extensively used to regulate large currency flows 
during the fixed-exchange rate period. After the 1992 crisis, the Riksbank floated the 
krona, and then announced the unilateral adoption of an inflation target in January 1993'^ .^ 
However, the bank has never been granted an independent status, and political influences 
on the board appear’ important (Svensson, 1995).
The full-sample estimates (1982-97) for Sweden show a significant but relatively 
low coefficient on expected inflation, while the output gap is not significant at all (see 
Table 7). The main instability in the estimated reaction function corresponds to the time 
of the ERM crisis in 1992, when the krona was forced to devaluate with respect to the 
ERM parity despite an unprecedented surge in domestic interest rates. Since then, Sweden 
has adopted inflation targeting. However, Svensson (1995) points out that the credibility 
of the new regime has been hampered by a number of factors, such as the deep political 
divisions over the conduct of monetary policy and the relatively large budget deficits. The 
sudden policy reversals and the overall uncertainty about the post-1992 regime clearly 
show up in our estimates, making it difficult to detect a clear- policy pattern.
Once a dummy for the ERM crisis in 1992 is included, the coefficient on 
expected inflation rises and becomes more significant, but the point estimate remains 
below one. The output gap variable is almost significant at the 5% level. However, we are 
unable to find signs of a significant permanent shift in the reaction function following the
Although the N-step down Chow tests are not significant at the 5% level
The term unilateral emphasises the lack of a legislative mandate to achieve a specific inflation target. See Svensson 
(1995) for a detailed account o f these events.
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introduction of inflation targets. The main fact that emerges from Figure 9 is (as for the 
UK) the decreasing importance of domestic inflation and output targets just before the 
ERM crisis in 1992. On the other hand, since inflation did in fact fall in Sweden, one 
might conclude that monetary policy in this period mainly acted to keep real interest rates 
high until inflation was brought down. Taking into account the severe credibility 
constraints outlined above, this apparently stubborn policy was perhaps the only 
alternative left to the bank in order to signal its willingness to curb inflation.
Finally, we turn to the evolution of the monetary regime in New Zealand, which 
switched to inflation targeting in 1989. Historically, New Zealand's Reserve Bank had a 
degree of independence that ranked lowest amongst the OECD countries (see Cukierman, 
1992; Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996). Correspondingly, New Zealand’s inflation rate was 
well above the OECD average. Up until the mid-1980s monetary policy relied mainly on 
regulation and administrative controls of capital markets. Since 1985, the Bank has turned 
to a more market-oriented approach to monetary control, and based policy decisions on a 
variety of indicators, such as the exchange rate, the term structure of interest rates, 
monetary aggregates and output (see Fischer and Orr, 1994). The Reserve Bank Act, 
introduced in 1990 to establish a legislative commitment to price stability, gave the 
Government and the Central Bank Governor the mandate to agree on a policy target (it 
was decided that this should be an inflation target). The Act explicitly contemplates the 
possibility of the Governor's dismissal if the set target is not met.
For these reasons, New Zealand has been the most-often-quoted inflation- 
targeting experience. This not least because the legal arrangements designed to regulate 
bank’s activity follow the prescriptions of policy design theory more closely than 
elsewhere (see Walsh, 1995, 1998). The estimated equation for the full sample (see Table 
8 and Figure 10) shows that interest rates seem to have reacted only to expected inflation - 
the estimated coefficient is close to be significantly larger than 1 - whereas domestic 
cyclical conditions do not seem to matter much''^ ®. Although exchange rate shocks are 
explicitly quoted in the Bank charter as a possible justification for deviating from the 
announced policy, we could not find a significant exchange rate effect. On the other hand, 
diagnostic tests signal some ARCH pattern in the residuals. This may be due to occasional
Hutchison and Walsh (1998) suggested that the Reserve Bank, looked at output stabilisation as an additional objective, 
but the output gap term is not significant in our estimates. Nevertheless, as pointed out previously, the absence of an 
output gap term in the reaction function does not preclude some degree o f output stabilisation.
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interest rate adjustments to external conditions. Another possible explanation can be found 
in the relatively narrow band originally set around the inflation target, which caused 
significant instrument instability in a futile effort to “fine tune” inflation control'^^ 
(Mishkin and Posen, 1997). Again, the essential result from the stability tests is that in the 
‘90s the Central Bank followed a policy pattern that had already been established in the 
former decade. It is impossible to detect significant breaks in correspondence of the 
announcement of inflation targets. The other main point to note is that inflation targeting 
does not seem to have provided the authority with a greater leeway to stabilise output 
fluctuations. The stability of the coefficient attached to inflation expectations and of the 
overall equation indicates that the inflation target regime does not seem to have made a 
marked difference to interest rate policy.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have discussed and estimated forward-looking interest rate 
reaction functions for two groups of OECD economies. Our aim was twofold. First, we 
sought to envisage whether the recent emphasis placed by the existing empirical literature 
on the consistency of monetary regimes in the G-3 economies with an inflation-forecasting 
approach, was justified. Second, we wished to establish empirically whether there was any 
systematic pattern between institutional change, in the form of the adoption of explicit 
inflation targets and central bank reforms, and the operational conduct of monetaiy 
strategies. In addition to the detailed results for each country set out above, a number of 
general conclusions emerge from our empirical results.
First, with the exception of Germany and the UK (since 1992), most of the 
monetary authorities in our sample do not seem to follow stable simple forward-looking 
policy reaction functions based on output gaps and expected inflation (and, a fortiori, 
Taylor rules). This suggests that caution has to be exercised in using an inflation-forecast 
targeting framework to model monetary authorities’ preferences (see Claiida et a l, 1998; 
Favero and Rovelli, 1999). In the US and Japan, countries where there have been no major 
central bank or other institutional reforms, we find that policies did evolve to a 
considerable degree in the 1980s and 1990s. However, it is only since the 1990s that
Perhaps not surprisingly, both the inflation target and the band width were revised in the ‘90s
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estimated interest rate rules in these countries begin to look like the ones the theoretical 
research on the inflation-forecast targeting approach has recently illustrated.
Second, in countries where there were explicit intermediate targets (such as the 
growth of M3 in Germany), these appear mainly (see also the discussion in Chapter 3) as a 
device to anchor expectations. In practice, policy is not constrained to follow them strictly. 
In addition, monetary policy is often found to follow a broader set of objectives. Our 
results confirm those of previous researchers who have detected in the Bundesbank a 
marked “targeting” attitude regarding inflation, output, and some external conditions. 
More generally, where the policymaker is subject to implicit external constraints (as in the 
case of Canada, Japan, and to a lesser extent, Sweden), this can sometimes lead to a less 
interpretable picture. This sends a negative signal regarding the ability of simple interest 
rate rules expressed in terms of inflation and cyclical conditions in capturing monetary 
policy changes.
Third, with the exception of the UK, the recent switch to inflation targets in the 
countries we studied does not seem to have radically altered the way in which interest rate 
policy reacts to changes in its final objectives. In practice, there is some evidence, 
particularly clear in Canada’s and New Zealand’s cases, that any major changes in the 
responsiveness of interest rates to expected inflation took place well before the adoption of 
inflation targets. The same pattern seems to have been followed even when such 
institutional reforms have been accompanied by greater central bank independence. A 
possible interpretation is that the new regimes were brought in simply to consolidate gains 
in terms of lower inflation. Only longer datasets will tell whether, in response to major 
exogenous shocks, monetary policy will be able to respond more vigorously to 
inflationary forces than in the past.
Finally, we detected some important differences in the behaviour of central banks 
as far as output stabilisation is concerned. On the one hand, we found some evidence in 
favour of an apparent ‘just do it’ attitude of the Fed. That is, the central bank, at least since 
1990 seems to exploit its consolidated reputation to focus on the cycle. This pattern is 
reflected, to some extent, by the shorter optimal lead placed on expected inflation in the 
estimated reaction function. At the other extreme, some monetary authorities apparently 
feel the need to build up a reputation. This was particularly clear in the Swedish 
Riksbank’s stubborn attempt to lower inflation expectations by means of high interest
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rates and the apparently exclusive focus of the Bank of New Zealand on domestic 
inflation.
Whether this ‘reputation-building’ phase will also apply to those central banks 
that have only recently acquired their independence, such as the Bank of England and the 
European Central Bank, remains, however, a fairly open question.
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Data Appendix
The data we used were quarterly series, extracted from OECD Main Economic 
Indicators, apart from a few cases, in which the source is equivalently quoted. In most 
cases, we were able to employ seasonally adjusted data.
For each country, we measured output using the GDP at constant price series. For 
Sweden and New Zealand the available constant price series for GDP do not go back 
further than 1980 and 1982Q2, respectively. The inflation series were defined as simple 4- 
quaiter log-differences in the all-items CPI, except for Britain, where it was the equivalent 
change in the index of retail prices excluding mortgage interest payments (not available 
before 1975).
The index of effective exchange rates (trade weighted) was the measure for the 
exchange rates. Also, spot exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar were tried for Japan, 
Germany, Canada, New Zealand and the UK; vis-a-vis the German mark for the UK and 
Sweden.
The rate on US Federal Funds was used as the foreign interest rate for Japan, 
Germany, Canada, and New Zealand. The 3-month FIB OR German rate was the foreign 
rate for the UK and Sweden.
Below we briefly outline the short-term interest rates we chose as policy 
indicators, along with the monetary aggregates we applied in the generation of regressors. 
The rates are generally converted from monthly series.
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Country Modelled Interest Rate Variable Money
Federal Funds Rate. As noted in the main text, during the early to mid-80s, the FFR provides an USA accurate measure o f Fed’s policy stance. The only exception is the Volcker experiment in the M l
1979-82 period, when operating procedures could be better summarised by a different 
instrument choice (inter alia, Bernanke and Mihov, 1998; Goodfriend, 1995)
The Call Money Rate (rate between financial institutions) is directly affected by Bank o f M2 plus CD JAPAN Japan’s reserve management policy, through discount window and open market operations (see 
Ichimura, 1993)
Bundesbank’s intentions are mainly reflected by the rate in the market for interbank reserves,GERMANY the Call Money Rate. In facts, the discount window lending to commercial banks exclusively M3’
affected the behaviour o f this rate until 1985, when the banks started to be supplied with
reserves through repurchase operations. Since then the call rate shadows the rate on these loans
(REPO rate), (see Bernanke and Mihov, 1998; Clarida and Gertler, 1997)
We use an Overnight Interbank Rate series post-1983. Tliis is not available pre-1983, and thus UK we employ the Rate on 90-dav Treasury B ills, which displays a very close correlation with the
interbank lending rate, for those observations (source: IMF, IPS).
The Bank o f Canada introduced in 1996 the concept o f Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) as its CANADA short-run operational target. The changes in the index are defined as a weighted average o f the
changes in the 90-day commercial paper rate and the changes in a trade-weighted Can$ 
exchange rate. Although the MCI was computed backward and onward from 1987, the
Overnight Money Market Rate (available from 1975) is clearly a superior indicator o f the
Bank’s policy stance
During the fixed-exchange rate regime, the overnight rate in the interbank market represented SWEDEN Riksbank’s favourite instrument to keep the krona within the desired parity. Then, after the 
switch to the inflation-targeting regime, the Repo rate has become the operational instrument of 
the Bank. For the sake o f homogeneity and continuity we use the Rate on 3-month Treasury 
Discount Notes (not available before 1982), which roughly shadows the behaviour o f both 
marginal and Repo rates (Baumgartner et al., 1997).
M4
M l,M2plus'^
M3
NEW
ZEALAND
Tlie Rate on 90-dav Bank Bills (not available before 1974) was our choice. Until March 1985, 
New Zealand has pursued an adjustable pegged exchange rate, “ ...the instrument since 1985 has 
been the quantity target for settlement balances held at the Reserve Bank. Settlement cash is 
used by commercial banks for end-of-day settlements with each other and the government. 
Should the banks run out o f cash during the settlement period, further cash is available from the 
Reserve Bank by discounting Reserve Bank bills o f  short maturity at a penalty rate o f 1.5% 
above market rates...Such an approach allows interest rates to move quickly, particularly when 
the change involves a politically unpopular increase in interest rates...” (Fischer, 1995, p.35) It 
is then understandable why banks prefer to act in the bank bills market, whose short-term 
interest rate tends to react rapidly to changes in policy intentions.
Ml
’ The Bundesbank announced targets for the growth o f Central Bank Money until 1987, when it switched to M3, which 
we chose. The two move very closely together, apart from two episodes o f divergence in 1988 and 1990-91. Despite the 
official target is announced in terms o f base-money growth, the evidence points to Germany as to an “atypical” inflation 
targeter, who influences the money markets through changes in a day-to-day rate (Neumann and von Hagen, 1993; von 
Hagen, 1995; Bernanke and Mihov, 1998; Mishkin and Posen, 1997).
 ^Until 1982 the Bank o f Canada was committed to target M I. It is now following closely also the behaviour of M2+ and 
a MCI, to obtain some indication about future inflation (Freedman, 1995).
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Test GDP Inflation 
‘72-‘97
Inflation
‘80-‘97
LC
USA
0.548* 0.543* 1.762***
MeanF 7.946** 10.713*** 9.495***
SupF 23.682*** 68.269*** 48.400***
LC
G erm any
0.339 1.553*** 0.651**
MeanF 4.931 14.422*** 8.195***
SupF 47.889*** 25.059*** 58.105***
LC
Japan
0.193 0.743** 0.998***
MeanF 4.186 5.913* 7.987***
SupF 8.647 29.530*** 28.035***
LC
U n ited  K ingdom
0.514* 0.624** 2.049***
MeanF 13.150*** 5.915** 11.247***
SupF 43.787*** 29.530*** 48.371***
LC
C anada
0.254 1.406*** 1.383***
MeanF 5.449* 12.803*** 12.5***
SupF 24.662*** 49.207*** 55.908***
LC
Sw eden
0.334 1.137*** 0.959***
MeanF 7.846** 10.848*** 24.192***
SupF 14.731* 31.085*** ■ 73.784***
LC
N ew  Z ealand
0.481* 1.097*** 0.484*
MeanF 9.047*** 21.772*** 8,051***
SupF 26.849*** 92.627*** 27.016***
T a b le  1 -  T e s ts  o f  p a r a m e te r  in s ta b il ity . Le, MeanF, SupF  are defined as testin g  the null of stability  
against nonconstancy on the param eters o f univariate autoregi-essive models for inflation (4-quarter 
change in  CPI) and real GDP. C onstants and linear tim e trends w here included w hen relevant. 
and *** indicate significance o f the relative F -statistic  at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (for tabulated  
critical values, see H ansen, 1992b).
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Interest R ate R ules and P olicy  Chapter 2
C redibility from  ERM to EMU
"...But how do you run a common currency without a common government?
Europe has some experience with this sort o f thing. For almost two decades - since the 
formation o f  the European Monetary System in 1979 - most European nations have committed 
themselves to maintaining fixed exchange rates between their currencies, which basically 
means adopting a common monetary’ policy. And while there have been occasional flareiips in 
the arrangement - a last-gasp attempt by the French to follow their own path back in 1982, and 
a wave o f  speculative attacks that pushed Britain out o f the system a decade later - the EMS 
has proved surprisingly durable. How did  Europe manage to follow a common monetary 
policy? There was a bit o f  neatly calculated hypocrisy. Athoiigh the EMS was in principle a 
symmetric system, with all countries treated equally, in practice it was tacitly run as a German 
hegemony: the Bundesbank set interest rates as it pleased, and other central banks then did  
whatever was necessary to keep their currencies pegged to the Deutsche mark. This 
arrangement allowed the system to meet two seemingly irreconcilable demands: the insistence 
o f  Germans, who still remember both the hyperinflation o f 1923 and the economic miracle that 
follow ed the introduction o f  a new, stable currency in 1948, that their beloved Bundesbank 
keep its hand firmly on the monetary tiller; and the political imperative that any European 
institution must look like an association o f equals, not a new, um, Reich. The Europeans, they 
are a subtle race... ”
P. Krugman, Fortune, December 1998
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, we studied how changes in monetary policy institutions 
influence the way interest rate policies react to expected inflation and the business cycle. 
We saw that, in some instances, greater central bank independence and the introduction of 
inflation tai'gets do not seem to have radically altered the way in which authorities react to 
changes in the final objectives of monetary policy. The latter were identified using a 
simple policy rule expressed in terms of deviations of expected inflation from some pre­
set target, and a measure of the output gap.
In this chapter, we investigate the same issue, this time with reference to four 
former EMS countries. More precisely, we study, from a perspective similar to that in the 
previous chapter, the effects of the most remarkable institutional change monetary policy 
has undergone in modern times, namely, the process of monetary unification in Europe. 
Whether such process will be successful or not is a complex and perhaps unanswerable 
question. Instead, we wish to evaluate the path followed by monetary policies throughout 
Europe in the process of monetary convergence towards EMU. More in detail, we ask 
ourselves whether and how the nominal convergence achieved amongst the former EMS
countries was affected by the existence of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, and by other 
well-known constraints on national monetary policies. Apart from the existence of 
exchange rate bands, we attempt a broad assessment of the way in which the required 
convergence in budget positions across countries has affected the response of national 
monetary authorities to final domestic objectives.
This broad-based aim suggested us to estimate interest rate reaction functions - 
similarly to what we did for the G-3 and inflation-targeting economies- for four key 
European countries: France, Italy, Ireland and Belgium. Our estimation sample -1980Q1- 
1997Q2- covers the whole period spanned by the EMS, and ends when financial markets 
started to be persuaded as to the real outcome of the Stage Two of EMU, i.e., whether the 
euro would have really be put in place as planned. We recall that the major doubts about 
the start of Stage Three of EMU concerned the soundness of recent efforts of fiscal 
consolidation produced by some countries (De Grauwe, 1997; Obstfeld, 1998; Dornbusch, 
Favero and Giavazzi, 1998; Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998). It is then interesting to 
understand the extent to which such efforts and those concerns influenced the course of 
national interest rate policies on the road to EMU. Once interest rate reaction functions for 
the above mentioned countries are estimated, we evaluate the stability of estimated 
equations and preference parameters attached to domestic objectives and relevant 
additional regressors. This allows us to draw some conclusions about the convergence 
process amongst these countries and Germany.
The question, besides an eminently historical interest, would certainly help 
understanding how ESCB’s monetary policies will be drafted in the coming years. We 
wish to provide an approximate assessment of the costs and the adjustments in policy 
preferences that accompanied the process of monetary convergence throughout Europe. 
Such process involved countries where initial monetary conditions and policy credibility 
were very similar (Belgium), relatively similar (France), or relatively different (Italy and 
Ireland) from those prevailing in Germany. A better knowledge of the individual trade­
offs faced by the monetary authorities of these countries would surely reveal some clue 
about how national issues will be evaluated in the current and future issues decision­
making process of the ESCB.
The literature developed during the latter part of the 1980s provided an intuitive 
and flexible framework for studying the EMS (Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989; Fratianni 
and von Hagen, 1992). The main theoretical motivation devised for the existence of the
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EMS was that, if  credible, it could have provided an effective instrument to bring 
monetary discipline to relatively inflation-prone countries like the ones we chose. In fact, 
conventional accounts of monetary policy events in Europe tend to argue that, since the 
second half of 1980s, a stronger exchange rate commitment helped in bringing down 
inflation expectations in many European countries (Caporale and Pittis, 1993)*. In other 
words, the exchange rate agreement apparently forced national policymakers to pursue 
more restrictive monetary policies than those that might have been followed in the absence 
of such agreements. The fall in inflation, and the following strong convergence in nominal 
terms achieved by the start of Stage Three of EMU, is then to be attributed to the ever 
stronger external constraints binding national authorities.
In reality, given the long history of realignments and parity adjustments, 
especially in the early years of its existence, one can safely argue that the ERM was a 
classical example of partially credible target zone regime. In other words, price stability 
and pan-European nominal convergence were achieved only after a long and uncertain 
process, in which the simple ERM membership was not sufficient to guarantee the 
outcome.
However, one can argue that the ERM, along with other factors, did have a 
“wheel-greasing” role in forcing such process. The well-known imported credibility 
approach to the EMS, stemming from Giavazzi and Pagano’s (1988) work (see also Coles 
and Philippopoulos, 1997), ai'gues that EMS membership was indeed crucial in bringing in 
potentially large credibility gains to national monetary authorities. By attaching extra 
penalties to departures of interest rate policies from an anti-inflationary stance, the ERM 
of the EMS made financial markets, and the public in general, more aware of the new 
trade-off faced by monetary authorities. This way, the exchange rate agreement provided 
low-credibility policymakers with some commitment technology, gradually shrinking the 
inefficiencies commonly associated with monetary policy equilibria in the absence of 
commitment (Persson and Tabellini, 1999). Last, but not least, severe ceilings on the use 
of national fiscal policies were enacted by 1992’s Maastricht Treaty, adding further 
grounds on which the conduct of national policymakers were to be evaluated in EMU’s 
perspective. In addition, throughout the latter half of 1980s, capital controls were 
progressively dismantled, financial markets became more integrated on an international
' However, inflation fell along a very similar pattern in the majority of OECD countries outside the EMS,
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level, and increasing product market integration was overall promoted by EC-EU 
institutions.
While the exact impact of those and other changes is still difficult to ascertain, it 
is relatively safe to argue that they gradually made exchange rate realignments more costly 
and less effective in boosting competitiveness and growth. One can also hypothesise that 
such changing macroeconomic environment gradually tilted the balance between the 
benefits from realignments, and the credibility gains brought about by a more 
“disciplined” conduct of monetary policy, in favour of the latter.
It is then interesting to understand how the convergence of national Central 
Banks’ -or the public’s- preferences towards Bundesbank’s anti-inflationary attitude^ took 
place. Similarly, given the relevance attributed by the Maastricht Treaty and the 
subsequent Stability and Growth Pact, to fiscal consolidation, one might want to evaluate 
how such additional constraint affected Member States’ macroeconomic conditions on 
their road to EMU.
In this chapter, we provide some empirical evidence supporting the view that the 
historical path followed by monetary policies in the former Members of EMS to achieve 
nominal convergence with Germany was not uniform. We show that the process itself bore 
significant shifts to the way in which monetary policy authorities were reacting to 
domestic objectives. This appears to have taken place with differentiated timings in 
Belgium, France, Iieland, and Italy. In addition, we allow our theoretical model to take 
into account the possibility that the credibility of the fiscal stance explicitly affected 
interest rate policies adopted in the EMS countries. With imperfect credibility, an 
unsustainable fiscal position in principle may induce markets to believe that the central 
bank will need to loosen its anti-inflationary stance (and, ultimately, the country’s 
exchange rate commitment) in the future. This line of reasoning has been recently revived 
in the debate on the fiscal theory of price level determination (Woodford, 1995; Canzoneri 
and Diba, 1996; Cochi’ane, 2000).
Following Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa (1997), we proxied maiket’s 
perception of the exchange rate risk by an adjusted measure of the long-term yield 
differential between each country and Germany. If unbalanced fiscal policies were to 
affect mai'ket’s perception of the probability of loose interest rate policies in the future, the 
optimal policy mie would directly target such perception. By consequence, and with
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reference to the policy rules analysed in the preceding chapter, the policy instrument 
would be explicitly reacting to the long-term spread, other than to final output and 
inflation objectives. The significance of the spread as a regressor in an estimated interest 
rate reaction function would then signal to what extent inflation and output stabilisation 
were sacrificed in the attempt to stabilise the exchange rate within the ERM band. In 
addition, the evolution of the way in which the central banks reacted to the spread and to 
other regressors, and an assessment of the stability of estimated reaction functions, would 
illustrate further aspects. For example, it would show the extent to which the adoption of a 
tougher exchange rate commitment since late eighties (the “hard ERM”), and the varying 
commitment of national authorities to programs of fiscal consolidation, affected short­
term interest rate determination.
Estimated interest rate reaction functions for the countries in our sample show 
that budget policies had severe effects on, and critically constrained, the behaviour of 
monetary authorities. In all countries, monetary policy stances seem to have been often 
motivated by the need to respond to changes in the credibility of the country’s exchange 
rate position within the ERM band. Interestingly, with the start of the “hard ERM” phase, 
in France, Belgium and Eeland, the importance of the long yield spread tends to decrease 
as severe efforts of fiscal retrenchment were undertaken. In such countries, the ERM 
turbulence in 1992-93 does not appear to have significantly affected interest rate policies, 
probably thanks to the largely achieved macroeconomic stability. On the contrary, for 
Italy, well-founded concerns surrounding its macroeconomic policies at the eve of Stage 
Thi’ee of EMU severely constrained interest rate determination. Some more consistent 
fiscal consolidation somehow eased the process of nominal convergence vis-à-vis the 
other Member countries, but only in latter pait of the sample.
The chapter unfolds as follows. Section 2 outlines the benchmark theoretical 
model used to derive the reaction function subsequently estimated. Cieaiiy, despite the 
similarities between the interest rate equations estimated here and in the previous chapter, 
the presence of the exchange rate band make the flexible rates model previously adopted 
fully inadequate. In addition, one needs to take into consideration the alternative sources 
of exchange rate risk present during the ERM years and the way in which these affected 
interest rate policies. This is why Section 3 illustrates some details of our estimation 
methodology, and shows how we tried to obtain a measure of exchange rate risks
 ^Or, alternatively o f European median voters’ attitude as regards the costs o f disinflationary programs towards German
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orthogonal to expected inflation. In Section 4 we briefly examine monetaiy policy 
developments in the four countries in our sample, while in Section 5 we finally present 
and comment our estimates. Section 6 briefly summarises what we have found.
2. Modelling Interest Rate Rules in the ERM: A Simple Theoretical Framework
In this section, we modify the baseline theoretical framework studied in the 
previous chapter. Our purpose is to obtain an empirically testable relationship between the 
policy instmment and some final objectives. This will be placed in a policy framework 
within an imperfectly credible fixed-exchange rate system^. It would be trivial to simply 
include an exchange rate regressor in the baseline reaction functions estimated in the 
previous chapter. Indeed, this was done for some of the open economies considered in that 
case. In the present case, however, the existence of an exchange rate central par between 
the countries at hand makes such an option unfeasible, as interest rate policies under a 
fixed exchange rate regime do not respond to exchange rate movements in a linear 
fashion.
We refer to the second section of the previous chapter for a somewhat more 
extensive discussion of the basic forward-looking policy framework, which forms the 
basis for most recent monetary policy studies. There, we stressed the fact that a relatively 
broad consensus has emerged about a new wave of models, in which aggregate 
relationships are explicitly derived from the optimising behaviour of households and firms 
(Walsh, 1998; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999).
The resulting behavioural relationships allow current aggregate values for 
macroeconomic variables to depend, inter alia, on the future course of monetary policies.
We postulate almost all the same aggregate relationships that we derived at the 
outset of last chapter’s model. The main difference with what claimed there lies in the fact 
that we now explicitly introduce exchange rate considerations in the model and in the 
policy objective function. The way we carry out such task will enable us to model the 
effects of policy credibility on the cunent exchange rate, following recent developments
median voters’ one.
As we have mentioned in the Introduction, the numerous realignments negotiated during the ERM support the belief 
that the latter was, particularly during its early years, a quasi-flexible exchange rate system. See Giavazzi and 
Giovannini (1989), Fratianni and von Hagen (1992), Cukierman (1992), Garber and Svensson (1995), De Grauwe 
(1997), Dornbusch et a l  (1998), Obstfeld (1998).
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introduced by the well-known “fiscal theory of price level determination” (Canzoneri, 
Cumby and Diba, 1998; Cochrane, 2000).
Let y, and y /  be again the current and potential level of output, and pt the price 
level. The following expectations-augmented Phillips curve is assumed (all variables but 
interest rates in logs)'*:
=>^<+1+(»(!/,-y , ')  [1]
In [1], current inflation depends on the inflation rate expected in the next period, 
and on the current output gap. In turn, the latter is affected by the deviations of the 
nominal interest rate from its expected value, and by a white noise shock:
y , - y ; = - X { R , - R ’) + £, [2]
Again, [2] is a customary relationship whereby a positive suiprise in the interest 
rate level negatively affects current output. The Fisher ex ante parity holds, so that
[3]
Now, classical contributions on exchange rate bands (Miller and Weller, 1991; 
Flood, Rose, and Mathieson, 1991; Bertola and Caballero, 1992; Delgado and Dumas, 
1993; Garber and Svensson, 1995) all stemming from Krugman’s (1991) seminal work, 
implicitly allow for policy credibility effects in the behaviour of exchange rate^. The 
common starting point of such literature (see Miller and Weller’s paper, for example) is a 
basic relationship in which the current exchange rate et is determined according to the 
following (in logs):
= m ,+ v^+ rA ‘;e,, [4]
See Bernake, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) or Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for details on the derivation of all 
aggregate relationships.
 ^See also Bartolini and Prati (1999), and Avesani, Gallo and Salmon (1999)
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where m, is money supply (or an endogenous policy variable), v, is the cumulative 
velocity of money, and represents the instantaneous expected rate of change of the 
exchange rate. The latter affects the current value of the exchange rate through the semi­
elasticity of money demand, The last term on the right-hand side thus reflects market 
expectations about the future course of monetary policy, likely reflected in exchange rate 
risk considerations.
An ideal way of modelling the credibility effects stemming from ERM 
membership would call for incorporating [4] into an optimum model of policy behaviour^. 
Whereas such idea is certainly appealing and indicates an interesting direction for further 
theoretical research, our aim here is different. In particular, the use of [4] in an amended 
version of the model presented in the previous chapter would make the subsequent 
estimation of the derived policy rules hardly manageable.
More simply, we assume that the current value of the exchange rate is determined 
by the sum of two components: the differential between home country’s and Germany’s 
short-term interest rates, and a measure of the exchange rate risk. In what follows, we 
define the (log of the) exchange rate e, in terms of its deviations from the ERM parity with 
the German mark, which is in turn assumed to be, for simplicity, zero. The current 
exchange rate may then deviate from the central par according to :^
£( = - s ( R , +  [5]
In [5], we take the two interest rates used as the policy instruments in the home 
country and in Germany. We chose the Fibor rate as the foreign interest rate because it is 
strongly collinear, over the medium term, with the German call money rate, while its use 
avoids some likely simultaneity with home country’s policy instmment.
Equation [5] is a rough-and-ready way of char acterising the relationship between 
exchange rate expectations in each period and the credibility of the overall policy thrust. 
In particular, the equation is a linear approximation of a relationship that, given eq. [4], 
should be thought as non-linear in practice. According to it, the current exchange rate is 
affected by the current differential between domestic short interest rate and Germany’s 
Fibor rate F,^, while it is driven away from the parity whenever the exchange rate risk P,
Coles and Philippopoulos (1997) represents a first and successful attempt. 
 ^The superscript denotes German variables.
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is different from zero. While the rationale for such a law of motion is intuitive in our 
simplified context, it allows to model exchange rate dynamics avoiding exceedingly 
complex relationships. In particular, while it would be optimal to employ a relationship 
akin to [5], but closer to an uncovered interest parity, this would involve postulating some 
exogenously fixed mechanism of determination for exchange rate expectations. Here, our 
aim is different. The use of the above, ad hoc, relationship, will enable us to model the 
state of inflation and exchange rate expectations entirely within the model. Furthermore, 
its use allows us to characterise the influence of fiscal policy stance on future inflation 
expectations, without departing too much from the classical framework outlined by 
equation [4].
Finally, we assume that the exchange rate risk is fully reflected in the current 
long-term interest rate differential with Germany, = LR  ^-  LR f :
P,=r{LRi-LRf) [6]
Under normal circumstances, one may think that the long-term spread simply 
reflects expected differences in future inflation rates between the two countries. Favero, 
Giavazzi and Spaventa (1997) provide robust empirical evidence as to the determinants of 
the long yield spreads in Europe, and amongst these, exchange rate risk seems to explain 
well the recent historical behaviour of such spread against Germany.
As in the previous chapter, monetary policy authorities’s objectives are modelled 
such as to involve stabilisation, in each period, of the deviations of current inflation and 
output from respective targets n  and ÿ (the latter, as in the previous chapter, is assumed
to lie above the market-clearing level. See Bano and Gordon, 1983; Cukierman, 1992; 
Rogoff, 1985; Svensson, 1997a). Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) show that objectives 
like those sketched above can be derived directly from the minimisation of society’s 
welfare function.
Moreover, we assume with Svensson (2000a) that the central bank attempts to 
minimise interest rate changes, and the departures of the policy instrument from its 
expected value. Finally, ERM membership entails that authorities’ inflation target is given
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by German inflation®: ft - j u f , and that central bank’s loss function penalises deviations of 
the exchange rate from the zero parity:
h  -  +{}/ t~ÿ)  + A  (^f + a ( ^ j )  [7]
Given such objectives, the central bank has a clear incentive to set its policy 
instrument below the level expected by the private sector^, in the attempt to push output 
above its market-clearing level. However, the presence of the exchange rate band 
somehow shrinks such incentive, since, according to [5], a lower level of the short-term 
interest rate vis-à-vis the Fibor rate directly triggers depreciation. Participants in the 
foreign currency market, in turn, perceive the existence of this incentive, and adjust their 
expectations about inflation and the exchange rate accordingly.
Now, three scenarios are possible. In the first, called for simplicity Central Bank 
Dominance (CBD), monetary authorities rein in inflation and the exchange rate. Under 
such regime, the exchange rate parity is fully credible, i.e. the probability that the parity 
will be re-negotiated in the following period is zero. Under these circumstances, the 
exchange rate will not systematically diverge from the central par, because the expected 
inflation differential and the long-term interest rate differential between the two countries 
will not be different from zero. On the right-hand side of [5], the perceived exchange rate 
risk is zero, and the current exchange rate is unambiguously determined by the short-term 
interest differential. Since we assume that supply shocks are uncoiTelated, there is no 
scope for systematic inflation differentials between the home country and Germany. The 
current exchange rate then behaves according to:
Given that E, j  = the policy problem is to minimise [7] with respect to
the policy instrument, subject to [l]-[3] and [8], and holding expectations as given. We 
obtain the following optimal feedback rule for the short-term interest rate:
 ^This is consistent with traditional models of the ERM. See Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), and Giavazzi and Giovannini 
(1989)
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where
T = xp(p^ + +A  ^ [10]
\ -  X(pZn^  -XifPt ~ÿ)  +
In equilibrium, , and the short-term expected interest rate equals the
expected German Fibor.
In the alternative regime, called for convenience Fiscal Dominance (FD), the 
exchange rate band has zero credibility. The current exchange rate is not uniquely 
determined by monetary policy actions, because the bank is unable to control inflation. 
That is, under such a regime, there is a probability equal to one that a current fiscal shock 
will force the central bank to expand money supply in t+1 , and that the parity will be re­
negotiated***. In other words, the exchange rate risk is positive, and central bank’s actions 
in t affect the level of the current exchange rate only to a marginal extent, overridden by 
the “unbalancing” behaviour of the fiscal authority.
Consequently, the exchange rate is expected to depreciate by an extent 
proportional to the exchange rate risk. We saw that such risk is reflected in the current 
spread between interest rates on home and German long-term bonds. The current 
exchange rate in [4] is thus determined as;
4'^=-d^,-P?) + r{LR,-LRf) [11]
Under the present regime, the bank’s optimal feedback rule becomes;
Rf° = K . r + / - 1+ p,srS,}+ [ 12]
 ^Which, in a perfectly credible equilibrium, would coincide with the Fibor.
See Cukierman (1992), who, independently of the recent debate on the fiscal determination o f the price level, 
illustrates some rationale for a monetary surprise in presence o f a high level o f  public debt.
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Note that [12] differs from [9] for the presence of the term in the long interest rate 
spread within curly brackets.
Finally, let us assume that, in a third scenario, in t the market is uncertain about 
which regime in actually in place. In other terms, the exchange rate band is not fully 
credible. Market participants will assign some positive probability q to the event that the 
cuiTent regime is, in fact, one of FD. In this case, the current exchange rate will be a 
weighted average of [8] and [11];
= q [ - s { R , -F , ‘^ ) + r { L R , - L R f ) ]  + { l -q ) [ - s {R ,~ F , ‘=)] [13]
=  - s ( R , - F ° )  +  (jyS |
By solving the optimal policy problem under uncertainty about the fiscal 
policymaker behaviour, we obtain a reaction function akin to [12], but this time with the 
parameter associated to the yield spread modified by the factor q:
[14]
Under such regime, expected inflation is a weighted average of expected inflation 
prevailing in the FD and CBD scenarios. Obviously, to the extent to which the expected 
inflation diffeiential is leflected in the long-term spread, the latter should be collinear with 
expected inflation. We show below how we tried to avoid this collinearity problem when 
estimating oui leaction functions. In a multi-period framework, one can assume q as 
levised in each period according to the observed central bank’s behaviour, that is, agents 
revise q according to past exchange rate and inflation volatility. Following this, one might 
try to estimate some version of eq. [14].
In line with the analogous assumptions of the previous chapter, in the estimation 
of [14] we allow for imperfect information as to central bank’s objectives'*, and we also 
assume that the latter’s ability to predict the supply shock is limited. Following Muscatelli
“ Also assumed to be time-varying.
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(1998, 1999), Faust and Svensson (2000), and Walsh (1998), we let private sector’s beliefs 
about central banker’s relative inflation aversion to be represented by:
Zt = f c - i  + A A ~ (0/A-) [15]
In addition, we suppose that the policymaker has only limited knowledge of the 
state of the economy (the supply shock s,), that he/she makes inferences on it through a 
forecasting process, and that such forecast, sf, is private information. In each period, then, 
private agents are uncertain as to whether the shock they observe is due to a true supply 
shock, or it simply reflects a shift in policymaker’s preferences /q (Cukierman, 1992). 
Private sector’s perception of the interest rate rule will thus be different from [14], and 
will be:
Rf -  Cq + 4-^ , [16]
In [16], the par ameters are linear functions of those in equation [14], but now 
has replaced Xh and the supply shock is only the forecast of the one on the right-hand side 
of [14]. Note also that the coefficient C4 is a function of q, the exogenous probability 
assigned by the market to the likelihood of a regime of FD. Agents update their 
expectations about the business cycle and central banker’s preferences in each period, by 
looking at past disturbances’ variances.
In the case of a policy break, like the move to narrower exchange rate bands, the 
announcement of a tougher commitment to the parity, or the adoption of some fiscal 
convergence criteria, like those contained in the Maastricht Treaty, we have two possible 
scenarios. If the new regime is a fully credible one, the adjustment of equilibrium inflation 
and interest rates is immediate. Moreover, if the fiscal policy stance does not suggest a 
future switch to fiscal dominance, the coefficient q  in [16] should be close to zero. If the 
reform is instead only partly credible, nominal variables will adjust gradually to the new 
steady state. Assuming one can obtain estimates for the inflation and output regressors of 
the above relationship, significant and permanent changes of estimated coefficients in [16] 
could be easily detected. These, along with eventual instability of the overall equation in 
correspondence of major policy shifts, would signal either changes in policymakers’
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preferences, or the introduction of some institutional reforms, or both*^. In addition, the 
size and the behaviour of the estimated coefficient C4 will signal whether interest rate 
policy has in fact targeted the exchange rate risk as perceived by market paiticipants. In 
other words, with a perfectly credible central par, the central bank can exploit the 
exchange rate band to pursue domestic objectives. With less than full credibility, the 
current position of the exchange rate within the band signals the overall credibility of the 
exchange rate commitment. In the latter case, the central bank is ready to offset the effect 
of a positive exchange rate risk on the current exchange rate through interest rate changes 
not otherwise triggered by changes in the level of economic activity.
To sum up, what we aim to obtain, by studying estimated versions of reaction 
functions like [16], is an assessment of central banks’ conduct in France, Italy, Belgium 
and Ireland on the road to their participation to EMU. Such conduct can be usefully 
exemplified by estimated rules like [16], which capture the implicit way in which 
monetary policies translate in a simple rule expressed in terms of expected inflation, 
output gap and the long-term spread (in the spirit of Batini and Haldane, 1999).
As in the preceding chapter, we are not dogmatic about the functional form to be 
estimated. We shall include additional regressors to the baseline specification in [16]. In 
all the countries we examine, we will test whether variables like lagged money growth, or 
the change in central banks’ official reserves excluding gold, significantly enter the policy 
rule* .^ Cleariy, what matters when one evaluates the effectiveness and stability of policy 
rules, is their performance in terms of announced final, not intermediate, objectives. 
Should any of the above indicators enter an estimated reaction function, one would then 
conclude that the role it plays in the policy rule is similar to those played by final inflation, 
exchange rate and output objectives. Again, should we really find a significant role for 
money growth in the estimated interest rate function of any of the countries we study*'*, we 
would conclude that the stabilisation of money supply in that country took place at the 
expense of meeting final output, inflation, and exchange rate objectives.
The key difficulty with the estimation of reaction functions like [16] is 
represented by the availability of the unobserved series for expected inflation and potential 
output (Clarida et a.L, 1998; Gerlach and Smets, 1999; Favero and Rovelli, 1999), along
Of course, a third possibility would be that the observed instability is simply due to changes in the underlying 
behavioural relationships between the variables o f interest. The way in which we calculate the series for expected 
inflation and the output gap, however, takes into account such possibility.
In the case o f reserves, changes in their level significantly enter all estimated interest rate reaction functions.
This was the case with Italy over the latter part o f  the sample, as we show below.
with the identification of some updating mechanisms for all expected variables. In the 
previous chapter we showed that one optimal, though not unique, way of solving this 
issue, is applying the Kalman filter to such variables. As we adopt this technique here 
again, we refer to the brief discussion of such choice, and of the recent literature on 
monetary policy rules, contained in the previous chapter.
3. Econometric Methodology
3.1 Measuring Inflation Expectations and the Output Gap
Given the uncertainty with which the central bank is assumed to observe the 
behaviour of output and inflation, we adopted an unobserved component approach to the 
derivation of trend inflation and output’ .^ In particular, the calculation of our measures of 
expected inflation and potential output involved fitting a Structural Time Series model 
(STS, Harvey, 1989) to a univariate*^ specification of inflation and real GDP processes*^. 
The STS methodology allows to find an appropriate decomposition of the original series 
into (stochastic) trend and cyclical components, using a Kalman filter estimation 
procedure. The latter constitutes a natural way of allowing model parameters to be 
optimally and gradually updated, as new information becomes available. This way, the 
model better reflects the gradual learning by private agents’ -and central bank’s- of the 
behaviour of inflation and output processes, as new information becomes available. 
Furthermore, it allows incorporating private agents’ learning about central bankers’ 
preferences into the estimation strategy we pursue. As we have seen, this aspect is critical 
in a context of imperfect information like ours. ML estimation of the hyperparameters of 
interest then ensues. In the present case, both series contained marked cyclical 
components, which were modelled by allowing for one or two stochastic cycles, as 
needed*^.
For a similar, though not identical, application o f the unobserved component approach to the estimation of the output 
gap in the EMU area, see Gerlach and Smets (1999).
As in the previous chapter, we tried a multivariate specification of the model. The series were allowed to respond to 
simultaneous and lagged innovations o f other macroeconomic variables, but the explanatory power o f such 
specifications was never greater than in the univariate case. We then definitely chose the latter. Further details on the 
generation o f regressors and the econometric methodology are available from the author upon request.
Again, in Chapter 1 we extensively motivate this choice, and discuss some possible alternatives.
The STAMP 5.0 software was used to estimate the STS models, through the conventional concentrated diffuse 
likelihood technique. Output and inflation were found to be 1(1), and to have significant cyclical components. For a 
similar approach to forecasting inflation in the presence of potential structural breaks, see Stock and Watson (1999). The 
trends were specified according to a “stochastic level, damped slope” formulation, which however did not yield 
substantial differences relative to the “fixed level, stochastic slope” case.
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We estimated quarterly models for real GDP and inflation for each country, 
obtaining a decomposition of the series into trend, cycle, and irregular components. In the 
case of GDP, a convenient decomposition was generated by applying the Kalman filter on 
the trend component. The latter was then optimally computed based on one-step-ahead 
predictions of the state vector. This way, estimates of potential output aie based only on 
past information, rather than on the full sample.
In the case of inflation, we simply computed one-step-ahead prediction errors 
from a univariate STS model to obtain a measure of expected and unanticipated inflation. 
This way, model parameters are updated only gradually, as new infoimation becomes 
available. The use of the basic filter, as opposed to the smoothing algorithm (Kim and 
Nelson, 1999), guaiantees that future observations never affect the calculation of the 
stochastic components.
We finally turned to the estimation of the interest rate reaction function [16], for 
each country, using simple Recursive Least Squares*^. Recursive estimates are pai'ticularly 
useful when, as in the present case, one needs to observe how estimated coefficients 
evolve over time. Moreover, we performed conventional structural-stability tests on the 
residuals of each equation, to capture eventual signs of breaks.
We estimated the quarterly models for the four economies over a sample starting 
in 1980Q1 and ending in I997Q2. The data we use are quarterly observations taken from 
OECD Main Economic Indicators and IMF International Financial Statistics, as described 
in the Data Appendix.
3,2 Interest Rate Differentials and Expected Inflation
As explained in Section 2 and in the Introduction, one of our aims is to 
understand the effects that the credibility of the fiscal stance had on interest rate policies. 
This task can be tackled in many fashions. An ideal one would be assessing the alternative 
effects of the business cycle and fiscal policies on the monetary stance. Some recent work 
on the effects of the fiscal stance argues that the latter may pose additional constraints on 
the way in which inflation is generated (Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 1998). In particular, 
such literature draws a distinction between regimes of central bank dominance (CBD) and
Estimated coefficients are computed using the author’s GAUSS code. Stability tests are conducted using PcGive 9.1.
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those of fiscal dominance (FD). In the latter, primary surpluses are not responsive to the 
level of public debt, so that the price level and the money stock need to adjust to ensure 
fiscal solvency^^. Inflation simply adjusts to the needs of fiscal solvency. Under a CBD 
regime, instead, primary surpluses systematically react to the level of public debt, and 
inflation is determined according to central bank’s unconstrained optimal feedback rule 
for money supply and interest rates. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any significant 
application of this interesting literature to an open-economy context.
Melitz (1997) provides some empirical support to the idea that, over the sample 
we are studying, the complementarities between budget and monetary policies within 
European countries (and elsewhere) were substantial. In other words, there appears to be 
trace of tout-court fiscal dominance in none of the former ERM countries. In principle, 
however, the strategic interactions between fiscal and monetary policies -and authorities- 
in presence of budget rules as those endorsed by the Maastricht Treaty, are quite complex. 
Very recent work (Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000) has shed some light on the issue of 
whether the above-mentioned “fiscal theory of price level determination” (Woodford, 
1995; Canzoneri and Diba, 1996; Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 1998; Cochrane, 2000) 
helps explaining some of these theoretical features. Sorne more sophisticated empirical 
research is however needed, and with reference to individual ERM countries, as well as 
for the EMU area as a whole, under way.
In the previous section, we illustrated a simple way in which the interactions 
between the public and the monetary authorities in presence of an exchange rate 
agreement may unfold. Our theoretical model says that the spread between the interest rate 
on long-term bonds relative to Germany can be employed as a measure of the overall 
credibility of economic policy stance, as perceived by financial markets participants. More 
precisely, we assumed that the long-term spread might reflect the market view about the 
likelihood that national authorities may be forced to expand monetary policy, thus 
loosening control of inflation and the exchange rate. The larger such probability, the larger 
the spread. If the spread systematically enters an estimated version of our final reaction 
function in equation [16], we then conclude that interest rate policies in that country have 
been reacting to the perceived exchange rate risk associated to the country position within 
the ERM band. We can then view such simple mechanism as one that guarantees an 
observable link between the behaviour of fiscal authorities and that of monetary
That is, to ensure that government’s intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied.
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authorities. The size and the behaviour over time of the coefficient attached to the spread 
in the estimated reaction function then describe the extent to which the fiscal stance 
constituted an additional constraint on national interest rate policies.
However, there are intuitive reasons to expect that long-tenn interest rates 
differentials and expected inflation are strongly collinear. Using the pure interest rate 
differential as a regressor in our estimates would involve dealing with an aggregate 
measure of the exchange rate risk that is clearly correlated with expected inflation.
Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa (1997) study the daily behaviour of the spread on 
the 10-year benchmark bonds of Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Germany^*. They identify and 
measure three components of such spread: one directly related to the expectation of 
exchange rate depreciation, another due to differences in tax regimes across countries, and 
one which reflects the market assessment of default risk. While it would be optimal to 
consider such complex decomposition in our work, its use would invariably complicate 
the subsequent estimation of reaction functions. Therefore, we limit ourselves to the 
calculation of a measure of the exchange risk more closely associated with the first and 
third component identified by Favero et a l  (1997). We attempt to do so by purging the 
component of the total differential directly associated with expected inflation, and 
obtaining a proxy for the pai't of exchange rate risk orthogonal to inflation expectations. 
Simple recursive regressions of the interest differential on expected inflation, for each 
country, appealed to serve the purpose without significant bearings on the precision of our 
final estimates. Residuals from those recursive regressions (Adjspread) were then inserted 
as regressors into our baseline reaction function, along with expected inflation, the output 
gap, and other regressors.
Though difficult to inteipret, the results of these preliminary regressions (Table 
1) are as expected. The coefficients are all strongly significant and correctly signed.
Finally, as we have already mentioned, we explicitly account for the possibility 
that the central bank might have responded to changes in intermediate objectives not 
included in our baseline specification. The inclusion of additional regressors like money 
growth and the change in central bank’s foreign exchange reserves excluding gold, is 
tested for each equation. Those additional variables would not be relevant simply because 
they provide information about future inflation and real activity. This will instead allow us 
to check whether such variables had some relevance in the formulation of interest rate
We calculate the spread on the same category of bonds.
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policies, beyond the effects that they might have had on the generation of inflation 
expectations, the exchange rate risk, and the output gap.
To better fix ideas before commenting on the results of estimated interest rate 
reaction functions, we briefly examine some of the major developments involving the 
economic policies of each country during the period covered by our estimates.
4. Monetary and exchange rate developments in France, Italy, Belgium and Ireland
According to many historical accounts^^, the ERM was not initially established as 
a rigid system of fixed exchange rates. The universal perception was that each country’s 
parity could have been adjusted according to accommodate changes in underlying 
economic conditions. In fact, during the first four years, seven (out of twelve) 
realignments took place. As time went on, however, the system evolved towards a more 
rigid regime, and the years between 1987 and 1992-93’s breakdown (the so-called “hard 
ERM” phase) witnessed no adjustment^^ at all. Since 2 August 1993, the bilateral margins 
around the exchange rate parities were widened from ±6 to ± 15%.
What follows is a concise history of the interplay between domestic 
macroeconomic conditions and the external constraint represented by the ERM, in the 
group of countries under study.
The Banque de France has repeatedly argued that since late ‘70s its policy had 
relied on two fundamental interaiediate objectives: strict adherence to the ERM, and 
money supply growth (Fratianni and Salvatore, 1993; OECD, 1999c). Since 1977, the 
Bank has set targets for monetary growth: M2, from 1988 to 1990, M3 thereafter.
During the first years of French participation to the EMS, the commitment to the 
exchange rate tar get seemed a relatively loose one, and capital controls were heavily used 
to shield domestic money markets from “undesirable” fluctuations. In 1984, however, the 
overall policy thrust turned unambiguously more anti-inflationar y, and the activation of a 
stricter targeting of the exchange rate, rather than of money growth, gradually took place. 
The “hard ERM” phase in early ‘90s saw France’s attempts -as well as other countries’ 
ones- to seek further convergence of domestic inflation levels with Germany.
See Fratianni and von Hagen (1992), amongst others.
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Consequently, between 1984 and 1990 capital controls were progressively dismantled. 
However, the run-up to closer monetary co-ordination within the EMS broke down during 
1992-1993, when the franc was forced outside “strict” targeting of the DM. Despite that, 
the Banque de France managed to control inflation and the exchange rate. According to an 
interesting view of the events following the ERM break-up in 1992-93 (Baitolini and 
Prati, 1999), those events changed the exchange rate strategy of the Bank. Its policy of 
tolerating short-lived fluctuations of the DM/FF rate, while still strongly committed to 
longer-term exchange rate parity, nairowed the scope for short-run speculation^"*. Since the 
overall stance of economic policies appealed consistent with the pursuit of a rigid 
exchange rate in the long mn, that strategy helped in stabilising inflationary expectations 
as well.
From an operational point of view, the mid-eighties saw a major change in the 
conduct of French monetary policy (Melitz, 1993; Mojon, 1998). A number of financial 
reforms progressively abolished the regime of administrative credit rationing and the day- 
to-day official fixing of the interbank rate prevailed up to 1987. Moreover, the Banque de 
France began to provide liquidity to the system acting essentially on the interbank and 
overnight money markets. Until the start of EMU’s Stage Three, repurchase agreements 
were the main source of central bank money.
Finally, it is important to note that the Bank was granted full legal independence
in 1993.
Since the split of 1981 with the Treasury, the Bank of Italy gained a substantial 
amount of formal independence. This in turn enabled it to gradually switch, as in the 
French case, from the use of credit ceilings to standard interest rate policy^^. In recent 
years, the interest rate on repurchase agreements seemed to have become the main policy 
instrument (Gaiotti, 1999). In 1984, the Bank announced the first M2 official target"^. It 
soon became clear that, however, monetary targets were subordinate to the government-set 
exchange-rate target, and that eventual harmonisation between the two had still to pass 
through restrictions to capital flows.
Aside from the narrowing o f Italian lira’s band, in 1990.
Anthony and MacDonald (1999) find some empirical evidence supporting this view. Their work shows that the mean- 
reverting properties o f various ERM exchange rates were essentially the same with the broad band as with the narrow 
band.
See Spinelli and Tirelli (1993), Fratianni and Spinelli (1997), Gaiotti, Gavosto and Grande (1997).
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Italy had joined the ERM as a founding member in 1979, though the initial wider 
band, several realignments and strong capital controls made the exchange rate constraint 
relatively flexible throughout the first half of the eighties. Clearly, full financial 
liberalisation occurred only when (early 1990s) a more favourable climate of confidence 
about inflation control temporarily relieved the pressure on the exchange rate. At the same 
time, the lira entered the narrow band of the ERM. A loose fiscal policy stance and the 
mounting public debt, however, have cast a recurrent shadow on the ability of Italian 
monetary authorities to control nominal variables^^. Thus, concerns became to grow over 
the compatibility of the current state of public finances with EMU provisions (the 
Maastricht Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992), if not with medium- to long-ran 
overall sustainability^®. The dramatic exit of the lira from the ERM in 1992 appeared, inter 
alia^^, as a direct consequence of such concerns.
Meanwhile, successful agreements on labour costs in 1992-93 had contributed to 
ease the pressure on inflationaiy expectations. However, the flight to foreign currency- 
denominated assets that accompanied the currency crisis was halted only when decisive 
steps towards a badly needed fiscal correction were finally undertaken by the second half 
of the ‘90s. By then, a more optimistic outlook for public finances probably contributed to 
somehow lower the risk premium on lira-denominated assets. In November 1996, Italy 
rejoined the ERM, and in 1998 the Bank of Italy became one the 11 founding Members of 
the ECB.
Belgian monetary authorities have always argued that in a small open economy 
the relationship between the exchange rate and inflation was far' more stable, and reliable, 
for policy purposes, than the growth of monetary aggregates (targeted by Germany’s 
authorities since 1974). Consequently, since the collapse of Bretton Woods, Belgium 
(along with the Netherlands), had joined various exchange rate arrangements in the
The official intermediate objective of the Bank had previously been total domestic credit. This, as discussed in Spinelli 
and Tirelli (1993), and Fratianni and Spinelli (1997), entailed large crowding-out of private-sector credit and lack o f 
control on monetary aggregates, in presence of large government budget deficits.
”  For an effective assessment o f the effects o f these considerations on currency markets, see Giorgianni (1997).
The ratio of central government deficit to nominal national income almost doubled in the decade 1981-91 relative to 
the previous one (Fratianni and Spinelli, 1997).
One of the other most commonly argued causes unfolds as follows. The Italian participation to the ERM witnessed the 
accumulation o f substantial inflation differentials between Italy and the other participating countries. Occasional parity 
realignments never fully compensated for such differentials. This way, the lira appeared, in the early ‘90s, as 
considerably appreciated, in real terms, vis-à-vis the other ERM members. The 1992 breakdown was then produced by 
long-term competitiveness difficulties, and directly triggered by the interest rate shocks following the German 
reunification. This argument, however, does not take account the existence o f diverging productivity trends between 
Germany and its ERM partners (for such considerations, see, for example, Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba and Eudey, 1998)
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attempt to provide a nominal anchor to its economy^**. Aside from a devaluation of 8.5% 
in February 1982, in the 1980s monetary policy was essentially designed to maintain 
stable exchange rates between the franc and the ECU. In 1990, monetary authorities 
finally declared their intention to peg the currency against the D-maik within a very 
narrow range of fluctuation.
As in Italy, substantial budget imbalances generated relatively high real interest 
rates throughout the Belgian participation to the ERM. However, a decisive strategy of 
fiscal consolidation, pursued over the medium term, has progressively boosted confidence 
in the currency and overall policy credibility, then narrowing the scope for speculative 
attacks (see IMF, 1998; Perotti, Strauch and von Hagen, 1998). Moreover, the stability- 
oriented monetary policy of the seventies and eighties managed to curb inflation towards 
German levels already since mid-eighties. That strongly contributed to the decline of 
interest rate differentials with Germany, and to a steadily credible climate surrounding 
economic policies.
Until 1979, the prospects of the Irish monetary policy were closely tied with 
those of Britain, since Ireland had adopted a currency board fixed on the British sterling. 
This resulted, amongst other things, in a significant depreciation of the Irish punt against 
many “snake’s” currencies. The entry of Ireland in the EMS in 1979, however, did not 
result in immediate convergence of domestic inflation on German levels. The strong trade 
links with Britain meant that the domestic price level was still closely tied to the British 
one, and that the persistent real appreciation of sterling was affecting Irish competitiveness 
as well. Moreover, as in the case of Italy and Belgium, substantial budget imbalances 
developed over the years have recunently put the currency at risk of speculative attacks. 
However, the severe macroeconomic adjustment carried out since 1984 did start to 
produce some effects in the second part of the decade. In fact, between 1987 and 1989 the 
differential with German long-term interest rates dropped, as the main consequence of a 
more optimistic economic outlook and increased credibility of the fiscal stance on asset 
markets. Subsequently, a mix of tax cuts, parity realignments, and wage moderation 
boosted competitiveness, which stimulated a further economic expansion since 1994. This 
paiticulai' chain of events is now commonly classified as one of the few cases of 
“expansionary fiscal adjustment” depicted in the recent literature on budget consolidation
See National Bank of Belgium (1998) for a summary o f the history o f Belgian franc.
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(see Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano, 2000)^*. The monetary 
authorities then left the punt to significantly appreciate vis-à-vis the D-mark, strategy 
subsequently reversed in 1997, and in 1998, when a 3% revaluation of the punt was the 
last official realignment of ERM history.
5. ERM in Action: Monetary Policy Reaction Functions
In Section 2 we saw that a simple policy reaction function can be derived within a 
standard sticky price model with fixed -bu t “adjustable”-  exchange rates. Moreover, the 
class of policy rules in equation [16] is broadly consistent with the inflation-forecast based 
rules recently advocated in the monetary policy design literature (Svensson, 1997b, 2000a; 
Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999; Batini and Haldane, 1999). Here we simply refer to the 
considerations contained in the previous chapter for a discussion of such rules.
Bearing in mind the events summarised in the previous section, we then turn to 
illustrating our estimates of the interest rate reaction functions for France, Italy, Belgium 
and Ireland, using quarterly data for each country. The policy instrument we adopted for 
each central bank has been chosen following widespread opinions in the literature on the 
transmission of monetar y policy impulses, and in all cases but Italy coincides with the call 
money rate. Further details on the single series are contained in the Data Appendix. The 
sample chosen is 1980Q1-1997Q2 for all countries.
In principle, congruent models of monetary policies during the EMS should be 
able to unveil some systematic link between national interest rate policies and inflation 
and interest rates in Germany^^. Our results confirm that during the “hard ERM” phase of 
the EMS the leeway for the countries under investigation to carry out independent 
monetary policies, had overall shrunk, as one would expect. Policies do appear to have 
converged over time towards the behaviour of interest rates in Germany, and to have taken 
the exchange rate commitment with a progressively tougher attitude. Such shift, however, 
has been relatively gradual. Some country can be seen as adapting its national policies in 
order to achieve a swift, though not painless, convergence towards low and stable 
inflation. Others have probably suffered from the presence of structural hurdles that
For a short but effective account o f those Irish events, see Obstfeld (1998).
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initially prevented full monetary co-ordination with the rest of Europe. Our measure of 
credibility, i.e., the adjusted spread on long-tenn bonds vis-à-vis Germany, significantly 
enters all estimated reaction functions, whereas the output gap never does so. On the other 
hand, the generalised significance of the coefficient attached to changes in foreign 
exchange reserves provides us with some additional evidence in favour of exchange rate 
considerations playing a substantial role in each central bank’s policy. This overall 
confirms that the ERM bands were not a fully credible exchange rate regime, and that 
fiscal imbalances may have played a significant role in interest rate determination.
The illustration of our findings for each country proceeds as follows. Tables 2 
and 3 displays estimates for the long-run solved static reaction functions, while the 
recursive graphs in Figures 1-4 show estimated coefficients -between 2-standard .error 
bands^^- and Chow’s tests of structural stability. The study of single recursive 
coefficients’ path over time can provide for an educated guess of possible shifts in 
monetary authorities’ preferences. However, the relevance of such changes can be fully 
gauged only with reference to their impact on the estimated reaction function as a whole.
Our estimates for France (Table 2, Figure 1) show that monetary authorities 
have been shadowing German policies at least over the last decade. The coefficient 
associated with the 3-month German Fibor rate is significant and larger than the one on 
domestic expected inflation. Clearly, French authorities appear to have signalled their 
commitment to an anti-inflationary stance through a close shadowing of German interest 
rates. In parallel, domestic inflation considerations have apparently played a minor role in 
the setting of French interest rates in recent yeas. Recursive graphs show how this pattern 
has gradually but firmly been enhanced: after 1985, the coefficient on domestic inflation 
steadily falls, while the one on the German rate rises by nearly the same extent. The 
(adjusted) spread on German bunds seems to play an important role during the “soft 
ERM” phase. The gradual relative reduction of French fiscal activism, however, may have 
contributed to the decline of this coefficient, as the graph clearly shows. Interestingly, the 
coefficient associated with the changes in reserves, tough small, is always significant, 
whereas the growth of any monetary aggregates does not significantly enter the equation.
Overall, the estimated equation shows some sign of instability in correspondence 
of the 1992-93 ERM crisis. Since then the coefficients have slightly larger standard errors,
An attempt in this sense, involving EMU-wide measures of output gaps, can be found in Gerlach and Smets (1999). 
Gerlach and Schnabel (1999) instead perform a brief exercise aimed at estimating a Taylor rule for the EMU area 
centred on the latter part of our sample.
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and the lup Chow test explicitly displays a break around those events. We interpret this as 
evidence that the uncertainties surrounding the start of Stage Three of EMU had some 
bearing on French interest rates’ behaviour. Nevertheless, the size of these fluctuations is 
relatively small, compared to other countries in the sample -notably Italy- and the N-down 
Chow test is unable to pick up significant disturbances.
After a cursory look at these results, it is plain to say that the whole thrust of 
French monetary policy has turned progressively more inflation-averse since mid-eighties. 
The deceleration in inflation that ensued turns out to be the likely consequence of a change 
in central bank’s and/or public’s attitude towards inflation, as well as of some underlying 
structural change. As we saw in the previous section, structural adjustment replaced output 
stabilisation as a policy priority, while policies aimed at the liberalisation of prices and the 
lifting of capital restrictions were enforced in parallel with a less expansionary budget 
stance. A closer pegging of the franc vis-à-vis the D-mark made French interest rates 
progressively more sensitive to monetary developments in Germany. Such results also 
show that the “soft” exchange rate bands implemented since the 1992-93 crisis did not 
entail significant loosening in inflation control (as observed by Bartolini and Prati, 1999; 
see also Anthony and MacDonald, 1999).
Estimates of the policy rule for Italy (Table 2, Figure 2) find a significant 
coefficient on domestic expected inflation, the highest value in our country sample. In 
addition, the coefficient on Germany’s Fibor, contrary to all other countries, overall is 
barely significant, and its size, as displayed in the recursive graphs, tends to shrink 
substantially after 1989. Some rationale to these results can perhaps be found by looking 
at the relevance of exchange rate risk considerations: the coefficient on the spread against 
German bonds is strongly significant and outweighs all other parameters. Recursive 
graphs show that its size seems to have grown in parallel with the well-known concerns 
about Italy’s budgetary position. This points towards fiscal policy having peculiarly heavy 
effects on market perception about monetary authorities’ ability to control inflation. 
According to the theoretical scheme laid out in Section 2, if the central bank is able to 
control inflation and exchange rate fluctuations in the long run, the current exchange rate 
depends on the expected sequence of short-term rates and exchange rate risk 
considerations. These are in turn affected by expectations about the business cycle, and by 
the belief that the Central Bank will intervene to stabilise the exchange rate. On the
Recursive estimates are obtained with a GAUSS code, and plotted using GiveWin. Stability tests are from PcGive 9.1.
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contrary, if fiscal authorities do not stabilise public debt, the current exchange rate 
becomes independent from the cunent actions of the Bank, and it is instead affected by the 
belief that monetary policy will sooner or later be forced to create a regime of high 
inflation and realign the parity. In this case, the long-teim spread measures fiscal policy 
credibility, and the size of the coefficient attached to it in our estimated policy rules 
reflects the likelihood that markets attribute to such event. We believe that our findings for 
Italy strongly support the latter scenario.
In all instances, 1992-93 appears as a turning point for monetary policy. Around 
early 1990s, the record levels of public debt of the past decade had clearly undermined the 
overall credibility of economic policies. Furthermore, the resilience of Italian fiscal 
policymakers in pursuing a policy of “benign neglect” towards the state of public finances 
between late eighties and early nineties likely reinforced this tendency (Fratianni and 
Spinelli, 1997). Consequently, the spread of Italian long-term bonds vis-à-vis their 
German analogues simply inflated. In the presence of restrictions on capital flows and 
wide exchange rate bands, this might still be consistent with some form of exchange rate 
co-ordination. But once such “allowances” were lifted, the only chance an independent 
Banc a d’ltalia had of controlling nominal variables was to restrict interest rate policy to 
offset the impact of unbalanced fiscal policies on exchange-rate risk. This is why our 
adjusted measure of the interest rate differential, a direct indicator of fiscal policy 
credibility, turns out to be even more relevant than domestic inflation for interest rate 
setting.
In line with this interpretation, our estimates clearly signal a structural break 
around the 1992-93 ERM crisis. Since those turbulent events, the overall thrust of 
economic policies appears more firmly oriented towards achieving price stability and 
budgetary consolidation (OECD, 1999b).
Interestingly, Italy is also the only country in the sample in which the growth of a 
monetary aggregate (Ml in this case), though only since recent years, significantly enters 
the central bank’s policy mle. Prior tests did not reveal M2 growth, the announced 
intermediate target, as a significant regressor. M l is probably the most relevant monetary 
aggregate if pure transactions are targeted as intermediate objective of monetary policy. 
Nonetheless, the majority of existing estimates of policy reaction functions agree on the
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empirical irrelevance of such a case^ "*. hi addition, it is clear that in periods of rapid 
inflation fall, M l growth is strongly affected by adjustments in real money holdings, and it 
becomes completely unreliable as an indicator of economic activity^^.
Turning to the two smaller countries in our sample, estimates for Belgium (Table 
3, Figure 3) appear broadly in line with those obtained for France. The coefficient on 
expected inflation, however, is small and barely significant. At the same time, while the 
evident significance of Germany’s Fibor highlights the announced strategy of convergence 
on Bundesbank’s interest rate policy, the adjusted spread against German bonds plays a 
prominent role in central bank’s reaction function. This is particularly evident in the early 
part of the sample, as the coefficient significantly shrank since late 1980s onwards. 
Interestingly, the rise in the size of Fibor’s estimated coefficient is almost perfectly 
mirrored by the fall in the coefficient on expected inflation and the adjusted spread. The 
short-term interest rate seemed to react, in line with results on all other countries, to the 
change in reserves as well. A glimpse at the recursive graphs shows that the country’s 
interest rate reaction function was quite stable over time: very narrow confidence bands 
around all coefficients, little evidence of significant breaks, even around the 1992-93 
crisis. That is, our estimated policy rule shows an overall stable relationship between 
interest rates, inflation, and the exchange rate. Belgian monetary policy could have 
suffered, as the Italian one, from the presence of a record level of public debt, and the 
subsequent rise in exchange rate risk premia. However, nominal convergence with 
Germany seems to have been pursued more resolutely than in the Italian case, and fiscal 
consolidation was successfully achieved over a medium- to long-term horizon (OECD, 
1999). Both processes substantially staved off speculative attacks, and further enhanced 
exchange rate stability.
The picture sketched by the estimated reaction function for Ireland (Table 3, 
Figure 4) is somehow halfway through what we found for Belgium and Italy. The 
coefficient on expected inflation highlights the importance of domestic inflation
The most orthodox example o f monetary targeting regime, Germany, is now seen in the literature as an implicit 
inflation targeter (inter alia, Bemanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen, 1999). The majority o f  the available evidence 
points out that monetary aggregates are never significant in estimated reaction functions for the G3 and the inflation 
targeting regimes (Clarida, Gall and Gertler, 1998, and the previous chapter). In any instance, however, broad rather than 
narrow monetary aggregates are universally indicated as the ones with more desirable stability and controllability 
properties (see Friedman and Kuttner, 1996, or Friedman, 1996, for a detailed account of the failures o f monetary 
targeting experiments in the US).
See the extensive discussion in Chapter 3. With reference to the present case, an advocate o f monetary targeting in 
Europe argues: “When a country attempts to maintain a fixed value of the currency vis-à-vis the DM, internal monetary 
developments become theoretically highly endogenous, and almost unmanageable for the monetary authorities” 
(Groeneveld, 1998).
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stabilisation as a final objective of monetary policy, whereas the output gap, in line with 
what we expect for a country that experienced sustained fiscal expansions, is never 
significant.
Changes in official reserves play a significantly stronger role than in other 
countries. This points to their role as to a short-run absorber for shocks to the exchange 
rate, given the recurrent misalignments triggered, inter alia, by the exceptional economic 
growth of the last decade.
Peculiarly, both coefficients on the long-term spread and the German Fibor do 
not significantly differ from one in recent years. This signals a very strong attitude on the 
part of the Central Bank of Ireland towards shadowing Bundesbank’s interest rate policies, 
while trying to offset the ups and downs of a prolonged fiscal consolidation (see Alesina 
and Perotti, 1997; Perotti, Strauch and von Hagen, 1998). The coefficient on the adjusted 
spread was very large until 1989-1990; thereafter the severe fiscal retrenchment enacted ~ 
and facilitated by strong real growth- likely made it converge towards lower levels.
Overall, the policy iiile appears relatively stable in recent years; confidence bands 
are relatively narrow around estimated coefficients, while the only peak displayed by one 
of the structural stability tests is found in correspondence of the 1992 currency crisis. 
Since then, the behaviour of interest rates in Iieland became even more synchronised with 
ERM’s core, although the sustained economic growth, as we saw, required some 
additional exchange rate adjustment.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have examined the behaviour of interest rate policies in 
France, Italy, Belgium, and Ireland, during the eighties and on their more recent road to 
EMU. Estimated reaction functions for each countiy provided us with some evidence 
about the relative costs these countries faced in maintaining the parities within the ERM, 
and in fulfilling the basic convergence criteria laid out in the Maastricht Treaty. The role 
of exchange rate risk, and the way long-term interest rate differentials reflected the overall 
credibility of fiscal policies in each country, has been analysed in relation to the trade-offs 
national policymakers faced between domestic and external objectives. By allowing each
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country’s policy rule to reflect the extent to which exchange rate risk affected interest rate 
determination independently from expected inflation, we obtained an indirect measure of 
how fiscal policy credibility influenced central bank’s decisions.
Our findings highlight quite clearly that in some cases (France, Belgium) the 
process of convergence towards a stable exchange rate vis-à-vis Germany and a tight 
inflation control took place amidst sustained policy reforms over a medium- to long-term 
horizon. In addition, the ERM turbulence in 1992-93 does not appear to have impaired the 
largely achieved macroeconomic stability. On the contrary, Italy’s, and to a much lesser 
extent, Ireland’s monetary policies, seem to have been severely constrained, in their 
efforts to stabilise the economy, by the lack of credibility of their respective fiscal stances. 
For Ireland, such pattern appears to have been promptly reversed, likely with the help of a 
very favourable growth outlook. For Italy, well-founded concerns surrounding its 
macroeconomic policies at the eve of Stage Three of EMU severely affected interest rate 
policies. Some more consistent fiscal consolidation somehow eased the process of 
nominal convergence vis-à-vis the other Member countries, but only in latter part of the 
sample.
Overall, our results appear as a first empirical validation, with reference to 
European countries, of the idea that fiscal imbalances do impose some additional 
constraint on the manoeuvrability of monetary policies. This message appears even more 
relevant in the context of a unified European monetary policy process. Calls for fiscal 
restraint and sounder national budget policies within the Stability and Growth Pact are 
addressed on a recurrent basis by the new monetary authorities. Some observers even 
attribute the current alleged weakness of the external value of the euro to single countries’ 
social security long-term solvency problems.
In the EMS context, the relationships between a country’s budgetary position and 
interest rate determination were somehow made more evident by the further presence of a 
binding constraint on economic policies -the ERM band. The adoption of exchange rate 
agreements made financial markets, and the public in general, more aware of the new 
trade-off faced by monetary authorities, by attaching extra penalties to departures of 
interest rate policies from an anti-inflationaiy stance. It is clear that financial markets and 
policy observers for the very same reason scrupulously and critically monitor the 
behaviour of the European Central Bank. Whether the interesting results found in this
103
study are going to be observed for the euro area as a whole and for other economies, is left 
as a direction for further research.
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Data Appendix
Variables were taken from OECD Main Economic Indicators and IMF 
International Financial Statistics. In most cases, we were able to employ seasonally 
adjusted data. For each country we measured real output using the GDP at constant price 
series. The inflation series were defined as simple 4-quarter log-differences in the all­
items CPI. Below we briefly list the short-term interest rates we chose as policy indicators, 
and the definition of variables in the graphs contained in the Data Appendix. Rates are 
generally converted from monthly series.
Country Modelled Interest Rate Variable
F r a n c e Call Money Rate
I ta l y 3-Month Interbank Deposits (Overnight)
B e l g iu m Call Money Rate
Ir e l a n d Call Money Rate
Variable Definition
E x p in f
A d j Sp r e a d
G e r F ib o r
R e s e r v e s
M 1 (3 )G r o w t h
Expected inflation, as described in the main text 
Adjusted spread, as described in the main text
3-month German Fibor
4-quarter log-difference in official reserves excluding gold 
4-quarter log-difference in M1(M3) Growth
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Constant Coefficient
France 0.025337(0.0028092) 0.65963(0.174470) 0.171613
Italy 0.030986(0.0039753) 0.40003(0.047464) 0.510899
Belgium 0.0067862(0.0023722) 0.39122(0.056233) 0.41227
Ireland 0.032671(0.0030398) 0.39169(0.10448) 0.169222
T able 1. P re lim in a ry  reg ress io n s . F ran ce , Ita ly , B elg ium , Irelan d , 1980Q1-1997Q2.
Results are from RLS regi'essions of the spread between the yields on national long-term bonds and that 
on analogous German Bunds on expected inflation (standard  errors in parentheses).
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Country/Regressor France Italy
Constant 0.0324(0.004901) 0.06893(0 .007694)
Expected Inflation 0.5583(0 .115) 0 .7067(0.07481)
Output Gap 0.152(0 .1331) -0.1584(0.3602)
GerFibor 0.8559(0 .06993) 0 .2047(0.1252)
Adjspread 0 .8625(0.07898) 0.9645(0.1467)
Variable Addition M3 Growth 0.08616 (0.06205) M l Growth 0.1347(0.05864)
Tests
A R e s e iy e s -0.01434 (0.0072) A R e serves -0.0151 (0.00875)
Summary
Statistics
k" 0.918652 
O' 0.0101441 D W  '  J g j
P ” ’ =
1.7875 [0.1860]
0.953379
^ 0.00831553 DW
RFSET 16.113 [0.0003J 
7.646 [0.0074J
T able 2. E stim a ted  in te r e s t  ra te  re a c tio n  fu n ctio n s. F ran ce and  Ita ly , 1980Q1- 
1997Q2. S ta tic  L ong-R un S o lu tion s.
All results are obtained from Recursive Least Squares r'egj'essions of the monetary instrument on a 
constant, the indicated regressors, and one lag o f the dependent variable. Regressors ai'e defined in the 
main text. Asym ptotic standard errors in parentheses. We tested for the addition of other regi'essors. Zero 
restrictions on lagged money growth and the 4-quarter change in the (log of) official reserves of foreign 
currency were tested by including them in the baseline regression. Asymptotic standard errors are in 
parentheses. AR is a LM  test for the hypothesis o f no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether residuals 
have an ARCH  structure, with no ARCH as the null; N orm ality tests the normality of residuals; RESET  
tests the null o f no functional mis-specification. P-values in brackets.
ill
Country/Regressor Belgium Ireland
Constant 0.01362(0.003863)
0.04562
(0.01502)
Expected Inflation 0.1441(0.06617) 0.5312(0.1864)
Output Gap -0.02964(0.05137) 0.1962(0.2266)
GerFibor 0.877(0.06842) 0.9121(0.2122)
Adjspread 0.8809(0.1076) 1.074(0.2172)
Variable Addition M3 Growth 0.02811 (0.02532) M3 Growth -0.005084 (0.05689)
Tests
AReserves -0.01522 (0.00650) AResetwes -0.07666 (0.02123)
Summary
Statistics
K 0.942585 
^ 0.00641402 DW 2 09
P ”  —
3.7747 [0.0565]
0.670091 
O' 0.0303 J 22 DW J p2
RESET 728.99 [0.0000] 
2.1777 [0.1449]
T able 3. E stim ated  in te r e s t  ra te  re a c tio n  fu n ctio n s. Ire lan d  and  B elg ium , 1980QI- 
1997Q2. S ta tic  L ong-R un S o lu tion s.
All results are obtained from Recursive Least Squares regressions of the monetary instrument on a 
constant, the indicated j'egressors, and one lag of the dependent variable. Regressors are defined in the 
main text. Asymptotic standard errors in pai'entheses. We tested for the addition o f other regressors. Zero 
restrictions on lagged money growth and the 4-quarter change in the (log of) official reserves of foreign 
currency were tested by including them in the baseline regression. Asymptotic standard errors are in 
parentheses. AR is a LM test for the hypothesis o f no serial correlation; ARCH checks whether residuals 
have an ARCH structure, with no ARCH as the null; N orm ality tests the normality o f residuals; RESET  
tests the null o f no functional mis-specification. P-values in brackets.
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Recursive Graphs and Stability Tests
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The Inform ation Content o f Chapter 3
Euro A rea M onetary Aggregates:
Is M3 a L eading Indicator o f Inflation  
D evelopm ents?
"...M aking m oney grow th an explicit target o f  m onetary policy, o r even using m oney grow th  in the role o f  
what the literature has called  an ‘information va r ia b le ’, makes no sense unless observed  fluctuations in 
money an ticipate movem ents o f  prices, o r  output, o r  w hatever constitutes the ultimate objective that 
m onetary po licym akers seek to achieve. (W hat w ould it mean to exploit an information variable that 
contains no relevan t information? What w ould be the po in t in pursuing an interm ediate target that is not 
observably interm ediate between the central ban k’s  actions and the intended consequences?) In either case, 
whether m ovem ents in money anticipate m ovem ents in prices and/or output is c ru c ia l...’’
B. Friedman (1996), p. 138
1. Introduction
The monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem, as illustrated in a number of 
official declarations of European Central Bank’s Governing Council\ consists of three 
elements. Firstly, the broadly defined primaiy objective of the Eurosystem, namely price 
stability over the medium term, is given a quantitative definition (“...increase in the HICP 
for the euro area of below 2%”). To achieve the stated goal of the strategy, a prominent 
role is then assigned to the monitoring of monetary aggregates for the area as a whole. 
This translates into the announcement, each year, of a reference value for the growth of a 
broad monetary aggregate. For 1999 and 2000, the announced reference value for the 
growth of M3 was 4.5%. Finally, a broad assessment of the outlook for, and risks to, price 
stability, completes a pragmatic framework whereby the information obtained from 
monetary aggregates is jointly gathered with other derived from a number of economic 
indicators.
It is then clear how, despite the controversies accompanying and following the 
choice of the monetary policy strategy of the ESCB, the option adopted marks a 
substantial departure from standard models of monetary targeting regimes. The 
“prominent” status assigned by ECB’s Governing Council to money, though forcefully 
stated, by no means coincides with the intermediate-objective role monetary aggregates 
play in textbook treatments of such regimes. Indeed, a bird’s eye view of the overall 
strategy reveals significant departures even from the most closely followed model of 
inflation control in Europe, i.e., the Bundesbank. Whereas the latter was attaching to the
announced value for M3 growth an explicit role of target^, the ECB clearly defines it as 
reference value, qualifying its relevance as the most important, but not unique, leading 
indicator of price developments. However, the recent literature on monetary policy rules 
(Bernanke et a l, 1999; Taylor, 1998, 1999) and some related empirical evidence (Clarida 
et aL, 1998; see our results in Chapter 1), agree that inflation forecast regimes and 
monetary targeting regimes behave according to similar observed patterns.
Economic theory suggests that money can play two roles in a monetary policy 
strategy. In common to both inflation forecast- and standard monetary-targeting regimes, 
the behaviour of monetary aggregates can be usefully monitored by the Central Bank to 
obtain information about future inflation. Monetary authorities adopting money growth as 
an information variable assume that past and current monetary developments contain 
useful information about current and future price developments.
On the other hand, in standard regimes of monetary targeting, the money stock is 
seen to provide for a nominal anchor to the whole economic system, and to inflation 
expectations in particular. Consistently with the view that inflation is, ultimately, a 
monetary phenomenon, the announcement of a target for the growth of some broad 
monetary aggregate helps the private sector forming expectations about future nominal 
variables. The path of inflation expectations is thus “co-ordinated” by monetary authorities 
towards the adopted definition of price stability. Of course, for such strategy to lead to 
optimal outcomes, some important criteria have to be fulfilled:
a) A stable demand for the monetary aggregate must exist. This involves that a 
monotonie relationship between money and prices is identified, and that, in 
turn, a similar one be found between the intermediate and the final goal of the 
strategy.
b) A monotonie relationship of the available policy instrument -usually a short- 
run interest rate- with the monetary aggregate must exist. This is equivalent to 
require that the money stock is controllable at some horizon through changes 
in the policy instrument.
c) The commitment of monetary authorities to the strategy and the 
announcement must be credible.
' See, for example, ECB (1999a). Angeloni et al. (1999) extensively discuss the motivations of such strategy.
 ^ See von Hagen (1999) for an interesting reconstruction o f the foundations and development o f Bundesbank’s strategy 
since early 1970s.
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d) Finally, relationships in both a) and b) must be invariant not only to changes 
in the behavioural relationships within the economic system, but also to 
Central Bank’s own actions. In other words, the strategy must be immune to 
Lucas’ critique.
It is thus clear that, for a monetary policy strategy aiming at using monetary 
aggregates, either as an intermediate target (nominal-anchor role) or as an information 
variable (leading-indicator role), the identification of the statistical properties of the 
money-prices relationships is crucial.
Well before the start of Stage Three of the European Monetary Union, a number 
of empirical contributions have then addressed some of the above issues, from a number 
of perspectives. A first strand of the literature has focused on the estimation of structural 
models for the euro area, to evaluate their restricted reduced forms in terms of stability and 
controllability of the M3 stock (Cabrero et al., 1998; Ease and Winder, 1999; Vlaar and 
Schuberth, 1999; Coenen and Vega, 1999). The results point to positive findings for the 
former feature, but to a negative response as regards the latter.
More recently, the forecasting properties of euro-aiea M3 have stalled to be 
analysed directly in terms of price developments. This is the case of a recent contribution 
by Gerlach and Svensson (1999)^. This paper assesses the informational content of the 
output gap (actual output minus its potential level) and the interest rate spread (long-term 
interest rate minus short-term) along with that of the real money gap (actual real M3 
holdings minus their long-run equilibrium value). The exercise, performed within the so- 
called Pstar framework, finds that both the output gap and the real money gap contain 
useful information about future price developments'^.
A further direction for research is suggested by Sims (1972). This pioneering 
study points out that investigating the leading indicator properties of monetary aggregates 
for future price developments is equivalent to studying the Granger-causality properties of 
money on prices. More precisely, Granger causality from money to prices is the necessary 
and sufficient condition for money to be a leading indicator of price developments^.
 ^ See also Svensson and Woodford (1999) for a further attempt to fully rationalise the use of monetary indicators for 
interest-rate policy.
A somewhat deeper discussion of Gerlach and Svensson’s (1999) results and Pstar models is carried out below.
 ^ However, this is neither necessary nor sufficient to guarantee a nominal-anchor role for it. Sims (1972) also shows that 
the direction o f Granger causality has to run from prices to money for the latter to be effectively employed as a nominal 
anchor. This is in open conflict with the assumption in Estrella and Mishkin (1997), who instead rely on a minimal 
information content o f monetary aggregates as a for money to be used as a nominal anchor.
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Consequently, such properties do not necessarily need to be investigated from the 
restricted reduced form of a stmctural model: standard Granger non-causality tests are 
usually performed straight from the unrestricted reduced form of the same model. This 
result is crucial, for it allows to overcome a number of important hurdles one would meet 
when trying to identify (or over-identify) a minimally well specified stmctural model of 
the euro area.
However, some relevant caveats are in order. First, when information from 
monetary indicators is to be employed for policy purposes, a clear understanding of the 
transmission mechanism of policy actions is as relevant as that of the existence of a 
relationship between money and prices. More importantly, the concept of Granger 
causality is strictly non-operational, since it refers to the entire universe of relevant 
information characterising the behavioural relationships within the economic system. 
Again, this problem is particularly severe in the case of policy-related variables. Inference 
on Granger causality may not be invariant to the inclusion or exclusion of additional 
information, i.e., the extension or reduction of the information set. Thus, conclusions 
about the nature of monetary shocks cannot be firmly drawn based on the limited vector of 
variables typically included in structural models of the economy.
Bearing these constraints in mind, we devote the first part of this analysis to 
conduct a series of tests on the null hypothesis that money does not Granger-cause prices 
in the euro area. The study is carried out within the context of a cointegrated VAR system 
already used by Coenen and Vega (1999) to estimate a demand function for euro-area M3. 
Subsequently, the leading indicator properties of M3 are investigated within the Pstar 
framework, in line with the previous attempt by Gerlach and Svensson (1999). In other 
words, we try to assess the information content, and more specifically the predictive 
power, of the real money gap, but also of the output gap and a measure of the term spread, 
for future inflation. Finally, with an eye to the results of previous sections, we perform a 
number of forecast encompassing tests, to compare the predictive ability of our model vis- 
à-vis that of an empirical model of euro area inflation (Fagan, Henry and Mestre, 2000) in 
which developments in the money markets do not play any role in forecasting inflation.
The main conclusions of our analysis are as follows. First, there is very little 
empirical evidence against the null of Granger non-causality of M3 aggregates on prices 
for the euro area. This finding appears to be robust to a number of crucial changes in the 
specification of the system estimation, the sample used, and the assumptions about the
120
order of integration of the variables. Second, our forecasting model shows the existence of 
a reasonably strong positive association between the real money gap and future inflation 
up to five-six quarters ahead. However, the output gap and, to a lesser extent, the real 
interest rate or the term spread, tend to display similar’ predictive ability. This is in line 
with recent findings for the US^ (Tzavalis and Wickens, 1996; Stock and Watson, 1999), 
and allows to conclude that standard Pstar models are likely to forgo the rich information 
content of variables other than the real money gap. Finally, our forecast encompassing 
exercises suggest that information obtained from "monetary" models like ours and that 
from more “structural” models of the euro area should be systematically and jointly used 
to study future price developments.
2. Money-Prices Relationships in the Euro Area and Granger-causality tests
In this section we focus on the statistical properties of the relationship between 
monetar y aggregates and inflation as displayed by the results of tests on Granger non­
causality conducted within the same framework as in Coenen and Vega (1999). Our aim is 
to investigate the causality relationships between money and prices within the information 
set at hand. In the next section, we will show that the causality links found below, while 
robust to a reduction of this dataset, are not invariant to its extension. In particular, the 
results of this section will not appear robust to the inclusion, as in Gerlach and Svensson 
(1999), of variables accounting for monetary policy’s implicit inflation objective and for 
the area-wide output gap.
The series we use (see Data Appendix) come from the European Central Bank 
Area-Wide Database^, and are seasonally adjusted quarterly observations from 1980Q1 to 
1998Q4, computed using fixed weights based on 1995 GDP at PPP rates. Quarterly 
averages of M3 monthly data were employed for the broad money aggregate, whereas 
GDP and the GDP deflator were used for the scale and the price variables. The real money 
growth measure is the quarteriy change in the real stock; = A(?n  ^ ,
Friedman (1997) carefully examines a number o f theoretical and empirical issues related to the use of monetary 
indicators for the US interest rate policy.
’ The series employed in this study are now publicly available. Similar data are also available from the Bank of 
International Settlements. The February 1999 ECB Monthly Bulletin released historical estimates o f  these aggregates, 
while ECB (1999b) contains further information about the identification of the links between the different categories of
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whereas the short- and long-term interest rates are computed as averages of national rates 
weighted using the same weights as above^.
Let Z ’ = (m-p, TV, y, R ,^ R )^ = (m-p, tv, X ’) be a vector of CI(1,1) variables 
consisting of real holdings of M3 {m-p), the inflation rate (as measured by the annualised 
quarterly changes in the GDP deflator, Tv = 4Ap), real GDP (y) and the short- (R^) and long­
term {R^ ) interest rates. The problems inherent to the order of integration of these variables 
have already been examined, and they are fully discussed in Coenen and Vega^ (1999). 
Consider the following VAR model:
[1]1=1
and its VECM representation:
k-l
AZ( — ^  A'AZ _^. +rA'Z,_| + Vf, [2]/=!
with r  and A (5, r) full-rank matrices.
Coenen and Vega (1999) estimated model [2] with lag-length k = 2 and 
cointegration rank r = 5. In our context, we investigate the leading indicator properties of 
M3 by perfoiming a battery of tests on the null hypothesis that money does not Granger- 
cause prices. Following the suggestions in Toda and Phillips (1993, 1994), we define the 
following partitioned matrices:
monetary aggregates and financial instruments included in the old national monetary statistics and the hanuonised 
categories o f Monetary and Financial Institutions o f the Euro Area.
® Obviously, there are non-trivial issues related to the DGP of our aggregate variables. Indeed, the very existence o f an 
area-wide business cycle, monetary policy, financial market, etc. appears to be the key problem for any analysis dealing 
with similar aggregate issues. However, we feel that some empirical exercise on the objective of our investigation is 
worth trying well before reliable and uncontroversial statistics for Euroland become available. A more extensive 
discussion o f  the weighting procedures and aggregation methods can be found in Coenen and Vega (1999), who also 
show how their results -and likely ours- are substantially invariant to changes in the aggregation methods.
 ^See also footnote 10 below.
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4 3 '
; A ' = A 21 ^23I y ^32 ^33 y
i = ;
r  = and A = ^2 [3]
This way, we are able to impose a series of hypotheses about causality, exclusion 
and weak exogeneity, both on short- and long-mn parameter matrices. These different 
hypotheses are defined as follows [see Toda and Phillips (1994) for the asymptotic 
distributions of the corresponding Wald tests]:
* 1 H  :
H r
A ^ i  ^= 0 and  A'^ = 0; (short- and long-run causality) 
k - l... = A 2 1  =0; (short-run causality)
X-H^: A ^ = 0 ; (long-run exclusion)
5{- (weak exogeneity)
X-
^ 2 1 ' ^ 2 ^ 1 “ *^" (long-run causality)
[4]
Toda and Phillips (1993, 1994) devise three sequential causality Wald-type tests 
to test the causal effects of one variable on another group of variables and viceversa. In 
particular, the recommended sequence is as follows:
(PI) Test H
(P2) Test h ;
, j i f  H i is rejected, test H* 
\otherwise, test
j i f  H] is rejected, test H* 
\othenvise, test
'if  H* is rejected, reject the null
j i f  both are rejected, test
(P3) Test H [{  ^ /  H 2 1  z/ r > 1, or reject
otherwise, test H* and H[ I the null if r
\ otherwise, accept the null
\  of noncausality
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After estimation of model [2], we obtain the following results (p-values in brackets);
H*: %^=.251 (.882)
= .069 (.793)
H*; z !  = 12.72 (.005)
H*: z ( =  26.43 (.000) 
z (  = .251 (.617)
Therefore, based on the Toda and Phillips tests conducted above, the null 
hypothesis that M3 money does not Granger-cause GDP prices within the vector of 
variables at hand cannot be rejected at standard confidence levels. This finding is also 
robust to the choice of the sample period. When our baseline VAR is estimated recursively 
over the sample 1993:Q1 to 1998:Q4, the maximal test statistics for the hypotheses H*,
and HiA are, respectively: 0.477, 0.268 and 0.937. All of these are well below the
corresponding ^  critical values'^. The same results hold if the estimation sample starts in 
1985, dropping the first five years from the analysis.
The Phillips-Toda tests conducted above heavily rest on the results of standard 
pre-tests for unit roots and cointegrationG ranger-causality tests conditional on the 
estimation of VAR parameters may be cmcially impaired by potential biases arising from 
inaccurate determination of the number of unit roots and cointegration rank in small 
samples like ours. To counter-check our conclusion about the failure to reject Granger 
non-causality of M3 on prices, we thus study whether it can be attributed to mis- 
specification of the cointegration rank, and/or of the order of integration of the variables 
included in our vector.
The use o f 1'^  critical values in a recursive context tends to bias results towards rejection o f non-causality, since no 
allowance is made for the endogenous search. In this sense, our conclusion on non-Granger causality appears to be even 
more firmly grounded.
H The application of ADF tests to our vector of variables yields results absolutely in line with the findings of the 
Johansen cointegration tests performed in Coenen and Vega (1999). Real money balances, income and both interest rates 
are 1(1) for the sample under investigation. As regards m and p, however, the evidence is more mixed, and appears not to 
be invariant to the nature of the trend contained in the alternative hypothesis, and to the sample under consideration. 
Comforted by results o f recursive computation of these statistics, we conclude that the evidence is broadly in favour of 
the inflation rate and nominal money growth being non-stationary processes for the sample we adopt. Detailed results 
from these tests are available from the author upon request.
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To this end, we follow Toda and Yamamoto (1995), who show how the 
estimation of VARs in levels and the inference on general restrictions can be efficiently 
conducted even if the time series involved are integrated or cointegrated of an arbitrary 
order.
First, we apply the standard lag-selection procedures to determine the lag length 
(k"=) in the VAR. Subsequently, a (k*+J„,a;t)th-order VAR is estimated, where dmax is the 
maximum order of integration suspected to occur among the variables in the system (in 
our case 1 or 2). Finally, we impose and test restrictions on the first /c* coefficient 
matrices, discarding the last dmax lagged terms, as suggested by Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995).
Table 1 (left panel) reports results from tests for Granger non-causality of M3 on 
p  in VARs including two sets of variables; = (m, p, y, R \ r!) and Z^  = (m-p, Ap, y, R\ 
R‘). This way, we are able to develop our tests on alternative assumptions concerning the 
order of integration of the price series, and the long-run homogeneity of m and p.  The 
maximum order of integration is presumed to be 2 (1(2) model) or 1 (1(1) model) in Z^  and 
1 (1(1) model) in Z ,^ allowing for the possibility of nominal variables being 1(2) but 
constraining real variables to be, at most, 1(1). In other words, we allow for the possibility 
of both nominal and real variables being 1(1). Accordingly, columns 1 and 2 in the table 
refer to the specification in Z \  under alternative hypotheses on the maximum degree of 
integration among the vaiiables included in the vector; d,„ax = 2 (col. 1) or d^ax-l (col. 2). 
Column 3 refers to the specification in Z ,^ under the hypothesis d,nax=l- The right panel of 
table 1 reports tests for model reduction from Z^  to Z ;^ in other words, we also explicitly 
test for long-run homogeneity of money and prices. Finally, in line with the evidence 
from both sequential tests for lag exclusion and information criteria, the VAR’s orders are 
set to k = 2 in the shaded cells in the table. However, we also report results for !H+1 and 
JH-L The complete set of results in the table permit to comfortably gauge the robustness 
of the conclusions of the Phillips-Toda tests conducted above against alternative 
assumptions on maximum order of integration {d„,ax) and the VAR lag-length (^*).
Table 2 repeats the tests for different subsets of the variables in the systems: 1) 
Zj={m, p) and Zf=(m-p, Ap}\ 2) Zb=(m, p, y) and Zb~~(m-p, Ap, yj; 3) Z j- (m , p, y, R') 
and Zf=(m-p, Ap, y, R2)\ and 4) Zj=(m, p, y, r!-R^} and Zf=(m-p, Ap, y, R’-R )^. The 
structure of the table is the same as in Table 1, except for the inclusion of the 
corresponding Phillips-Toda tests in column 4. This in turn allows us to obtain some clues
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on the relevance of the composition and size of the information set for the nature of the 
Granger-causality relationships we aie testing for.
By looking at tables 1 and 2, a number of clear-cut conclusions can be drawn. 
The analysis just performed suggests that the empirical evidence for rejecting Granger 
non-causality of M3 on prices is very thin. Both the Phillips-Toda tests and the Toda- 
Yamamoto tests fail to reject Granger non-causality of m on p  at standaid confidence 
levels. This finding, which is stable throughout the sample chosen, appears also to be 
robust to a number of alternative assumptions regaiding: i) the maximum degree of 
integration of the variables in the system; ii) the lag-length selected for the VAR; and, iii) 
the imposition or not of the long-run homogeneity of money and prices'^. Finally, the 
results in table 2 also suggest that the above findings aie broadly invariant to a reduction 
of the information set employed. This conclusion, however, cannot be readily extended to 
the case in which the vector of variables included in the system is broadened, as we will 
see in the next section.
3. The Pstar Concept and Leading Indicator Properties of M3: Forecasting Models 
of Euro-Area Inflation
3.1 An Introduction to the Pstar model
The policy relevance of the Pstar concept dates back to its use by a number of 
influential studies as the analytical basis for the quantitative derivation of annual monetary 
targets in various coun triesM o n e ta iy  targets were, of course, introduced in Germany 
only (since 1975; see Neumann, 1997; von Hagen, 1995, 1999), and the Bundesbank 
appeal's to be the only monetaiy authority actively employing a Pstar-typt framework. 
Nonetheless, this indicator of price pressures has re-emerged in the context of discussions 
on the process of monetaiy unification in Europe (Svensson, 1999c; Gerlach and 
Svensson, 1999). In fact, an intuitive illustration of the concept can easily be shown as 
underlying the quantitative definition of the money-growth reference value announced by
Though the homogeneity hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional confidence levels
The use o f Pstar as an indicator o f price pressures was initially advocated by studies developed mainly within Central 
Banks. For instance: US, see Hallman, Porter and Small (1991); Germany, Tddter and Reimers (1994); Japan, Bank o f  
Japan (1990). Tlie evident trending behaviour of the velocity o f money in many o f these countries subsequently posed 
severe theoretical challenges to its practical implementation. A study o f the Pstar concept (applied to Germany and the 
UK) from a cointegration perspective is undertaken by Funke et al. (1997), while Groeneveld (1998) extends the 
analysis by applying a Kalman-Filter technique to a number of EMS countries.
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the Eurosystem as one of the two “pillars” of its own policy strategy (ECB, 1999a). In the 
words of the President of the ECB:
"...The first reference value fo r  monetary growth decided by 
the Governing Council. .. is consistent with the maintenance o f 
price stability according to the ESCB's published definition, 
while allowing for sustainable output growth. It has been 
derived by assumins that the trend srowth rate o f real GDP in 
the euro area is in the ranse o f 2 % to 2  1/2 % per annum and 
the velocity o f circulation o f M3 declines at a trend rate o f 
between 1/2 % and 1 % each year.... ”
(Introductory Statements by W. Duisenberg, Press Conference 
of December 1, 1998)
The basic idea of the Pstar approach is to define the equilibrium price level (p*) 
as current money holdings per unit of potential output in correspondence of an equilibrium 
level of velocity. From the simple equation of exchange ( , in logs):
m ' [5]
Thus, deviations of the current price level from this long-run equilibrium can only be 
possible if current output and/or velocity depait from their respective equilibrium values
p ,-p ', [6]
and may affect inflation according to some law of motion. If economic activity exceeds its 
potential value, and/or a expansion in liquidity causes velocity to exceed its long-run level, 
inflationary pressures will therefore develop. The adjustment between inflation and the 
price gap may follow, for instance,
r{p,-i -  p',-t )+ z , . [7]
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where Z; is a white-noise disturbance. Thus, if the price gap in the previous period was 
indeed positive {p,_^ -  > 0 ), current inflation would be rising to eliminate the price
gap. By contrast, and assuming there is a long-run stable relationship between the two 
variables''^, if p,_  ^ = both price levels will grow at the same rate. In this instance, if 
the monetary authorities aim at stabilising inflation around a pre-set target tv, , the money 
growth value consistent with such objective would simply be:
Am, =  Ay* -  Av* + t v ,  , [8]
which fully explains the rationale behind ESCB’s choice for M3 reference value. 
It is interesting to note that according to this framework, an interest rate policy exclusively 
geared at targeting money growth is in fact tai'geting inflation, and it does so explicitly^^.
Despite its widespread and influential use as an empirical tool for monetaiy 
policy, the Pstar framework has no solid theoretical background. Any work that aims at 
providing some evidence on its empirical properties faces the hard task of setting up 
reduced-form relationships with no microfoundations at hand. More importantly, this set­
up suffers from some of the well-known drawbacks associated with the applications of the 
quantity theory of money to policy variables over a short- and medium term-horizon. That 
is, the velocity of circulation of money is in practice endogenous with respect to output, 
inflation, and the situation of money markets (liquidity, interest rates, etc.). It is then 
inappropriate to infer causality and forecasting properties from a model that does not take 
into consideration that velocity is simultaneously determined alongside other real and 
nominal vaiiables. Finally, the very existence of a velocity trend is difficult to rationalise 
in the context of a model that has virtually no microfoundations. It is then clear how the 
statistical properties of the M3-prices relationships should be more properly studied by 
nesting the Pstar concept within alternative models of price pressures, relying on more 
“structural” frameworks than the one just sketched.
H Groeneveld (1998) and Funke et al. (1997) provide some evidence concerning such point
128
3 .2  S tru ctu ra l M odels o f  M on ey in E urope
Amongst the first to investigate the money-prices relationships in the euro area, 
Vlaar and Schuberth (1999) estimate a structural VECM including inflation, real income, 
short- and long-term interest rates and financial wealth, and identify the structural shocks 
within the model. Closer to our purposes, the study derives impulse responses that show 
how (proxied) deviations of real money balances from equilibrium do tend to create some 
inflationary pressures, as one would expect. Finally, although stable money demand and 
excess money-inflation relationships are identified, controllability of the money stock via 
short-term interest rates is rejected.
Coenen and Vega (1999) estimate a demand function for M3 in the euro aiea 
spanning 1980-1998. System estimates conducted with the Johansen (1995) procedure and 
applied to a vector comprising real money holdings, income, long and short interest rates 
and inflation led to the identification of three cointegrating vectors. The spread between 
the long and short interest rate, a Fisher-type long-term interest rate parity, and a relation 
expressing real M3 holdings as a function of income and the nominal and real stochastic 
trends driving the overall system are identified. Weak exogeneity of real income, interest 
rates and inflation with respect to the long-run parameters of the latter cointegrating vector 
is subsequently not rejected. This involves accepting the idea that M3 does not Granger- 
cause inflation. In the light of this, a long-run conditional money demand equation is 
estimated. Furthermore, a dynamic, single-equation model of M3 is developed and tested 
for weak exogeneity of real income, interest rates and inflation with respect to the short- 
run parameters, and for stability, confirming the previous results. These findings prove to 
be robust to alternative aggregation methods. Further investigation into the identification 
of the structural innovations to the multivariate money demand through impulse response 
analysis broadly validates Vlaar and Schuberth’s (1999) findings about the lack of 
controllability of the money stock via standard policy instruments.
Closer to the problem at hand, Gerlach and Svensson (1999) nested a Pstar-iy^Q 
model of inflation and a simple expectations-augmented Phillips curve:
The majority o f  estimated interest rate reaction functions for the Bundesbank detect a more significant role for 
expected inflation than for M3, which empirically corroborates the above statement. See Chapter 1, and Muscatelli et ai.,
1999; Clarida et al., 1998. Svensson (1999a, b) elaborates more extensively on this point.
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;r, + - fh l ,)+ â ,{ y ,^ ,  -ylx)+Ç,>  [9]
where ; f  represents inflation expectations and m indicates long-run real money 
balances. Where starred, the latter are calculated in correspondence of trend output, 
velocity, and real interest rates.
The rest of Gerlach and Svensson’s model is as follows;
<_i = [9.1]
TTf^expiT^ + Tf) [9.2] 
fh^  ={m-p)^ -kç,+kyyf-kj{Rl [9.3]
Arhi ^ Jq -  AJm -  /Cq -  k^y + k f R ’ ~ R" )],_i -  (;r, + d, [9.4]
Pt =  ~  ^0 “  KjVt +  ) [9.5]
m ^ - ml ={ m- p ) t - { m- p * f = - {p , -p l )  = {m~p)f -k*-kyyl  H ^ i k ^ - k f R ’ -R^)*] [9.6] g
't
Inflation expectations are determined in [9.1] on the basis of past inflation and 
authorities’ implicit inflation objective ( ^ ) .  The latter in turn is computed ([9.2]) as a
deterministic exponential trend, under the constraint that inflation equalled 1.5% in 1998.
This particular assumption, kept also in our study, attempts to provide an elementary 
rationale to the inflation downward trend observed in Europe since mid-eighties. Though 
not particular sophisticated, the hypothesis of an exponential trend aims at simplifying the 
task of devising more detailed explanations of the same phenomenon, while stressing the 
importance of monetary authorities’ increasing commitment to lower inflation in the area.
The definition of real money balances in [9.3] follows the standard treatments of 
long-run real money balances, assumed to depend positively on real income and 
negatively on the opportunity cost of holding money (as measured by the term spread)'^.
Equation [9.4] postulates Gerlach and Svensson’s modelling of the short-mn demand for 
real money holdings, while [9.5] is similar to our equation [6], with the term spread 
replacing the deviations of velocity from trend. Finally, [9.6] defines the real money gap 
as the negative of the price gap.
Assuming that long-mn equilibrium is characterised by having
:,.r
See Ericsson (1999) for an up-to-date analysis o f recent findings on the empirical specification o f money demand 
functions
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(weighted non-lineai' LS) system estimates of this model yield (standard errors in 
parentheses):
= .Ar, = -  -415 (7Z-i_i-^ ,) + .163 + .021 (y -y  ),_] + u,
(0.074) (0.094)
[11]
Inflation dynamics is then seen as dependent on the deviations of real money 
holdings from their equilibrium level and departures of past inflation from authorities’ 
implicit objective'^. These empirical findings broadly validate the Pstar concept, since 
they confirm that price pressures aiise from disequilibria in inflation expectations and/or 
past liquidity holdings. Although the relevance of the output gap is rejected at 
conventional confidence levels, this measure of the cycle appears to be capturing price 
pressures not otherwise explained by disequilibria in the money mai'kets and expectations. 
We turn to this important point later, because a similai' results, but with a much stronger 
statistical significance, will crop up in our results as well.
One conclusion from Gerlach and Svensson’s findings pertains to the results of 
our Granger-causality analysis. The very presence of the real money gap in [11] implies 
that money Granger-causes prices once one accounts for the presence of authorities’ 
inflation objective and the output gap in the information set. This in turn validates our 
early argument that inference on the forecasting properties of M3 is not invariant to the 
addition of relevant infoimation in the vector of vaiiables under consideration. We now 
build upon this point by extending the analysis towards more systematic inflation 
forecasting for the euro area.
H Gerlach and Svensson also argue that the Eurosystem’s money growth reference value performs worse than alternative 
indicators o f monetary disequilibrium, namely the real money gap as computed in [9]. Noting that
{ m -in )(  = + A ( m - m ) j  , the result in [11] can be easily re-parameterised in terms of the two RHS
variables in the above identity, the latter of which could be interpreted as the deviations o f money growth from the 
reference value. It follows that, provided due account is taken o f the prevailing liquidity situation as measured by the
level gap, {m -  , A(/h -  m)  ^ provides the same information content as (m -  fn)^, partly contradicting Gerlach
and Svensson’s claim.
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4. Forecasting Inflation in the Euro Area
4 .1 The In form ation  C on ten t o f  M oney, O u tpu t a n d  the In terest R a tes in an E x ten ded  
F ram ew ork
The task we set ourselves is to obtain a measure of disequilibrium in the money 
markets that does not depend to any extent on weak exogeneity assumptions, as these 
proved to be dependent on the information set employed.
Simple extension of Coenen and Vega’s (1999) two-step Johansen estimation, to 
a vector of variables now including the output gap and the authorities’ inflation objective, 
would be cumbersome and inappropriate, for a number of reasons;
• it would make impossible the structural identification of the exact cointegrating 
relationships;
simultaneity biases are likely;
• we wish to study M3-prices relationships regardless of weak exogeneity assumptions, 
in turn necessary to identify long-run money demand parameters.
We then start our analysis by considering the application of Johansen’s (1995) 
procedure to the largest vector of variables we adopted for our Granger-causality tests, 
namely Z' = (m~p, n, y, R \ r!}. That is, we test for cointegration in a system including real 
money balances, real income, short- and long-term interest rates, and inflation. This way, 
we aim at obtaining measures for the long-run income elasticity and the semi-elasticity of 
inflation with respect to long-run money demand, to be subsequently inserted in our 
measure of the real money gap. We avoid trying to infer the interest rate semi-elasticities 
of money demand, as that would involve imposing further, costly restrictions on an 
already complex system.
For the sample 1980Q1-1998Q4 we are thus able to identify the same number of 
stable cointegrating vectors as in Coenen and Vega (1999), and more precisely'^:
ecm\, +1.278;^, +k
(0.037) (0.189)
ecm2, ^ [ R '
(?cm3( = (K*
[12]
IN Results on cointegration tests are not shown here for brevity, but are available from the author upon request.
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In [12], the second and third vectors represent the spread between long- and 
short-term interest rates and the real short-term interest rate (consistently with the Fisher 
parity), respectively, both stationary around constants'^. The first cointegrating vector, in 
turn, allows us to unambiguously identify the two money-demand elasticities we were 
looking for.
All estimates are pretty close to those obtained through Coenen and Vega’s 
solved conditional ADL model for long-run money demand. Subsequently, we estimate a 
VAR system in dZ,, conditional on dZf.y, ecrnf.i, ecm2 .^.[, and ecm3^.\. The results we 
obtain for the inflation equation, after less significant vaiiables are excluded, are as 
follows (standard errors in parentheses)^'^:
A;r,= .45 [(R '-R = )-(R '-R »)'],_ ,+  .54 
(.13) (.10)
T=73 (J980:Q4-1998:Q4) R 2 M 0  cx=.88% DW=L95
LM(1)=  ^1.34 (.252) LM(4}=1.46 (.231) LM(l.4)=0.60 (.667)
ARCH(4)=0.50(.734) HET=0.80 (.553) NORM^O.OI (.997)
RESETr  ^1.33 (.252) FOR(24)=7.36 (.999) CHOW(24)=.31 (.999)
Standaid tests for the exclusion of additional dynamics on the two crucial terms 
dZf.y and ecmlt-i fail to reject the null ([F(8,63)=0.88 (.540)]), thus we conclude that v, is
a pure innovation relative to the information set we employ in [13]. In particular, the test 
for excluding yields F(l,70)= 0.25 (.617).
The specification above is similar to what previously estimated by Tzavalis and 
Wickens (1996) for the US. It is clearly inappropriate to give [13] a policy interpretation. 
What the estimated equation signals is that the past spread and real short interest rate helps 
predicting current inflation -though to a limited extent. In particular', one might want to 
rationalise the positive signs in the above expression using the idea that the term structure
Respectively, about 0.613% and 5.2%
The summary statistics are to be interpreted as follows. LM(i) and LM(l,i) are the Lagrange multiplier F-tests for 
residual autocorrelation of order and up to the order, respectively; ARCH is the Engle F-test for autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity; HET is the White F-test for heteroskedasticity; NORM is the Doornik and Hansen % -^test 
for normality; RESET is the regression specification F-test due to Ramsey; FOR and CHOW are the out-of-sample 
forecast test and the Chow test for parameter stability over the period 1993:Q1-1998;Q4.
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tends to react quite quickly to changes in expected inflation. One can also add that in 
correspondence of such reaction the likelihood of anti-inflationary policy actions tends to 
push the real short-term interest rate above its equilibrium value, even before any action is 
taken in practice. Finally, since the two estimated coefficients do not significantly differ 
from one another, one can easily show that (R® (R ’ - ( R ' -  R^  . This in turn
would call for an elementary re-parameterisation of [13] in terms of the real (ex-post) 
long-term interest rate and the spread only.
As in Tzavalis and Wickens’ main findings, our estimates allow us to conclude 
that both terms are helpful in predicting future GDP inflation in the area. The explanatory 
power of the above relationship, though, looks limited, as suggested by the low portion of 
inflation variability explained by the model. Nonetheless, the estimated equation appears 
well specified, with tests displaying no signs of severe serial correlation, 
heteroskedasticity or non-normality. No major problem crops up when the equation is 
used to produce one-step ahead forecasts over the last six years of the sample. The process 
of monetary convergence among EMS Member Countries that was then taking place, 
however, calls for some caution in drawing conclusions about this part of the sample"'. 
That is, we need to take into account the marked reduction of exchange rate risk premia 
over the last part of the sample, when uncertainties about the start of Stage Three of EMU 
were finally removed. We do so by modelling a step reduction in the equilibrium short­
term real interest rate from 5.4% (approximately the weighted average of national ex-post 
real interest rates in the period 1980:Q1 to 1997:Q7) to 3.0% as from 1998Q1, four 
quarters ahead of the introduction of the single currency. In the same sense, recursive 
estimation of [13] produces relatively constant parameters over the recent period. Figure 
la  records time series of fitted and actual values of Att, the scaled residuals and the 
residual correiogram, while Figure lb  shows a graphical summary of results from the 
recursive estimation of equation [13] over the 90’s.
With the statistical limitations of our model in mind, we turn to introduce in our 
baseline specification the money gap, (m -  in ), instead of the cointegrating vector ecml, .
Gerlach and Schnabel (1999), for example, compute a measure of credibility adjusted equilibrium real interest rate for 
the euro area by regressing the weighted ex-post real rate on the average rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate against the Deutsche mark. The intercept o f that regression could be interpretable as the equilibrium real rate that 
would prevail assuming no depreciation vis-à-vis the DM. The resulting estimate is 3.55%, with a standard error of 
0.96%.
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This re-pai*ameterisation is made possible by the following simple relationship linking the 
real money gap and the error correction term arising from the estimation of the 
cointegrating vector for long-run money demand [ecml^ = -R f)] •
ecna,  k ( y  - y ' \ +  k,[{R' -  R» ), -  (R' -  R=)- ] [14]
Next, we adopt a new formulation that encompasses equation [13] and Gerlach 
and Svensson’s specification as described in equation [11]. In other words, we augment 
our parsimonious initial VAR with the additional terms and (y .
The new model for inflation is then the following:
+ g,[(R' - R ') - ( R ' - ; r , ) - ( R ' +
where now the real money gap is defined in correspondence of potential output and 
the inflation objective
-/c*-1.158i/(%+ 1.278;Tf [16]
The two unobservables in the above equation are derived, for comparison 
purposes, using the deterministic exponential trend postulated in Gerlach and Svensson 
(1999) for ^  and computing potential output by means of a Hodrick-Prescott filter with 
smoothing par ameter À ^  160(P.
■■ The use o f two-sided filters to proxy potential GDP is standard in models comprising the output gap [see, for instance, 
Roberts (1997) in the context o f the estimation of a Phillips curve model] due to the lack of ciear-cut alternatives. This 
procedure, along with the one adopted to account for inflation expectations and the time-varying inflation objective, is 
certainly not exempt from both conceptual and econometric problems. More satisfactory measures would perhaps 
involve applying some errors-in approach to the orthogonalisation of private sectors’ misperceptions about future
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Estimation of the extended model over the sample 1980;Q4-1998:Q4 yields the
following results for equation [15]:
[17]
A;r, .783 + .196 .262 +
(.106) (.072) (.130)
+ .249 [(R ;^ -;e j-(R ''-;r ) l + 0,
(.073)
T=73 (1980:Q4-1998:Q4) R^=0,45 o^.79% DW=J.92
LM il)=.72i.399) LM(4)=.85 (.359) LM(1,4)=0.68 (.607)
ARCH(4)=0.14(.968) HET=.221(.986) NORM^l.23 (.541)
RESET=0.15(.904) FOR(24)^8.5 (.999) CHOW(24)=.31 (.998)
Once again, when we test for the exclusion of additional dynamics from (A7.j j 
and ecm2[.i) in [17], we fail to reject the null: [F(6,63) =1.31 (.315)]. A cursory look at 
Figures 2a-2b confirms the absence of major mis-specifications, and the substantial 
constancy of recursively-estimated parameters.
Our findings tend to provide some support to the idea that the real money gap has 
substantive predictive power for future inflation in the euro area. However, contrary to the 
pure Pstar specification, model [17] shows that the real money gap (or the negative of the 
price gap) is not able, by itself, to fully anticipate future inflation. The presence of 
additional terms in [17] indicates that real interest rates and the output gap have some 
predictive power for future inflation, and that information obtained from forecasting the 
level of economic activity and the term structure may turn to be useful in monitoring price 
developments. Another, more subtle, feature of the above results comes from the 
observation that they are obtained through a (modified) error-coiTection specification for 
the monetaiy disequilibrium. Hence, it is explicitly recognised that short-run deviations of 
real money balances from equilibrium are likely, if not normal. Therefore, using M3 
growth as a strictly exclusive indicator for future price developments may prove to be 
inappropriate^^. As Stock and Watson’s (1999) analysis for the US (whom we refer again
inflation, and some gradual learning process for the generation o f the output gap (also applicable in the case o f the 
unobservable stochastic component o f inflation). The first chapter o f this thesis and Muscatelli, Tirelli, and Trecroci 
(1999) offer some arguments in favour o f using a Kalman-filter procedure to overcome some o f these drawbacks. In the 
context o f the present investigation, we however prefer to stick with more mainstream solutions, given the need for 
encompassing exercises with rival models o f inflation forecasting.
Friedman (1997) strongly supports the same view for the US.
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shortly) seems to point out, “more structural” indicators of the level of economic activity 
are likely to be more effective in capturing such developments.
4.2 What Leading Indicator(s) for Euro-Area Inflation?
To draw some tentative conclusion on the relative importance of the various 
indicators we introduced in predicting future inflation, we now evaluate the correlation at 
different time horizons between { n - i t ) ,  and the various indicators included in [17]. In
doing so, we follow the approach taken by Stock and Watson (1999) for the US, by 
producing a series of forecasting equations for horizons ranging from h -  1 to h == 12  
quarters. The models we estimate are generally articulated as follows:
(^  -  - 4 ) + ^ '2  )t-i +
Ju..+ < '( y - y
[18]
where Vf+/,.y follows a MA(h-l) process"''.
Table 3 displays our results. The most evident feature is that there exists a 
substantive positive association between the real money gap and future inflation. This 
significant correlation spans over five-six quarters and reaches a peak at the three-to-four 
quarter horizon. Again, the real money gap does not appear to be a sufficient statistic for 
future inflation. The output gap and the difference between the real short-term rate and the 
estimated equilibrium real short-tenn rate contain valuable information over and above 
that already contained in the real money gap.
Moreover, according to our findings, the lead over which there is a positive 
association between output gap and future inflation may indeed be longer than in the case 
of the real money gap. It stretches over six quarters and reaches a maximum at the five- 
quaiter horizon. The leading information contained in the real rates is instead relatively 
short-lived, extending over just three quarters. Finally, the sharp reduction in the Pf of the 
regressions also shows how the forecasting performance of the model dramatically 
deteriorates as the time horizon increases. Beyond the sixth quarter, no indicator analysed
It should be noted that for h=I,  [18] is just a trivial re-parameterisation o f equation [17]. Equation [IB] is often 
interpreted as a forecasting equation. See, for instance, Clements and Hendry (1996a, b).
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appears to contain helpful information. Figure 3 contributes to further stress this result, by 
showing inflation deviations from the computed target along with the various (lagged) 
indicators entering our forecasting equations.
We finally perform some robustness checks on our findings. In particular, we ask 
ourselves whether the regularities we detect are robust with respect to the specification of 
added regressors, namely the output gap and the implicit inflation objective. In other 
terms, we investigate whether altering the way in which our ad hoc measures of the 
unobservables present in the forecasting equations has some bearing on the results we 
obtain.
Table 4 reproduces, the estimates of model [15], this time allowing, in turn, for 
alternative methods of generating the potential output and the implicit inflation objective 
series. In particular’, the left panel of the Table maintains the latter as computed through 
the usual deterministic exponential trend, while allowing potential output to be measured 
using a) the specification in the European Central Bank Area-Wide Model^^, and b) 
different smoothing parameters for the HP filter. The right-hand panel, conversely, keeps 
the baseline HP {X = 1600) specification for potential output, while allowing for various 
HP-based measures of n  .
The conclusions to be drawn from results in Table 4 are the following. First, the 
substantially good leading indicator properties of the real money gap we devised appear to 
be robust to alternative empirical measures of potential output employed. The same 
applies, though to a lesser extent, when different empirical measures of monetary 
authorities’ inflation objective are employed. Second, the relevance of the output gap is to 
vai-y crucially with its own empirical measurement. The smoother the filter employed for 
deriving potential output, the less significant the output gap becomes in our baseline 
model. Finally, the real interest rates and -to a lesser extent- the tenu spread are confirmed 
as containing valuable information for future inflation. Such information appears to extend 
over and above that already contained in the real money gap and the output gap. This 
finding also appeal's quite robust across alternative specifications for the unobservable 
measures of potential output and the inflation objective.
Potential output in the AWM is estimated from a Cobb-Douglas production function with smoothed Solow residuals
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5. Monetary or “Structural” Indicators? Encompassing Rival Models of Euro-Area 
Inflation
The main result of the previous sections is the ability of our estimated model for 
GDP inflation to account for the most salient features of the money-prices relationships in 
the euro area. Moreover, we evaluated the predictive content of various indicators, and 
tested for robustness of our results against a number of statistical (homoskedastic 
innovation errors; constant parameters; information set reduction and extension; etc.) and 
non-statistical (the alternative specifications for real money gap, output gap and the 
interest rates magnitudes) criteria. Though the model we specified appears to satisfactorily 
perform across such checks, we now want to ask ourselves how its forecasts fare against 
those produced by competing models of inflation in the euro area. Closer to our purposes, 
in particular we wish to compare the forecasting properties of our model to those of 
significantly different explanations of euro area inflation.
Following Mizon and Richard (1986), and Hendry and Richard (1989), we define 
a congruent encompassing model as a model that is congruent and that is able to account 
for, or explain, the results obtained by rival models. In this sense, ericompassing is a 
stricter requirement than ‘better fit’ or (when applied in the context of forecasting) ‘lower 
root mean square forecast error’, for it involves that the rival model does not contain any 
additional information relative to the model at hand.
Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2000) build a somewhat more “structural” model than 
ours for euro-area GDP inflation. In their work, GDP prices are pinned down in the long- 
run by trend unit labour costs, which depends in turn on potential GDP and the NAIRU. In 
the short-run, instead, GDP inflation is a function of changes in trend unit labour costs, 
changes in import prices and deviations of real trend unit labour cost from equilibrium. It 
is relative to forecasts produced within their model that we now compare the predictive 
ability of our own model.
Estimation of the Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2000; FHM, henceforth) model over 
the sample 1980;Q4-1997;Q4 yields the following results:
àTVf ~ .021 -  .776 + .140 Aw* +.068 + .136 +
(.005) (.109) (.043) (.047) (.045) [191+ .024Apm^_^ -  .274 { p ~ w  
(.014) (.076)
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T^69(1980:Q4-}997:Q4) R-=0.52 <y=.78% DW=2.02
LM(1)=0.22(.641) LM(4)^0.23 (.634) LM(1,4)=0.54 (.709)
ARCH(4)=0.48 (.750) HET=0.38 (.964) NORM=4.12 (.127)
RESET=1.55(.218) FOR(24)^16.019 (.887) CHOW(24,37)=^0.535 (.945)
where w* and pm stand, respectively, for trend unit labour costs and import
prices.
To discriminate between our model (T, henceforth, as described in equation [17]) 
and FHM, we first perfoiTn Mizon and Richard’s (1986) Simplification Encompassing Test 
(SET). This way, T and FHM are tested against the so-called minimal nesting model.
In addition, we check the performance of both models against two out-oFsample 
forecasting tests: the Forecast-Differential Encompassing Test (Chong and Hendry, 1981), 
and the Forecast-Model Encompassing Test (Ericsson, 1992). The former involves, inter 
alia, the estimation of parameters a and J3 in the following auxiliary regressions
1201
where f f  and stand for the inflation forecasts produced on the basis of 
equations [17] and [19], respectively. These estimates provide for an indicator of the need 
to pool forecasts from both models. In the Forecast-Model Encompassing Test, instead, 
forecasts under FHM model are produced using only lagged information, i.e. using the 
marginal model nt /ki-i, dwV/, zlw ,.2 , Tipnit.z^  (p-w-f^-0f_ , rather than the
conditional FHM model itself.
All statistics in the above tests are calculated on the basis of one-step ahead 
forecasts produced over the sample 1992:Q1-1997:Q4. We initially focus on one-quarter- 
ahead forecasts since this allows us to abstract from the lack of strong exogeneity required 
to produce dynamic forecasts at horizons longer than h = J in our single-equation 
framework. However, this exercise provides only a limited basis for evaluating forecasting 
performance, since relative rankings may not hold when longer horizons are considered.
Figure 4 shows the resulting forecasts {h = 1) for GDP inflation (top panel), 
along with forecasts obtained at four (middle panel) and eight (bottom panel) quarters. 
Figures 5a and 5b show the SET statistic recursively computed for T and FHM, 
respectively.
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From a cursory look at the graphs, it is clear that while the FHM model (dotted 
line) fares comparatively well at the one-quarter horizon, its performance appears to 
deteriorate as the forecast horizon is extended. Conversely, T (solid thin line) appears to 
outperform FHM at the four-quarter horizon, in line with our previous findings concerning 
the location of the peak of the correlation between the real money gap and future inflation. 
At the eight-quarter horizon, none of the models performs well.
From a quantitative point of view, both equations produce unbiased forecasts on 
average. FHM in particular appears to anticipate inflation developments somewhat more 
precisely. The Root Mean Square Forecast Error turns out to be 0.77% for T and 0.60% 
for FHM. The results of our forecast encompassing tests, as shown in the table below, 
show that the SET tests cannot reject at standard confidence levels that both models T and 
FHM are valid simplifications from the minimal nesting model. This inference appears to 
be stable when the test statistics are computed recursively over the sample 1992:1 to 
1997:4. Apparently, each model incorporates -though partially- some information that 
turns out to be relevant to explaining inflation developments in the euro area.
Test H o : T Ho: FHM
SET Mizon-Richards /(7 )-I1 .61 (.U 0) / (4 )  = 2.79 (.590)
Forecast-Differential F(l, 23) = 15.29*» (.001) F(l, 23)= 1.170 (.291)
Encompassing a  = .783 (.188) (3 =.217 (.188)
Forecast-Model
Encompassing
F(6, 18) = 4.733** (.005) F(4, 20) = .588 (.675)
We finally test for out-of-sample forecast encompassing at longer time horizons, 
using only lagged information. More precisely, the two equations are re-estimated 
recursively over the sample 1992:Q1-1997:Q4 to produce 24 observations of out-of-
sample forecasts at horizons ranging from h=I io h - 8  quarters^^:
In this exercise, the estimates o f the different gap terms in [21] and [22] (and hence the long-run parameters) are, 
however, based on end-of-sample information. It should be noted that this way o f proceeding ends up with downplaying 
the uncertainty surrounding inflation forecasts. Relevant to this latter point, see Orphanides and van Norden (1999) in 
relation to the measurement of the output gap.
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i ^ t + h - l  ^ l ~ l  ) ~ A) ■*■ Al ^ t - \  ^
2 [22] 
+ S  Æ ^P ^t-i + A4  (P “  ^  -  6^ ) + 2^/+/i-lr=l
Table 5 below shows Root Mean Square Forecast Errors at the different forecast 
horizons along with additional tests for forecast encompassing^^. When compared to the 
equation standard errors reported above, the results for h=I imply that both models fare 
particularly well over the sample considered (1992:1-1997:4), certainly because of the 
substantive decrease in inflation variability during that period. As regards forecasting 
encompassing, the table shows estimates of a  (with standard enors) as well as p-values for 
the null hypotheses Ho: a -0  and Hi: a=J in the auxiliary regressions:
4  = ^ ( 4 “ 4 ) + ^ i  [23]
where and {h = 5) stand, respectively, for the forecast errors obtained
from [21] and [22]. Rejection of one of the nulls would provide evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis that the rival model contains information helpful in explaining forecast errors 
from the own model, i.e. [21] under Hq or [22] under Hi. Should this happen for both 
models, it would constitute evidence of some essential mis-specification in both models 
(Ericsson, 1992). This situation would call for forecast pooling, i.e., better overall inflation 
forecasts would be generated combining the forecasts obtained from both models.
The results in the table point out that the out-of-sample forecast record of our 
estimated model is comparatively better for all forecast horizons h>3, though for h > 6  
performance is rather poor for both models. Interestingly enough, however, the 
encompassing hypotheses are rejected at all horizons other than /i=i. We inteipret this 
outcome as a further indication that, at those horizons, pooling information from both 
models constitutes an improvement relative to forecasts generated from any of the models.
See Chong and Hendry (1986) and Harvey et al. (1998).
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Model [21] Model [22]
h a RMSE Hq: a= 0 RMSE Hj: a=l
1 .830 (.348) 0.653 .0171** 0.585 .6251
2 .575 (.176) 0.656 .0011** 0.623 .0156**
3 .241 (.053) 0.638 .0000** 0.834 .0000**
4 .178 (.098) 0.614 .0701* 0.992 .0000**
5 .335 (.121) 0.827 .0058** 1.033 .0000**
6 .454 (.094) 1.094 .0000** 1.148 .0000**
7 .447 (.157) 1.145 .0043** 1.208 .0004**
8 .472 (.198) 1.259 .0173** 1.293 .0078**
T able 5. Root Mean Square Forecast Errors, alternative horizons; tests for forecast encompassing
6. Concluding Remarks
This chapter provided some preliminary empirical evidence on the information 
content of M3 broad money for future inflation in the euro area. Of course, serious 
measurement problems associated with these and other variables cannot be denied, but our 
attempt aimed at providing some evidence on the reality of day-to-day central banking, 
where information on the level of economic activity is generally incomplete.
First, we found little empirical support for rejecting at standard confidence levels 
Granger non-causality of M3 on prices. This conclusion is found stable throughout the 
sample and robust to a number of robustness checks.
Second, we investigated the leading indicator properties of broad money M3 by 
looking at a Pstar-iype model in which information about the cyclical state of the 
economy and a measure of authorities’ inflation target feed back onto the generation of 
inflation forecasts. In particular, our results confirm that a significant positive association 
exists in the euro area between the real money gap and future inflation up to five-six 
quarters ahead. Similai' predictive ability is displayed by the output gap, although this 
finding, contraiy to the previous one, does not prove to be robust to the use of alternative 
measures for the two unobservables. Finally, the real interest rate and (to a lesser extent) 
the term spread, appear to contain information that can be used to forecast inflation 
developments unexplained by recent extensions of baseline Pstar models for inflation.
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One possible, though not exclusive, implication of the latter point is that the treatment of 
inflation expectations, and the measurement of the monetary policy authorities implicit 
inflation objective, are the key issue when it comes to providing structural explanations for 
the observed decline in area-wide inflation. Besides the predictive content of monetary 
indicators, the state of inflation expectations and the credibility of the policy stance 
appeared to be critical features of the inflation record in the period leading to, and 
immediately following, the start of EMU.
Third, we compared the forecasting ability of the model developed in the 
previous sections to that of an alternative, non-monetary model for euro-aiea GDP 
inflation by Fagan, Heniy and Mestre (2000). The evidence we collected points to our 
modified Pstar model outperforming forecasts produced with the rival model at horizons 
h>3, and being in turn outperformed at shorter horizons. However, our aim was not to 
compare alternative explanations of euro-area inflation. We rather wanted to perform a 
comparison between the forecasting ability of non-nested explanations of euro-area 
inflation in predicting price developments. Overall, each model appeal's to have some 
strengths of its own: both of them incoiporate some information that is relevant to explain 
GDP inflation. However, taken individually, none of the models seems to be able to 
provide a complete account of inflation developments in the euro area. This clearly 
suggests that information derived from both monetaiy and non-monetaiy models (and 
indicators) should be used to generate reliable forecasts for euro-area inflation.
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Data Appendix
The sample spans the years 1980Q1-1998Q4, and data come from European Central Bank
Area-Wide Database. Series are seasonally adjusted aggregates from national sources, and
in particular
a GDP and GDP deflator are EUROSTAT and ECB aggregate data from national 
sources using fixed 1995 GDP weights at PPP rates
G Short- and long-term interest rates are BIS weighted averages of national rates using 
fixed 1995 GDP weights at PPP rates
D M3:
as from January 1999, ECB-calculated holdings of currency in circulation 
plus liabilities issued by MFIs and some central govt, institutions 
(overnight deposits, deposits with agreed maturity up to 2 years, deposits 
. redeemable at notice up to 3 months, repos, money market fund shares, 
money market paper and debt securities with maturity up to 2 years); series 
available from 199703 onwards 
" 198001-199702: ECB aggregation of historical national estimates of the
same series, with national contributions aggregated by their (fixed) GDP 
weight at PPP rates and 1997Q3 as starting values (ECB, 1999b) 
includes MFIs cross-border positions 
quarterly averages of monthly data
Q Inflation is the annualised quarterly change in the GDP deflator, ^  =
0 Real money growth is the quarterly change in the real money stock,
A/w, = A(m,
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Granger non-Causality Tests
Ml:( m,p,y,s,l)
1(2) model
dpiax”2 
( 1)
1(1) model 
dmax~l
(2)
M2:( m-p,y,s,l,p)
i ( l )  m odel dmax=l
(3)
Wald tests for
Ho: M2 vs H^ : Ml
1(2) model
dmax~2
(4)
I( 1 ) model
= 1
(5)
k = l
k = 3
0.110
(0.740)
0.970
(0.325)
0.384
(0.535)
9.109
(0.105)
19.490
(0.109)
L579 m m......
1.102
(0.777)
0.633
(0.889)
1.066
(0.785)
19.607
(0.106)
20.599
(0.245)
Table 1 -  Toda and Yamamoto (1995) tests for Granger non-causality of M3 on prices in the VAR(k). Standard errors in parentheses.
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Tests for Granger non-Causality Wald tests for
Toda and Yamamoto Toda and Phillips Ho: M2 vs H^ : Ml
1(2) model 1(1) model 1(1) model 1(2) model 1(1) model
dmax—2 d m a x ^ l dpnax^l dmax“ 2 dm ax~1
M2:(m-p,7t) Wl2:(m-p,7E)
r=0
k=1 0.004 0.134 0.425 H*=2.045 (.153) 8.189** 23.932***
(0.950) (0.714) (0.515) (0.017) (0.000)
0R14 1.410 5.105*
(0.666) (0.494) (0.078)  ^ (6,034).
k=3 0.257 2.273 1.819 2.0599 0.059
(0.968) (0.518) (0.611) (0.357) (0.970)
M1:(m,p,y) M2:(m-p,îc,y) M2:(iri"P,7c,y)
k=1 0.097 0.006 0.614 Hi*=15.71 (.000) 4.721 11.357**
(0.755) (0.938) (0.434) (0.193) (0.010)
Hg*=2.22 (.136)
k=2 0.518 0.950 1.033 6.061 15.633***
(0.772) (0.622) (0.597) Ht*=.345 (.557) ;(p.109) (0.001 y
k=3 3.387 1.159 0.827 H*=3.969 (.137) 2.150 1.690
(0.336) (0.763) (0.843) (0.542) (0.639)
WI1:(m,p,y,s) M2:(m-p,îï,y,s) M2:(m-p,ît,y,s)
r=2
k=1 0.970 2.470 1.337 Hi*=17.71 (.000) 5.209 5.158
(0.325) (0.116) (0.248) (0.267) (0.272)
H2*=5.20 (.074)
k=2 0.846 ^ ' 1.047 0.420 2ri04, 2;699
- (0.655) . (0.592) (0.811) H/=.013 (.909) (0,717) (0.609)
k=3 2.104 1.046 0.381 H*=1.556 (.459) 2.970 1.935
(0.551) (0.790) (0.944) (0.563) (0.748)
M1:(m,p,y,l-s) M2:(m-p,7t,y,I-s) M2;(m-p,it,y,I-s)
r=2
k=1 0.192 0.466 0.309 Hi*=22.72 (.000) 4.601 4.215
(0.661) (0.495) (0.578) (0.331) (0.378)
H2*=2.59 (.274)
k=2 0 243 0.335 \  0.445 4.726 11.131**
(0.886) (0.846) , (0.801) HF=.067 (.796) (0.317) (0.025)
k=3 0.312 0.810 0.527 H*=2.74 (.253) 1.819 1.593
(0.956) (0.847) (0.913) (0.769) (0.810)
Table 2 -  Toda and Yamamoto(1995) and Toda and Phillips (1994) tests for Granger non- causality of M3 on prices in the VAR(k). Standard erors in parentheses.
151
9-ss
%
Ti►SS
=?f
*n
“If-5;
1
T?
If>5S
?>45
t
ffi
in
o
- >
CNt"
VÛTj-
m
o
(NO
vOR
o
VO6
VO5
s
R
*
o
m
-X-*
*
moo
<N
*VOOv
<Ï3
s
VO
g
xt-s
§
oo
m
M
(NVO
(N
8
VO
g
g
**
in
5
8
8
0 4i n
1%;
( Nin
m—H 00 ooTj- oo mtn
o
I S I § I en
V ) CN x o  ^o\ m cN en
rH T—t CN '— I
Tf XÛ O OS3 T»
OOO s I S
29m  V) enXO OX 0 0o  o  o O
ë
Tf XO *Vî Ox tHp  ^
S  “  ®00 5 I 3 s
o oo in 'Oxo xo ooo  o  o g
Figure la.
  Dinf Fitted 2.02
1
0
-.02
■2
1980> . 1985Correiogram 1990 1995 20001980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.5
0 5
Figure Ib.
.0055
.005
.0045
.004
4' • Rss
1990 1995
.75.5
0
1990 1995 20001990 1995 2000
Innovs
20001990 1995 2000
J-—- RcsIS^ lu p  CH O W s.02
.5
-.02
1990 1995 20001990 1995 2000
N up CH O W s
1990 1995 20001990 1995 2000
154
Figure 2a
.02
.02
—  Dinf ■<-----► Fitted
■Jï
Residual
1980^ 1985 1990, Correiogram 1995 20001980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-.5
1 i
Figure 2b
rea l m uncy yap
20001990 2000 990
.0045
20001990
1990
' E
1995
- N u p C liO W s  I
.75
.5
2000
20001990 2000
-1----- kesiilcp 1 -----------— 1-----  3S4 ^ lu p c r i b w s l
.... "
2000 1990 1995 20001990 1995 2000
1990 1995 2000
155
Figure 3
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Time-Varying-VAR P erspectives on Chapter 4
R eal E xchange R ates, P roductivity  
L evels and G overnm ent Spending
“...T he starting po in t o f  the approach is that in specifying econom etric m odels one attem pts to 
f ilte r  as much information a s possib le from  the data. However, instead o f  relying on classical 
hypothesis testing o r  econom ic theory to decide w hether a  particu lar variable o r  lag should  
enter the autoregression, these authors use a sym m etric “a th eoretica l” p r io r  on a ll variables 
to trade o ff overparam eterisation  with oversim plification. The reason fo r  taking an alternative 
route to the specification problem  is that there is a ve ty  low signal-to-noise ratio in economic 
data  and economic theory leaves a g rea t deal o f  uncertainty concerning which economic 
structures are  useful fo r  inference and forecasting. Because highly param eterised  unrestricted  
VAR m odels include many variables in each equation, the extraction f ilte r  is too w ide and  
noise obscures the relatively weak signal presen t in the data: the p r io r  acts as an orientable  
antenna which, when appropria tely  directed, may clarify’ the s ig n a l...”
Canova (1995), pp.84-85
1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, developments in econometric theory have made 
possible to achieve a better understanding of the reasons why substantial deviations of the 
exchange rate from the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) can take place. In particular, the 
analysis of this phenomenon has greatly benefited from the emergence of concepts like 
stationarity and cointegration, and from their application to the study of exchange rates’ 
trending properties.
Although a more decisive response on this issue will need to resort to further 
advances in econometric theory, the baseline findings of this voluminous body of 
empirical literature can be summarised as follows. First, PPP appears to hold, but only in 
the very long run: both in its absolute and relative versions, PPP fails to hold continuously 
(Clarida and Gali, 1994; MacDonald, 1996; Engel, 1996). Second, the observed departures 
of the exchange rate from PPP are more persistent than traditional, flexible-price models 
of the exchange rate would predict.
As a direct consequence of such findings, the focus of the theoretical literature on 
exchange rates has recently shifted towards the development of intertemporal sticky-price 
models, in an effort to take more adequate consideration of the dynamic adjustment 
followed by saving and investment (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1997).
This chapter aims at providing some empirical evidence as to the origins of the 
observed deviations of the exchange rate from PPP. The question of whether PPP holds, 
and the related one about the mean-reverting properties of the nominal exchange rate, yet 
deserve extensive empirical work, but our focus is different. In what follows we wish to 
shed some light on the nature of the movements of the real exchange rate.
Thus far, the existing empirical evidence has provided some limited support to 
the idea that sustained divergences in government spending and sectoral productivity 
patterns might be at the root of persistent fluctuations of bilateral real exchange rates. 
Moreover, the persistence of deviations of the nominal exchange rate from PPP appears to 
critically depend on the exchange rate regime in place. That is, during periods of floating 
exchange rates, persistent fluctuations of the real exchange rate seem to be more common 
than under fixed exchange rates, thus producing the largest observed depaitures from 
PPP\ Finally, market imperfections -in the form of pricing-to-market behaviour or similar- 
market segmentation practices- may prevent perfect goods arbitrage, and make the 
dynamics of relative prices diverging from that of nominal exchange rates.
Against this background, we then seek to attribute the observed movements of the 
bilateral real exchange rates between the USA, UK, and Italy, to some of the causes above 
summarised. That is, we try a tentative attribution of the shocks to the real exchange rates 
to existing divergences in the fiscal stance^, differential productivity levels, and significant 
differences in money market conditions.
There are two main novelties in our study. First, following some recent advances 
in Bayesian approaches to the estimation of Vector Autoregressions, we employ a time- 
varying methodology. We apply such techniques to the estimation of an unrestricted VAR 
comprising the bilateral real exchange rate, a measure of productivity differentials, an 
indicator of the relative fiscal stance, and the ratio between real ex-post interest rates in the 
two countries. We then decompose the total residual variance of each VAR equation into 
stochastic contributions attributable to innovations in each endogenous variable. By 
applying a Kalman filter technique to the system’s estimated parameters and variances, we 
decompose the total variance of the real exchange rate equation into contributions that are 
allowed to change over time. The particular state-space representation we adopt for our
‘ Figure I displays series for the three bilateral real exchange rates we study. From it, it is relatively apparent that the 
major fluctuations o f the rates are concentrated during the free-floating intervals.
" Here we do not distinguish between the fiscal balance per se and the unexpected fiscal stance shocks as the emerging 
literature on fiscal policy transmission seeks to identify (Fatas and Mihov, 1998; Blanchard and Perotti, 1999; Giavazzi
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models enables us to impose the least restrictive assumptions on the dynamic structure of 
the system; the VAR coefficients are simply assumed to be stationary white noise 
processes. This way, our model is able to pick up the changing influences of the monetary 
regime, of productivity shocks, and the fiscal and monetary stance, on the real exchange 
rate, over time. We further avoid to impose particularly stringent identification structures, 
by adopting the Generalised Impulse Response approach of Koop et al. (1996) and 
Pesaran and Shin (1998) to examine the dynamic response of the real exchange rate to 
shocks in each of the remaining variables of the system.
The second novelty of this study is represented by the data we use. We apply our 
approach to a long historical set of annual observations spanning the last 130 years and 
obtained from a variety of sources. The bilateral real exchange rates between the USA, 
UK, and Italy aie analysed across all international monetary regimes (classical Gold 
Standard, Bretton Woods, the post-1973 floating and the EMS) these countries were 
involved in during the sample period.
There is a clear policy-motivated aim in the kind of analysis we undertake. 
Recently, monetary policymaking has been unified in Europe, with the introduction of the 
euro and the establishment of the ESCB. Moreover, recuirent proposals of dollarisation 
are put forward for some developing and transition economies. Should real shocks emerge 
as the driving force of real exchange rate fluctuations, this would constitute a relatively 
negative message for such attempts, and would instead provide a strong case in favour of 
flexible exchange rate regimes
The main results we obtain can be summarised as follows. First, we find very 
little evidence in favour of shocks to relative productivity levels as having persistent 
appreciating effects on real exchange rates. Such result, though not valid across all the 
sub-sample estimates we obtain, appears to be overall robust. Second, we find some 
stronger support for shocks to the relative fiscal position of a country as triggering 
substantial real exchange rate fluctuations. Third, estimates conducted within single 
exchange rate regimes suggest that the response of real exchange rates to shocks in the 
other variables appears to critically depend not just on the international monetary 
arrangements historically in place, but also on demographic and technological factors. As 
can be seen, the above mentioned dilemma between fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes is not fully solved by the evidence we uncover, and calls for further investigation.
et al. , 2000). The distinction is very important but, for sake o f simplicity, here we refer to the fiscal stance generically,
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The s tincture of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 recalls a simple analytical 
framework commonly used for standard testing of the PPP hypothesis, and then turns to 
the existing empirical evidence on real exchange rates dynamics, briefly summarising the 
main findings so far. Section 3 formalises the small VAR model of the real exchange rate 
adopted for our following empirical investigation, and discusses various identification 
issues related with the problem at hand. Then, our time-varying framework is introduced. 
Section 4 describes in detail the econometric techniques we use, while Section 5 
illustrates our main findings. Finally, Section 6 contains some concluding remarks and 
directions for further empirical research.
2. Modelling Real Exchange Rates in the Long Run 
2.1 A Simple Theoretical Framework
The framework used by the recent wave of tests on the PPP hypothesis rests on a 
simple specification of production and consumption in an intertemporal context. Before 
we start discussing the existing empirical evidence on this issue, we introduce a simple 
theoretical model that encompasses several of the features the literature has recently 
highlighted. In what follows, we illustrate a baseline framework first introduced by Rogoff 
(1992), and slightly modified for estimation purposes by Chinn and Johnston (1996).
The economy consists of two sectors, in which output is determined by Cobb- 
Douglas-type production functions:
[11
where and are output of the traded and nontraded sectors, respectively, K
and L are capital and labour inputs, and A is a stochastic productivity shock. In this as in 
many other similar models, the existence of some adjustment cost prevents, in the short- 
run, full factor mobility.
The general price level is a geometric average of the traded and nontraded goods 
price indices (all small-cap variables are in logs):
deferring the question to some future research.
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p , = a p ^  + ( l - a } p j [2]
The representative agent in the economy maximises a utility function expressed 
in terms of consumption of the two goods, and C :^
s=0
\-x
1 - À
[3]
where j3 is the subjective discount rate, and À is the inverse of the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution. Elementary budget constraints for private and government 
consumption hold, so that in each period total consumption in each sector equals output in
each sector. Consequently, the price of nontraded goods relative to traded ones, ,
is a function of relative consumption of the two goods:
P = ÔC] [4]
Agents smooth expected marginal utility over time, so that the first order 
condition from the optimisation problem can be approximated by an expression in which 
we also assume that the As have constant variance:
[5]
Rogoff (1992) shows that, by combining [3] into [4] and rearranging, relative 
price inflation becomes proportional to the growth of relative demand for the two goods:
[ 6 ]
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We now further assume that government spending falls entirely on nontraded 
goods and that it behaves according to a random walk. Clearly, the former assumption, 
along with the assumed existence of some adjustment cost affecting the reallocation of 
production factors between sectors, is the key to determine persistent effects of demand- 
side shocks on the real exchange rate. Alternatively, one might assume the existence of 
market power, or the breakdown of PPP for traded goods, to obtain the same effects^.
If technology shocks are normally distributed, that is
one can amend equation [6] to obtain an expression in which relative price 
inflation is also function of the ratio of nontraded output to private demand for it. is 
such ratio, [6] can be re-written as follows:
Pm  -P , = ( « L -«, ")  + ( /«  “ S',). [8]
where gt is (the log of) government spending. After recursive backward 
substitution, we obtain
P t  + l  +  { f N  ~ ^ ) S m + K  ’ [9]
where ko are the initial relative price conditions.
We now introduce the foreign country in our model. We start by defining the real 
exchange rate (q) as the nominal exchange rate {e) multiplied by the ratio between 
aggregate price indices: q^  =e^+p* . We further assume that the foreign country is
identical to the home one -which means that for the moment we assume the two countries 
as having the same weight a  in their price indices- and that PPP holds for traded goods. 
Through manipulation of the expression for the real exchange rate, we obtain:
 ^ De Gregorio, Giovannini and W olf (1994) pursue this lines of reasoning quite effectively in their empirical 
investigation, surveyed below
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g, = or(e,+ pf'’ -p ,'" ), [10]
where now the real exchange rate is a function of the relative price of nontraded
goods.
Using the previous equation, we can express [9] in terms of departures of home 
relative prices from foreign relative prices;
Pm -P'm  = ( p " i + - e , - P m )  =
=  + ( / n  + P o
In the above expression, starred variables refer to the foreign country, while the 
circumflex indicates a variable calculated in terms of relative differences (home minus 
foreign). In [11], the LHS is simply the ratio between relative price levels in the two
countries. The fact that PPP holds for traded goods implies that;
+Pw  -P w ) = « L + ( / n  -1)Sm  + P o_ .  [12]
and then, using [10]:
= - “ [«N.i - / n«w  + ( / n +Po] [13]
The above equation illustrates quite well a number of features of the long-run
relationship between the real exchange rate, the relative sectoral productivity levels, and 
government spending as a fraction of GDP. This relationship, or very similar ones, has 
often been used to develop testable hypotheses about real exchange rate movements. For 
example, diverging trends in the relative productivity levels in the traded and nontraded 
goods sectors can be seen in [13] as triggering an appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
According to the well-known Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis (BSH, henceforth. See 
Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964), if in one of the countries productivity tends to rise more 
in the traded goods sector than in the nontraded goods one, the relative price of nontraded 
goods will tend to rise. This because of, assuming perfect international capital mobility, 
productivity gains, and subsequent production cost savings, in the traded goods sector. It
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follows that the general CPI will rise more under the pressure of non-traded goods 
inflation- This will lead the price levels in economies that aie experiencing productivity 
gains or aie catching-up with more advanced countries to rise more quickly than in 
countries enjoying their steady-state levels of productivity growth. Real exchange rate 
appreciations on the paid of faster-growing economies relative to steady-state ones should 
thus ensue.
It is useful to point out that this result holds thanks to a series of standard, but 
critical assumptions. For example, the above model explicitly assumes that capital is 
perfectly mobile internationally, that capital and labour are perfectly mobile across 
sectors, and that Ricardian equivalence holds (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1997)"^ .
Rogoff (1992) developed this line of reasoning slightly further, by noting that in 
[11] temporary shocks to relative productivity can have persistent or even permanent 
effects on the relative price of nontraded goods. This because internationally developed 
capital markets will help agents to smooth out their consumption of traded goods. The 
intratemporal relative price of nontraded goods will then be smoothed too.
The natural question about the effect of diverging productivity patterns on the 
price of nontraded goods is then the following: should we expect to detect a Balassa- 
Samuelson effect in the long run? The final answer is eminently empirical, and indeed the 
evidence reviewed below provides some clue about it. However, two stylised facts should 
be borne in mind. First, technological advances tend to spread very fast, and the catehing- 
up of productivity levels in some previously lagging economies is one of the best-known 
historical facts of the 19'  ^ and 20^  ^centuries. As lagging economies approach steady-state 
levels of productivity, the Balassa-Samuelson effect should gradually die away. 
Interestingly, the US and Italy were, for parts of our sample, experiencing catching-up 
processes vis-à-vis a more mature industrial country like the UK. In turn Britain has seen 
its productivity levels relative to the US and Italy undergoing substantial fluctuations in 
the past 130 yeai's. More importantly, even if productivity levels can diverge across 
countries for prolonged periods, one expects capital and labour mobility pushing towaids 
long-run convergence of income levels. It is then clear how using long-span, low 
frequency data, is the only way one has to draw some conclusions about the persistence of 
such effects in the long run.
If Ricardian equivalence holds, a temporary tax has no effect on aggregate demand or the exchange rate. An additional 
implicit assumption is that taxation does not generate distortionary effects on private spending and labour supply.
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However, Froot and Rogoff (1995) slightly generalise this model, obtaining a 
formulation in which the change in the relative price of traded goods is also a function of 
each sector’s relative capital intensity -the ^ parameters in our equations [1]. They thus 
point out that, even in the case of balanced productivity growth between the traded and 
non-traded sectors, if the production of non-traded goods is more labour-intensive, the 
relative price of nontraded goods will rise, triggering once again an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate.
As far- as the effects of demand factors on the real exchange rate are concerned, 
from [13] we see that since government spending is assumed to be falling entirely on 
nontraded goods, the relative price of the latter, and the real exchange rate, are bound to 
appreciate. Clearly, this holds only as long as capital and labour are not perfectly mobile 
across sectors, so that the effects of any demand-side shock on the relative price of 
nontraded goods should be limited to the short run only. But this point, as well as the one 
related to the persistence of the effects of monetary shocks on the real exchange rate, 
appears another purely empirical question.
An additional practical point relates to the difficulty of devising productivity 
measures that are unrelated to the measures of fiscal stance, and ultimately, to the business 
cycle. As we will see, this may prevent, in principle, cleai' identification of the 
transmission of the shocks to the real exchange rate.
We now turn to analysing the empirical evidence about exchange rate deviations 
from PPP.
2.2 Productivity Differentials, Fiscal Shocks and Real Exchange Rate Movements
What follows is a brief review of the most recent empirical studies on the effects 
of differences in productivity levels and shocks to the fiscal stance on real exchange rates. 
As surveys with similar aims are widely available^, we will only focus on particulai' 
aspects of each contribution.
De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994) represents one of the first extensive 
studies about the relative importance of demand and supply factors in determining real
Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) somehow elaborate on the empirical relevance o f  
these effects.
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exchange rate movements. They stait by constmcting some measures of total factor 
productivity growth -as opposed to the labour productivity measure used in previous 
analyses- for 14 countries, using the OECD intersectoral database. After providing an 
innovative classification of the sectors in traded and nontraded, the authors pool data for 
all the countries over the period 1971-1985. De Gregorio et al. (1994) then detect 
significant effects of productivity growth and government spending as a share of GNP on 
the relative price of nontraded goods. However, only the former remains significant when 
similar regressions are run on cross-sectional data averaged for each country -a  way of 
solving the baseline model for the long-run equilibrium. That is, the productivity effect on 
real exchange rates is found to be persistent.
Using a similai' data set, Asea and Mendoza (1994) find that the BSH helps 
explaining the observed changes in the relative price of nontraded goods, in a sample of 14 
OECD countries between 1975 and 1985. However, such price changes do not appear to 
be relevant in explaining measured real exchange rate fluctuations over that sample.
Chinn (1997) and Chinn and Johnston (1996) assess whether the apparent lack of 
cointegration usually found between time series of real exchange rates, sectoral 
productivity levels and the fiscal balance^, is replicated when panel cointegration 
techniques aie applied. Their findings aie that panel data tend to confirm such 
cointegrating relationship, and in particular that productivity shocks in the traded goods 
sector do trigger a real appreciation in the real exchange rate. At the same conclusion 
arrived similai* panel cointegration tests by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1996) on a 
different panel of OECD economies. In fact, their evidence is paiticularly supportive of 
the real exchange rate being cointegrated with sectoral labour productivity differentials. In 
turn, Alberola and Tyrvainen (1998) use standard cointegration analysis to verify the same 
hypothesis for a number of European countries. Their findings confirm the results in 
Chinn (1997)^, though they reject the complete equalisation of wages across sectors that 
usually accompanies the baseline BSH.
Canzoneri, Cumby, Diba and Eudey (1998) look at the empirical evidence in 
favour of the BSH, for a number of EU countries. Their informal examination of data on 
relative prices of home and traded goods reveals two basic points. First, although overall
 ^ Asea and Corden (1994) and Froot and Rogoff (1995) provide exhaustive reviews o f this literature, more recently 
assessed by MacDonald (1999).
 ^Our equation [13] can be easily interpreted as such cointegrating relationship.
’ Their econometric results find support for the BSH in Germany, Belgium and Spain. For France, Italy, Netherlands, 
Austria and Finland the BSH is however rejected.
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inflation has converged among the EU Member States, there are still substantial 
differentials between non-traded goods inflation and traded goods inflation. In addition, 
differences are significant in home-good inflation rates between Germany and the other 
economies. In other words, all EU countries display significant nontraded goods inflation 
differentials. Secondly, productivity differentials with Germany seem to be the most 
important explanatory factor in generating inflation differentials amongst sectors.
Formal unit-root tests conducted by Canzoneri et a l  ( 1998) on a panel of all EU 
countries confirm that trends in relative prices of nontraded goods are to be explained by 
trends in relative productivity across sectors. This validates the BSH for the countries and 
the sample at hand.
Against this background, however, two points are worth noting. As argued, inter 
alia, by Rogoff (1995, 1996), if the law of one price fails to hold within the traded goods 
sector, the aggregate price ratio between countries will not move in line with the nominal 
exchange rate. Consequently, deviations from PPP tend to exist even in the absence of 
diverging productivity patterns or fiscal policy shocks. In addition, monetary factors have 
not, so far, been considered in the analysis. It is instead tme that they may play a major 
role in determining prolonged fluctuations in nominal, as well as in real exchange rates®. It 
might be more appropriate to think of the relationship between productivity differentials, 
the fiscal balance and the real exchange rate as not invariant, for example, to the exchange 
regime in place, or to the monetaiy stance more in general. We generally do expect 
monetaiy shocks to have only temporary effects on real exchange rates^. However, the 
monetary regime in which the country under investigation finds itself is likely to 
determine the transmission channels of productivity and fiscal balance shocks to the real 
exchange rate.
We then turn to assess the ways in which the empirical literature has faced these 
two issues.
 ^Rogers (1999), as we will see, provides some evidence in favour of such a case.
It is true, however, that every business cycle factor permanently affecting employment and output can have persistent 
effects on the real exchange rate too. This can happen through permanent changes in long-run productivity (Aghion and 
Saint-Paul, 1993), vintage effects in investment and hysteresis in the labour market (Darby, ireland and Wren-Lewis,
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2.3 Market Imperfections and Monetary Shocks: Do They Matter?
The failure of the law of one price is now a standard result in a number of 
empiiical open-economy studies. Campa and Wolf (1998) argue that the mean-reversion 
properties of G-7 economies’ real exchange rates can be attributed only to a limited extent 
to goods maiket ai'bitrage. Rogoff’s (1996) conclusion is that international product 
markets are probably still segmented to such an extent to produce large trading frictions 
and nominal rigidities. The same explanations are used by Cecchetti, Nelson and Sonora
(1998) to illustrate their findings, which prove the existence of a PPP puzzle for relative 
prices within the USA as well.
In line with the latter findings, Engel and Rogers (1998b) show that relative 
prices between two locations tend to be indefinitely more volatile than the simple 
geographical distance between markets can otherwise explain. The study stresses the 
importance of alternative factors in determining how close the integration of consumer 
markets is between different locations. Amongst these, the fraction of non-traded 
components -mainly local services- in any product; the eventual existence of bamers to 
shipments for the traded components; finally, the degree of monopolistic mark-up. The 
third of these factors, in particular, proxies for pricing-to-market behaviour on the pari of 
firms and allows for the possibility that market segmentation may provide room for price 
discrimination. The basic findings of this reseai'ch tend to show that relative price 
variability is well explained by a geographical-distance effect, and that the “tradability 
chai'acteristics” of the good play no role in that. Another contribution by Engel and Rogers 
(1998a), testing the same model on a sample of 23 countries on different continents, finds 
that international relative price volatility is a function of both distance and exchange rate 
variability. On the other hand, Engel, Hendrickson and Rogers (1997)’® reject the presence 
of a unit root in real exchange rates and show that the speed of convergence to PPP is 
different for intra-national, intra-continental and inter-continental real exchange rates.
Engel and Rogers (1998b) allow for the possibility that nominal exchange rate 
volatility might explain much of the cross-border price variability. If nominal prices are 
sticky and the nominal exchange rate is highly volatile, cross-country prices will be more 
volatile than within-country prices, simply because the former ai'e expressed through a
1996), or simply the loss of skills normally associated with severe business cycle downturns. These points were raised 
by Muscatelli and Spinelli (1999).
They use panel data from four countries on two continents.
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nominal exchange rate measure. In fact, Bayoumi and MacDonald (1999), by applying 
panel unit root methods, detect this effect in the context of two monetary unions, Canada 
and the United States. More generally, this pattern re-emerges in the comparison of intra- 
continental to cross-continental relative price; the intra-continental prices display lower 
variances (Engel and Rogers, 1998a). In fact, the border effect appears solid even to this 
caveat, and the simple relative stickiness of national prices is not able to fully explain 
market segmentation.
Cecchetti, Nelson and Sonora (1998) reach the same conclusions. Their main 
objective is to test for general price level discrepancies across U.S. cities, and they find large 
and persistent divergences. For example, annual inflation rates measured over 10-year 
intervals aie shown to differ by up to 1.6 percent. In the context of EMU, such differentials 
might involve substantial complications for ESCB’s interest rate policy.
In suiweying all the above analyses and those in the previous section, we have 
devoted little attention to the nature of the monetary regime in place. In fact, one of the 
stylised facts mentioned in the introduction is that, during periods of floating exchange rates, 
real exchange volatility appears to be higher. Indeed, using historical data on EMU 
Member States as well as non-EMU countries, Obstfeld (1998a, b) shows that, in low-to 
moderate-inflation contexts, shifts from floating to controlled nominal rates tend to 
produce lower short-run real and nominal exchange rates volatility, while variations in the 
two rates are almost perfectly correlated. The presence of price sluggishness is the most 
intuitive explanation for this result: the price level only adjusts slowly to changes in 
nominal exchange rates. In this case, variations in the nominal exchange rate may strongly 
affect the real exchange rate. Moreover, the whole transmission mechanism of aggregate 
supply and demand shocks may be different under alternative international monetary 
aiTangements.
In general, empirical studies on the matter have estimated small stmctural (VAR) 
models of the economy, often in the spirit of the Fleming-Mundell-Dornbusch tradition, to 
analyse the importance of these considerations. In this vein, Kaminsky and Klein (1994) 
estimate a structural VAR to decompose the shocks to the dollai/pound real exchange rate 
during the Gold Standard. Their main finding is that shocks to fiscal deficits were 
associated with fluctuations of the exchange rate, while changes in government spending 
per se were not having a systematic effect on it.
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Clarida and G ali (1994) perform a similar task, in turn, on the dollar real 
exchange rate with the other G3 countries over the post-Bretton Woods period. Their 
findings are that aggregate demand shocks in general had significant long-run effects on 
the real exchange rate, while monetary shocks tend to die out much quicker and account 
only for a small portion of its variability. Supply shocks, instead, play no role in real 
exchange rate dynamics. Eichenbaum and Evans’ (1995) estimated model yields the same 
results.
MacDonald (1996) estimates a cointegrating VAR over the same period and 
countries. Impulse-response analysis cairied out after imposing some long-run restrictions 
reveals that fiscal balance and productivity shocks do produce appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, but this is short-lived and quickly reversed” .
Rogers (1999) is one of the two studies -the other being Muscatelli and Spinelli
(1999)- that uses long historical data sets. It examines the relevance of various kinds of 
shocks on the dollai/pound real exchange rate between 1889 and 1992. A structural VAR 
analysis is conducted on a variety of system vectors including alternative measures of the 
fiscal stance, productivity levels, and money market indicators. The SVAR is then 
identified applying Blanchard and Quah’s (1989) identification restrictions on the long- 
run response of variables to the shocks. The main result from this study is that, contrary to 
Clarida and Gali’s (1994) findings, monetary shocks account for nearly half of the 
observed variability in the real exchange rate, though, again, these effects tend to die out 
relatively fast. In addition, fiscal and trade policies appear* to have a substantial impact on 
the exchange rate, while productivity levels do not seem to be the a key determinant of the 
variance of real exchange rate changes. These results should be carefully borne in mind 
when studying impulse responses in our time-varying context’ .^
Muscatelli and Spinelli (1999) estimate a semi-stiTtctural VAR model in the real 
exchange rate and deviations of domestic productivity levels, real ex ante interest rates and 
government spending as a fraction of GDP from their foreign counterparts. The study uses 
the same data set as ours (1870-1995), and it is then particularly relevant’®. Identification 
of the structural shocks is achieved through a recursive ordering of the variables. Results 
confirm that in many cases PPP does not hold even over long time horizons. In producing
Similar results are achieved by Clark and MacDonald (1998).
'' However, some words of caution should be spent on Rogers’ (1999) results. Impulse responses are presented within 
error bands representing the 84"' and 16‘" percentiles o f  the empirical distribution o f 1000 simulated impulse responses. 
This amounts to assuming a confidence level of about 70%.
Compared to ours, their country sample is extended to include France,
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such deviations fiscal and productivity shocks appeal* to have a substantial and persistent 
impact. In line with Rogers (1999), the authors find that a Balassa-Samuelson effect on 
real exchange rates can be tracked well before and into the post-Bretton Woods period.
Finally, Clarida and Prendergast (1999) re-examine the question for the dollar/G3 
rates, using a structural VAR consisting of the OECD’s estimates of the structural primary 
budget surplus relative to potential GDP, the output gap, the ratio of the actual primary 
budget surplus to actual GDP, and a trade-weighted index of the real exchange rate. Their 
findings are that the real exchange rate substantially appreciates in response to an 
expansionary fiscal shock, but again, this movement is eventually reversed after a few 
observations. Clarida and Prendergast’s (1999) work is certainly a useful staiting point for 
analyses devoted to the study of the dynamic effects of fiscal policy (see Fatas and Mihov, 
1998, Blanchard and Perotti, 1999). However, the lack of a significant number of 
observations -their study employs annual data over 1975 to 1996- does not permit to take 
the above results as particularly robust'"’.
2.4 Real Exchange Rates, Productivity, and Fiscal Policy Shocks: Where Do We Stand?
We are now in the position to express some remarks on the main findings of the 
studies just examined.
a) There is some evidence pointing towards diverging productivity patterns as 
having some persistent effect on real exchange rates. This is in line with the 
BSH, though there is little available empirical evidence as to the relative 
importance of this productivity-trend effect in determining observed 
movements in the real exchange rates. Also, there is some hint about the 
possibility that such relationship, as it depends on changing relative 
productivity levels, may not be invaiiant over time.
b) Some additional evidence suggests that positive shocks to the fiscal balance 
might have some appreciating effect on the relative price of traded goods. 
Such a relationship, however, appears to be confined to short-run deviations 
from equilibrium, and in some studies its sign is not in line with theory’s 
predictions.
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c) The persistence profile of both kinds of shocks appears to be very 
controversial. This does not come as a surprise, however. All recent 
intertemporal macro models (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1997) show that the 
persistence profile of such shocks is affected by changes in consumer 
preferences, demographic and technological factors, as well as by capital and 
labour mobility. The question is then an eminently empirical one, and it calls 
for some caution in employing structural models to disentangle the issue.
d) The variability in the results of many of the empirical analyses surveyed 
above also suggests that the data frequency, and the period over which such 
studies are conducted, are indeed crucial. The main reason might be that the 
transmission of monetary and non-monetary shocks is not invariant to the 
monetary regime in place, and that real exchange dynamics is better 
decomposed using low-frequency data.
3. VAR Models of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations; Time-Invariant or Time- 
Varying?
In the light of the above considerations about the existing evidence, we decided to 
study the dynamic response of bilateral real exchange rates between the US, UK and Italy 
from a time-varying VAR perspective. Since the empirical methodology we apply 
deserves careful examination, our next steps are as follows. We first illustrate the way we 
cast the model illustrated in Section 2.1 into a standard VAR representation. Then, we turn 
to discussing how such form can be further developed into one that better takes into 
account the intrinsic time-varying nature of the relationships we are investigating.
Equation [14] below (in which the bar on q emphasises the character of long-run, 
equilibrium value for the real exchange rate)
"/N^f+1+(/n +Po] [14]
was derived in the context of a small structural model in which the basic features 
of the recent wave of intertemporal macro models were all taken into account. It
This is likely to be the reason why the authors do not provide standard errors bands for their estimated impulse 
responses.
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represents a relationship between the real exchange rate, relative productivity levels in the 
traded and nontraded sectors, and government spending as a proportion of GDP. This 
specification, however, illustrates a long-run, equilibrium relationship, and would 
naturally call for a cointegration approach‘d (MacDonald, 1996). However, Muscatelli and 
Spinelli (1999) have already attempted such route, and for the same exchange rate series 
as ours, found no robust evidence of cointegration. Furthermore, we believe that a 
cointegrating approach employed on a very long dataset as ours, would end up assuming a 
fixed relationship amongst the variables, which is partly contradicting our original aim. 
Finally, the points we raised at the end of last section suggest to avoid being too dogmatic 
about the relationship between structural models and econometric specifications for the 
real exchange rate.
Drawing upon the negative findings of Muscatelli and Spinelli (1999) about the 
joint trending properties of our time series, we then choose to re-formulate the above 
model. In particular*, following MacDonald (1996) and, inter alia, Meese and Rogoff 
(1988), we now anchor a real exchange rate short-run adjustment mechanism to the long- 
run relationship in [14]‘®. Consider the standard uncovered interest parity condition for a 
one-period bond:
} = if + , [15]
where i is the nominal interest rate (again, circuiuflex denotes deviations from the 
foreign country’s respective value) and w'" is a relative money demand shock. Subtracting 
the expected inflation differential in f + i  from both sides we obtain a measure of the real 
interest parity condition expressed in terms of the actual equilibrium exchange rate:
<?, = £ , [ 1 6 ]
where r, = i^  -  } is the real ex ante interest rate. If we further assume that
the first term on the RHS of [16] coincides with the equilibrium real exchange rate (in
'■*’ Please recall, however, the difficulties the literature finds in detecting such cointegrating relationship empirically. See 
for example Chinn (1997).
Clark and MacDonald (1998) and MacDonald and Nagayasu (1999) find that Meese and R ogoff s (1988) inability to 
detect strong evidence o f thwe long-run link between real exchange rates and real interest differential might be due to 
the estimation technique. MacDonald and Nagayasu (1999) find strong evidence in favour of such link fay using panel 
cointegration techniques.
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t+1) we have in [14], we derive an expression in which the actual real exchange rate is a 
function of productivity and fiscal policy fundamentals and the real interest differential:
^ f + l  “  ^ t + l  “ 6 + 1  “  “ ^ [ ^ { + 1  ~ / j V ^ f + l  ■ * ' ( / n  F o ] ~ 6 + l
The above equation is our final relationship. The presence of the real interest 
differential constitutes the main mechanism through which the real exchange rate adjusts 
towards its long-run equilibrium. It should be noticed, once again, that it is the absence of 
perfect intersectoral factor mobility that allows us to obtain persistent fluctuations of the 
real exchange rate.
Expression [17] can be trivially turned into the following unrestricted VAR(p) 
specification” :
X ,= c  + j^A^X ,_^+ s, f = = [18]/=1
where X, is a (nxl) vector of endogenous vai'iables, AjS aie the (nxn) matrices of 
parameter coefficients, and s, is a. (nxl) vector of disturbances for which, of course
e {£,} = 0
In our case, X, ^  and n = 4. q represents a CPI-based measure of the
bilateral real exchange rate, D is a measure of the fiscal imbalance as a fraction of GDP, 
and T is the relative level of productivity in the traded sector’®. As before, circumflexes 
indicate that variables are expressed as departures of domestic magnitudes from their 
respective foreign counterparts.
We remind that Clarida and Gali (1994), Kaminsky and Klein (1994), and Muscatelli and Spinelli (1999) adopt semi- 
structural VARs. MacDonald (1996) estimates a (Johansen) cointegrating VAR and performs structural analysis on the 
orthogonalised shocks. The cointegrating relationship involves assuming that the real exchange rate depends on real 
interest rate differentials and the deviations of fiscal and productivity variables from foreign values. MacDonald’s (1996) 
approach appears very close to ours, in that it assumes a long-run relationship similar to our [13] and adopts the same 
information set as in our subsequent time-varying VAR estimates.
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Now, the existing empirical literature adopting VAR approaches (whether 
cointegrating or not) is confronted with the difficult task of devising some identifying 
restrictions in order to recover the fundamental disturbances from the VAR residuals, and 
to perform the necessary structural analysis. Following Lutkepohl (1991), Hamilton 
(1994), and Pesaran and Shin (1998), we re-cast the model in [18] in the following way” :
X - A Z  + U,
X = ... X ,) ;
A = (cA, ... Ap);Z = (Zj, Z^^, ... Z,_,)
^ 1 ^
X ,
X , . ,
[19]
p^+2 )
where now we have only T* = T - p observations available in each equation. 
Assuming that the model is stationary is equivalent to saying that the VAR has 
the following finite MA representation
X, /=0 [20]
where the BjS aie the (nxn) MA parameter matrices. Given the information set 
if the residual variance-covariance matrix X  is diagonal, the impulse-response function 
will be defined as
[21]
namely, the difference between the expected value of Xt at horizon h, given that a 
shock S hits the system in time t, and the expected value of X, in the absence of shocks.
Below we examine the key issues relative to the measurement o f such variables in our historical context. 
Henceforth we assume that p  is known.
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The MA parameters (p can then be interpreted as responses of X,+/, to a shock in t on 
variable j:
^j,h ~ ’ [22]
where ej is a vector of zeroes with one as the jth  element.
If, on the other hand, X  is not diagonal, contemporaneous interactions amongst 
the variables prevent any interpretation of the VAR residuals as fundamental disturbances, 
and the system is not identified.
The solutions put forward by the traditional VAR literature (Blanchard and Quah, 
1989; Hamilton, 1994) run essentially along two main avenues. First, one might try to 
impose some structure on the VAR by orthogonalising the shocks according to a Choleski 
decomposition of the residual variance-covariance matrix: PP’ ~ X, where P is a lower 
triangular matrix. This way, the orthogonalised responses are recovered as
[23]
Of course, devising congruent identifying restrictions is a major task that presents 
the researcher with problematic dilemmas about the ordering of the variables in the 
system, which in turn determines the dynamic interactions amongst reduced-form 
residuals.
Alternatively, Blanchard and Quah (1989) proposed to impose restrictions on 
long-run MA parameter matrices only, leaving the short-run movements of variables 
untouched. As in the case of recursive-triangular representations of the system, however, 
this amounts to impose some structure on the variables in order to recover the fundamental 
shocks. This obviously entails making relatively stringent assumptions on the transmission 
of the shocks. There is no agreement on the ideal recursive ordering or identifying 
structure to impose to our set of variables. In particular, it would be peculiarly hard to 
imagine a clear-cut way of configuring the apparent correlation existing between 
productivity and fiscal variables. Moreover, in our particular case, a fixed recursive 
ordering or a method à la Blanchard-Quah, would also entail that the transmission of the 
shocks is imposed to be invariant to fundamental changes occurring in the economy. Since
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we employ a relatively long-spanning data set, the latter idea sounds particularly odd. The 
approach we use is instead inspired to avoiding such restrictions. This is why we chose to 
follow, for the structural analysis following the time-varying estimation of our VAR 
systems, Koop, Pesaran and Potter’s (1996) and Pesaran and Shin’s (1998) Generalised 
Impulse Response methodology. They propose to employ an approach in which the 
empirical distribution of the response to a large number of different shocks to the system 
is examined. In our case, this approach will allow to overcome considerable difficulties we 
would meet in envisaging the interaction between the variables, and in attempting to 
identify the transmission of the shocks. This is particularly helpful, also because the 
contemporaneous correlations between productivity and fiscal stance measures are likely 
to be substantial.
Let us consider the impulse response of Xt+h to a shock on variable y, assuming 
that there are contemporaneous interactions amongst the variables;
If the distribution of Ss is multivariate normal, the conditional expectation of 
given the shock in equation j  is
[25]
where the os are elements from X. Accordingly, the generalised impulse 
response is defined as
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I  (J, ^
O':
[26]
In other words, the generalised impulse response function is based on an 
“average” shock hitting the system. It is equivalent to the function generated through a 
conventional Choleski decomposition when the residual variance-covariance matrix is 
diagonal.
In the same vein, defining the MSE matrix of a E-step forecast of Xt by
/i-i
m s e (x ,(?!))=X)b,-zb;, [27]
the error of a E-step forecast of a variable can be decomposed into the 
contributions of innovations to the variables of the system. In the case of orthogonalised 
and generalised responses, we have, respectively, the following forecast -error variance 
decomposition functions:
MSE(X,,,(ft))
^kk hO_________
M SE(X ,,(k))
[28]
An important caveat of this approach is that the interpretation of impulse 
responses and forecast eiTor variance decomposition is different from the case of 
othogonalised disturbances. If the residual variance-covariance matrix is not diagonal, 
innovation accounting is such that the sum of all contributions to explaining, for example, 
the total forecast error variance, does not add up to one. This means that comparisons over
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which variables contribute most to such variance cannot be conducted in percentage 
levels, but in relative terms.
Amongst the contributions we recurrently refer to^ ®, Rogers (1999) employs 
Blanchard-Quah’s structural-VAR framework. MacDonald (1996) estimates a 
cointegrating VAR on which long-run restrictions are imposed to investigate the impulse 
responses of the real exchange rate to various orthogonalised shocks to VAR’s elements. 
Muscatelli and Spinelli (1999) use for the real interest rate and productivity differentials, 
and for the real exchange rates, the same data set as ours. No cointegrating relationship is 
in turn found. The authors then identify the fundamental disturbances to the system 
through some restrictions imposed on the short-run parameter matrix.
Against this background, it is clear that the VAR approach overall represents 
quite a natural instrument to examine the relative importance of the fluctuations we are 
investigating. However, we have sought to circumvent the problematic identification tasks 
sketched above, not only by conducting structural analysis according to a generalised 
impulse response framework, but also by taking a radically different route as fax* as the 
VAR estimation is concerned. Following a recently developed strand of literature, we 
adopt a Bayesian perspective to the specification of the VAR system (Canova, 1995; 
Hamilton, 1994). We try to “enhance” the signal-to-noise content of the historical data set 
we use by adopting “....a symmetric atheoretical prior on all the variables to trade ojf 
overparameterization with oversimplification”^ .^ We first cast our baseline model into a 
convenient state-space representation, and then apply the Kalman filter to recursively 
compute an optimal estimate of the particular unobserved state vector used to explain the 
system’s dynamics. Our formulation then allows the VAR coefficients to be time varying, 
and, as we will see in the next Section, proposes a peculiarly unrestricted dynamics for the 
state vector. This avoids resorting to strict identifying restrictions and estimation 
procedures that might bias the economic hypotheses we are testing for^ .^
Our model is close to a number of time-varying coefficient models, developed 
during the eighties, which devoted particular attention to the specification of optimal 
probability distributions for the coefficients (Nicholls and Quinn, 1982; Quinn, 1986). 
Also, our approach is close, at least in spirit, to the studies stemming from the classic
See Section 2.3 
Canova (1995), p. 85.
Bee, Ben Salem and MacDonald (1999) estimate a Threshold Autoregressive model (TAR) o f seven real exchange 
rates in which the thresholds are defined in terms o f the real interest rate differential. Substantial nonlinearities are then
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Bayesian analysis of Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984). Our investigation differs from 
those analyses in that we do not rely on any prior belief about the autoregressive process 
of each time series. This will be particularly evident in the next section, where we clarify 
that the “atheoretical” prior we adopt is particularly “loose”, and characterised by the 
smallest possible number of parameters. Furthermore, in contrast with standard structural- 
VAR approaches, the time-varying specification adopted here does not require taking into 
consideration the eventual trending behaviour of some or all the variables included in the 
system. The analysis hinges on the likelihood principle, which makes it unaffected by the 
presence of unit roots (Canova, 1995).
The search for the optimal definition of the state vector is performed by applying 
the Kalman filter recursively over the sample. This yields (Harvey, 1989), under the 
assumption of normality of the residuals, the parameters (prediction error and its variance) 
of the optimal prediction error decomposition of the likelihood function. In turn, the 
selection of the optimal state vector is carried out numerically, through evaluation of the 
likelihood function. Structural analysis is finally performed over each observation of the 
state-space VAR model.
The dynamic response of the real exchange rate to shocks in each of the 
remaining variables of the system is finally examined, using the Generalised Impulse 
Response Approach of Koop et a l  (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998). In principle, one 
possible alternative to this route would have involved assuming a particular recursive 
ordering of the variables in the VAR, and perform structural analysis through Choleski 
decomposition of the residual variance-covariance matrix. As already discussed, this 
approach was followed by Muscatelli and Spinelli (1999). We believe that, given the long 
span of data, and the characteristics of the variables included in the model, an appropriate 
and unquestionable identification scheme for the various shocks within the system would 
be hard to find. As we have seen, despite the recent progress in the development of open 
economy intertemporal models, there is still wide disagreement as to the ways in which, 
for example, monetaiy and real shocks determine real exchange ate fluctuations. More 
specifically, we suspect that the degree of correlation between fiscal and productivity 
variables goes well beyond any effort to identify the transmission of shocks between them. 
Finding a recursive structure that fully accounts for such correlations would certainly 
represent a daunting task. Furthermore, a fixed recursive scheme assumed for the
detected, indicating that real fundamentals, like the ones considered in our work, might be very relevant in explaining
182
transmission of fundamental shocks to the variables would amount to treating the 130 
years of data as generated under one single monetary regime. This would be in open 
contrast with the aim of unveiling whether and how the transmission of shocks has 
changed over time.
The next Section illustrates in more details our approach.
4. A Time-Varying VAR Perspective on Real Exchange Rates
A transition and a measurement equation overall define a state-space model (see 
Harvey, 1989; Hamilton, 1994; Kim and Nelson, 1999). The measurement equation 
describes the dynamic relationship the model postulates between a nxT  vector of 
observable variables jt, and the so-called state vector /3t. The latter is usually assumed as 
generated by a first-order Markov process^®:
t = [29]
where f t  is a m xl vector, T, is a mxm  matrix, c, is a m xl vector, and R( is a mxG 
matrix. The measurement equation is in turn;
ij,=^Z,j3,+d,+s, f = [30]
where Zf is a nxn matrix that links the observed variable y, and the state variable 
J3t, and dj is a n x l vector. The disturbances rjt and £, are white-noise, uncorrelated 
processes of dimension G xl and n xl, respectively, with time-varying covariance matrices;
ro-M V N \
J
Once a model is formulated in state-space form, the Kalman filter is initially 
applied to obtain estimates of the unobserved state vector conditional on some starting
long-run real exchange rate movements, Bayoumi and MacDonald’s (1998) conclusions point to the same direction.
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value for the state vector and its variance. In correspondence of each observation, when 
system residuals are normally distributed, an evaluation of the log-likelihood function 
based on the prediction eiTor decomposition yields an intuitive way of updating those 
starting values. Iterating the filtering procedure from r = 1, and evaluating the log- 
likelihood function from f + 1 onwards, minimises the effect of the starting values, and 
yields estimates of the state vector based on information available up to time
Now, if a new observation on the data is available at the end of each period, the 
basic Kalman filter consists of two steps: prediction and updating In the former, an 
expectation of the state vector pt conditional on information up to the previous period is 
computed. Subsequently, a forecast of y, is calculated, along with the prediction error. 
Since this contains information about the state vector that goes beyond that contained in 
the estimated value for the previous period, a more accurate inference about it can now be 
made, based on information up to the present period. Using such information, the estimate 
of the state vector is updated.
Analytically:
P r e d ic t io n
Ajt-i -  +Cj
+ k q ,r ;
-  2/f
U p d a t in g
A = Alt-1
where [31]
If F  is a diagonal matrix with values less than one as its diagonal elements, the state vector follows a stationary 
autoregressive process.
Along with this basic filler, the smoothing procedure yields estimates o f the state vector based on all the available 
information in the sample up to T.
For more details about the derivation of these two steps, see Harvey (1989) or Hamilton (1994).
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In the above, P is the covariance matrix of the state vector, and K  represents the 
Kalman gain, which determines the weight assigned to new information contained in the 
prediction error. We initialise the recursive procedure by estimating an unrestricted VAR
in X^ Standard lag-length pre-tests are applied, yielding p ~ 3 and p = 2 ,
depending on the pair of countries under examination, as the optimal order. Next, we build 
the initial state-vector using the VAR estimated values of the residual variance-covariance 
matrix for each equation and all coefficients’ standard errors. The model is then cast into 
the state-space formulation we shortly illustrate below, and the (basic) Kalman filter 
procedure is passed recursively through the sample^®. This way, we produce an optimal 
estimate of a first state vector, providing values, inter alia, for the residual variance of 
each equation. Simultaneously, we apply a second Kalman filtering procedure -this time 
with an embedded smoothing algorithm- on the VAR’s coefficients. A vector of estimated 
coefficients is then generated for each observation. This way, we allow the contribution of 
single variables to the explanation of the total variance of each equation to vary in 
correspondence of each observation.
In time-varying formulations of the state-space model, the Z matrix is represented 
by a matrix of exogenous and/or predetermined variables. This is exactly what happens in 
our model (recall that our baseline specification involves « = 4 and p = 2 or 3), in which 
lags of the endogenous variables are included in the Z matrix:
Via 0 0 yi.t 0 0 3/»,i 0 0
0 Vu 0 0 yi.t 0 0 y„,i 0
0 0 Vu 0 0 3/2,1 0 0 y«,i
3/1 ,f—f^ +i 0 0 y2,t-p+\ 0 0 y n , t - p + \ 0 0
0 y\,i-p+\ 0 0 yi,i~p+\ 0 0 y 0
0 0 y \,t~p^ \ 0 0
[32]
3/2,1-p+l 0 0 y n , t - p + \
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (BEGS algorithm) is used. All estimates were produced using a GAUSS code 
purposely elaborated with Ulrich Woitek, whom I am particularly grateful to. The code is available from the author upon 
request. The Kalman filter and ML procedures employed TSM, an advanced time-series package for GAUSS, by Thierry 
Roncalli.
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Furthermore, we assume that all the elements of the 7, matrix, and of the c, vector 
(refer to equations [29]-[30]), are zeroes. This amounts to hypothesise that the state vector 
of the model behaves according to a white-noise stationary process. The rest of our state- 
space model is as follows
[33]A ~\Pit P21 Ai Ai]
whereas the Q and H  matrices are made up of appropriately chosen elements of 
the state vector. To sum up, the state-space representation we adopt is, in terms of 
equations [29]-[30], the following:
t/f -  + d ,+£■,
One appealing feature of the state space representation we adopt is that, by 
allowing the behaviour of the state vector to be unaffected by its past values, we avoid a 
major risk of using historical data. That is, we prevent the volatility of observations to be 
exceedingly reflected in the estimation of the state vector. Such a case would prevent us 
from capturing the many of the shocks of our system, as the signal-to-noise ratio perceived 
in the case of, say, a stationary autoregressive process for the betas in [34], would 
probably be lower.
5. Investigating Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations
Before evaluating the dynamics of the three real exchange rates we study, we 
perform a series of standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for nonstationarity on all our 
series. For each country, we pre-test for the level of integration of each of the elements in
the system vector X, = ■ Of course, Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests aie not the
optimal way of assessing the stationaiity properties of our series. Already Froot and 
Rogoff (1995) forcefully argued in favour of cointegration tests rather than standard tests
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for the mean reversion of real exchange rates, on the grounds that the former provide less 
stringent assumptions concerning the relative price of nontraded goods. Accordingly, 
Muscatelli and Spinelli (1999) perform, inter alia, Johansen cointegration tests on the 
same (CPI-based) real exchange rate series we study, finding very mixed results. For the 
US dollar/UK sterling real exchange rate, one cointegrating vector is identified, but the 
unit restriction on the coefficients on the price levels is rejected. For the Italian lira/US 
dollar rate there is more evidence of cointegration, while in the case of Italian lira/UK 
sterling rate, no significant eigenvectors are found.
More generally, a number of recently devised alternative tests, with trend- 
stationarity as a null (Kwiatowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992), for example), or 
which account for structural breaks in the trend, are likely to be better suited to investigate 
such properties'^. It is also clear that a system perspective, where the effects of temporary 
and permanent shocks of endogenous vaiiables are more closely pinned down, is a much 
better framework for conducting a study of the trending properties of real exchange rates. 
However, a cointegrated-VAR over a long historical data set would prove inappropriate, 
as the long-run relationships of both productivity and fiscal policy factors on the exchange 
rate may well change over time. This is one of the eye-catching features displayed by the 
three series, as plotted, for each country, in Figures 5 to 7 (see below a description of the 
way we measure each differential). Since the subsequent time varying VAR analysis is 
unaffected by the cointegration or nonstationarity properties of the series under 
investigation, in our context this issue does not appear* to be of primary relevance.
The real exchange rate series we use are CPI-based (Consumer Price Index) 
measures of the bilateral real exchange rate. Given the long time span covered by the data, 
we expect to find, in the ADF tests, some evidence supporting stationaiity. The bilateral 
exchange rate series are shown in Figure 1, where we have scaled means and ranges to 
allow better visual impression of the movements in the bilateral rates. The real exchange 
rate series have been constructed in a way that a decrease in their value constitutes a real 
appreciation.
Table 1 below displays results from simple ADF tests on the three bilateral 
exchange rates, using both CPI and WPI (Wholesale Price Index) definitions.
See Maddala and Kim (1998) for an excellent survey of such methods. However, Engel (1996) shows that tests, like 
those in Kwiatowski et al. (1992), suffer from severe shortcomings when applied to real exchange rate series. In 
addition, such tests appear biased towards finding stationarity, exactly as in the case o f traditional ADF tests.
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_CPI D efinition _____________   WPI D efin ition
T estlB il Ex. R a te  ^
UK/US -3.1307* -3.7242* -3.3423* -3.3998
IT/US  -4.5157** -4.7174** -3.7311** -3.8711*
UK/IT -2.7417 -3.2759 -3.0487* -2.9505
T ab le  1 -  Real Exchange Rates, Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Sample: UKTUS, 1861-1995; IT/US, 
1861-1996; UK/IT, 1861-1995. Real exchange rates are defined using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
and the Wholesale Price Index (WPI). The numbers in the columns labelled and ir refer to ADF £-ratios 
fi'om regressions (two lags were employed) in  which a constant only and a constant plus a trend, 
respectively, were included. and "**" indicate that the null of non-stationarity is rejected at the 5% 
and 1% significance level, respectively. Critical values are from Baneijee, Dolado and Mestre (1992)
The test statistics are computed from autoregressions with a constant only, and 
with a constant and a time trend. In most cases, the null of nonstationarity is rejected, with 
the notable exception of the CPI-defined UK/Italy exchange rate. The fact that with WPI- 
based measures of the real exchange rate the null of nonstationarity tends to be rejected 
more easily than with equivalent CPI-based series, is well known in empirical work^®, as 
well as the strong sample-dependence of the results®®.
Next, we test for the level of integration of the series we use for the productivity, 
budget position, and real interest rate differentials. All differentials are defined as home 
values minus respective foreign country’s values.
Productivity levels are proxied by real GDP per capita. Obviously, there are 
important shortcomings associated with such a measure, while output per worker could 
have represented a better indicator. However, given the long time span and the lack of 
reliable data on employment and capital stocks, our choice is rather limited.
Our measure of the fiscal imbalance is the ratio of government spending minus 
tax revenues on real GDP. Muscatelli and Spinelli (1999) adopt government spending on 
GDP as their measure of the fiscal stance. This, however, does not allow capturing the 
effect of tax-driven changes in the budgetary position. Of course, it is not clear how tax- 
driven fiscal shocks -as opposed to spending shocks- should be interpreted in terms of the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis and, more generally, of the intertemporal approach to the
See, for example, Muscatelli and Spinelli (1999). Bayoumi and MacDonald (1999), using a shorter sample, detect the 
same behaviour in their series. This is probably due to the smaller weight nontraded goods have in WPI series.
Rogers (1999), using a shorter sample, finds evidence of nonstationarity in the US/UK real exchange rate.
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current account and the exchange rate. However, we do believe it is necessary to take into 
account a more appropriate measure of a country’s fiscal position in our estimates. 
Unfortunately, data constraints do not allow us to take into account the effect of interest 
payments and transfers on gross government spending.
Finally, the real interest rate is computed as the nominal rate on long-term bonds 
minus the inflation rate in the previous period. Figures 2 to 4 compare such series for the 
three countries.
Table 2 below lists results from ADF test on the three series for each country. 
There is strong evidence of nonstationarity in the productivity differentials, whereas 
equally strong evidence of stationarity is found in the real interest differentials. The former 
result is in line with what one expects to find in a group of countries that have experienced 
relatively comparable productivity levels only recently by historical terms. On the other 
hand, the stationarity of the real interest differential is an intuitive and familial' finding 
(Bee, Salem, and MacDonald, 1999, for example). As regards the deviations in the fiscal 
indicators, results are less clear-cut. This can however be explained if one takes into 
account the impressive relevance of the war* periods on the overall Italian-US differential 
series (and to a similai' extent on the UK-Italian one), as displayed in Figure 3.
P rodu ctiv ity
d ifferen tia l
B u dget deficW GDP  
ra tio  d ifferen tia l
R ea l in terest ra te  
d ifferen tia l
Test!
Country P a ir 4 t r t f i t r
UKfUS -2 .5205 -2 .4 3 1 3 -3.8077** -4 .3 6 4 7 * * -6 .5 7 6 2 * * -6 .8507**
IT/US -2 .4 4 0 4 -2 .2 5 1 4 -2 .8 1 3 2 -2 .8011 -4 .2 3 0 7 * * -4 .2103**
UK/IT -1 .0 7 7 2 -2 .4 6 1 3 -3 .3 0 5 2 * -3.3391 -4 .1 2 7 1 * * -4 .1 0 8 2 * *
T a b le  2 -  Productivity, budget deficit/GDP ratio and real in terest rate differentials, A ugm ented Dickey- 
F uller tests. Sample: UK/US, 1871-1995; IT/US, 1867-1996; UK/IT, 1871-1995. Productivity levels are 
proxied by (the log of) GDP per capita levels. Budget deficit/GDP ratios are defined are governm ent 
spending m inus taxes over real GDP. The real in terest rate is computed as th e  nom inal rate on long­
term  bonds m inus the inflation rate in  the previous period. D ifferentials are defined as hom e values 
m inus respective foreign country’s values. The num bers in  the columns labelled tp and refer to ADF f- 
ratios from regiession s (two lags w ere em ployed) in  w hich a constant only and a constant plus a trend, 
respectively, w ere included. and indicate th at the null of non-stationarity is  rejected at the 5% 
and 1% significance level, respectively. Critical va lues are from Banerjee, Dolado and M estre (1992)
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We now turn to our time varying estimates. For each country pair, we initially
estimate the baseline VAR model consisting of the vector -{c j,T ,D ,r^  over the
longest sample we have^^. We remind that our approach lets the time-varying VAR 
coefficients contribute to explain each equation’s variance, in turn optimally estimated 
using the Kalman filter, in a different way at each observation. This way, we allow the 
contribution of single VAR parameters towards explaining the total autoregression 
variance to change in correspondence of each year. Subsequently, we use generalised 
impulse responses to make some inference about the source of fluctuations in the real 
exchange rate. Impulse responses aie bound between 95% confidence bands obtained 
through 500 Monte Carlo simulations. Analytical standaid errors were in principle 
available (Pesai'an and Shin, 1998), but are not sufficiently tested. On the other hand, 
bootstrapping (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) is a perfectly legitimate alternative to 
simulation, and in fact, it tends to yield roughly the same confidence bands. Despite 
finding a substantial number of insignificant responses at various horizons, we feel that 
our calculation of confidence bands took place along much more conservative grounds 
than in many related studies^*. Though this will not modify the lines along which 
inference is conducted, we believe that the evaluation of our empirical exercise should 
give this some consideration.
Figures 8 to 16 collect generalised impulse responses of the three bilateral 
exchange rates (RERATE) to shocks in the following differentials: productivity levels 
(PRODDEV), budget deficit/GDP ratios (BDDEV) and real interest rates (RDEV). The 
first column of each figure displays the effects on RERATE of its own shocks; the second, 
third and fourth columns, to shocks in each of the above variables, respectively. Each row 
shows impulse responses for selected years during the classical Gold Standaid, the second 
post-war period, Bretton Woods and the free-floating experiences.
Starting with the UK sterling/US dollar exchange rate, the two panels in Figure 8 
show that shocks to the relative fiscal position do not have significant impacts on the real 
exchange rate. Shocks to the real interest rate differentials have some very limited 
depreciating effects, but these are negligible and very short-lived. On the contrary, under 
the classical Gold Standard, shocks to the productivity differential appear to have a
UK sterling/US dollar, 1871-1995; Italian lira/US dollar, 1867-1996; UK sterling Italian lira, 1871-1995. Standard 
lag-length selection procedures were used to compute the optimal order o f the VAR, found to be p = 2, or /r = 3, 
depending on the country and the sample.
Clarida and Prendergast (1999), for example.
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significant, but not very persistent, depreciating effect. As a matter of fact, such effect 
becomes insignificant soon after the first year, when it does not reverse into a real 
appreciation (see third row in the Figure). On the other hand, the picture becomes less 
clear-cut in the second post-war period, with exchange rates first fixed and then allowed to 
float under the Bretton Woods and the post-1971 regimes (Figure 8, Panel b). The 
sterling real rate response to shocks in the productivity differential seems to become 
overall more persistent, and episodes of real appreciation alternate with ones of real 
depreciation. A cursory look at the forecast error variance decomposition reveals that, for 
the horizon at which all shocks seem to somewhat have some effect on the real exchange 
rate (h = T), the contribution of innovations to the productivity differential is by far the 
largest^^;
FEVD UK sterlingAJS dollar (typical year)horizon PRODDEV ^  RERATE BDDEVREBATE RDEV->REBATEH= 1 0.94553 0.001311 0.026174
When we turn to analysing the Italian lira/US dollar case (Figure 9), we find that 
positive innovations to the productivity differential do have an appreciating effect on the 
real exchange rate, but this is apparently confined to the first year or so following the 
shock, with no paiticular differences across monetary regimes. When it comes to assessing 
the impact of shocks to the relative fiscal position, we observe that these tend to have a 
short-lived depreciating effect during the Gold Standard years, with the remaikable 
exception of the inter-war period^\ In very recent years, however, in front of huge primary 
deficits accumulated by Italy since the late eighties, this pattern appears to be completely 
reversed: the initial depreciation is followed by a persistent real appreciation. The same 
changing pattern, but with an opposite sign, is displayed by the dynamic effects of a 
shocks to the real interest differential: these trigger a real appreciation during the Gold 
Standaid years, and a persistent depreciation in more recent times'*' .^ This suggests to 
further investigate the links between shocks to the fiscal stance, net of interest payments, 
and the behaviour of interest rates. The relative contributions of the vaiious shocks to
Pesaran and Shin (1998) explain in detail why forecast error variance decomposition with generalised impulse 
responses does not yield percentage contributions. Tliis is why interpreting forecast error variance decomposition 
functions in our context is much harder.
After the suspension o f convertibility Italy lived after 1913, the country briefly returned to the Gold Standard between 
1927-1930.
In recent years -between 1988 and 1995- such differential returned to be positive.
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explaining real exchange rate’s error variance, looks stable across the regimes covered by 
these estimates:
FEVD Italian liradJS dollar (1906)
horizon PRODDEVRERATE BDDEVRERATE RDEV-^RERATEH = 1 0.621211 0.086472 0.280335H = 2 0.618922 0.089069 0.283007H = 3 0.603851 0.111271 0.293212H = 4 0.596338 0.122271 0.298713H = 5 0.593059 0.127075 0.301194
FEVD Italian lira/US dollar (1927)
horizon PRODDEVRERATE BDDEVRERATE RDEV-^RERATEH = 1 0.621211 0.086472 0.280335H = 2 0.614344 0.093491 0.28827H = 3 0.502572 0.258735 0.36552H = 4 0.448099 0.338283 0.398392H = 5 0.388491 0.425896 0.449482
FEVD Italian lira/US dollar (1955)
horizon PRODDEVRERATE BDDEV ^  RERATE RDEV-^RERATE1 0.621211 0.086472 0.280335H = 2 0.621035 0.086681 0.280542H = 3 0.567779 0.165231 0.319632H = 4 0.561744 0.174058 0.32398H = 5 0.559807 0.176898 0.325389
FEVD Italian lira/US dollar (1990)
horizon PRODDEVRERATE BDDEVRERATE RDEV->RERATEH= 1 0.621211 0.086472 0.280335H = 2 0.621075 0.086647 0.280496H = 3 0.491021 0.278475 0.377345H = 4 0.490974 0.278544 0.377382H = 5 0.49097 0.278549 0.377385
The figures above suggest that innovations to the productivity differential account 
for most of the variation in the forecast variance of the exchange rate at short horizons. At 
longer horizons, shocks to the remaining differentials become more relevant, with the real 
interest differential especially important in recent years, probably as a result of the 
increased international integration of Italian financial markets.
Next, we examine the UK sterling/Italian lira exchange rate. The picture 
emerging from Figure 10 is not particularly clear-cut. The wide swings in the relative 
fiscal positions between the two countries introduce a stubborn amount of noise into the
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estimates, and make it peculiarly hard to assess the persistence of some effects. Shocks to 
relative productivity levels and to the real interest differential always have an appreciating 
effect on the exchange rate, as expected. This pattern, at least at the present stage, does not 
seem to be affected by the monetary regime in place. The relative importance of the 
various shocks to the decomposition of forecast error variance does not change much 
either across time:
FEVD UK sterlingf/Italian lira (tyipical year)horizon PRODDEVRERATE BDDEV “> RERATE RDEV->RERATE
H= 1 0.891545 0.003553 0.347798H = 2 0.891383 0.003672 0.347733
H = 3 0.887798 0.008344 0.347757H = 4 0.887095 0.009246 0.347742H = 5 0.886955 0.009427 0.34774
This also points to shocks in the productivity differentials and, to a lesser 
extent, in the real interest differential, as the main sources of innovation.
The main result from our estimates, so far, is that the evidence in favour of a 
persistent, productivity effect on the real exchange rate, if any, appears very thin. Instead, 
the link between fiscal shocks and real appreciation appears much more robust.
Only partly satisfied by the precision of our findings, we decided to conduct a 
further battery of estimates. That is, we split the initial sample into two sub-samples. The 
first covers the classical Gold Standard, running from around 1870 up to the First World 
War, whereas the second spans the Bretton Woods years plus the post-1971 floating 
experience. This way, we seek to introduce further room for variation in our estimates, 
allowing the VAR variance-covariance matrix to change across the historical data set we 
employ. The explicit cost of such strategy will involve giving up any attempt of using 
inter-war data for our estimates. However, a bird’s eye view to the series in Figures 1-7 
suggests that such cost is not too high, compared to the level of noise brought by those 
observations.
Figure 11, Panel a illustrates generalised impulse responses for the 
sterling/dollar exchange rate from the model estimated over 1871-1913. The response of 
the real exchange rate in a typical year of the Gold Standard ( 1899) substantially confirms 
the irrelevance of the shocks to the relative fiscal position we had already found. In 
addition, shocks to the real interest differential appear irrelevant at all horizons. This time, 
however, the latter seems to trigger a real appreciation, in line with the predictions of our
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theoretical model, rather than depreciation. Shocks to the productivity differential, again, 
have a significant and very strong depreciating impact on the exchange rate, but not 
beyond the first year or so.
Estimation of the baseline model over the post-war sample yields the typical 
impulse responses illustrated in Figure 11, Panel b. The picture shows that during those 
years a shock to Britain’s relative productivity levels did produce a short-lived 
depreciation of the exchange rate, of a much smaller size than during the Gold Standard. 
Innovations to the relative budget position instead trigger a real appreciation, this short­
lived too. No persistent effects on the real exchange rate are detected.
When sub-sample estimation is conducted on the lira/dollar rate, the generalised 
impulse responses we obtain are displayed in Figure 12. Panel a shows results for the 
Gold Standard sample; in common to the full sample estimates they indicate that a shock 
to the relative budget deficit indicator leads the exchange rate to depreciate in real terms. 
On the contrary, a shock to productivity differential depreciates the rate, and by a 
remarkable extent^^. Interestingly, such peculiar result is reversed in the post-wai' 
estimates (Panel b). The forecast error variance decomposition for a typical year of the 
sample confirms the increasing role of fiscal and monetary shocks over the latter part of 
the sample. Though not persistent, shocks originated in the demand side of the economy 
again appear to be of increasing relevance:
horizon PRODDEV ^  RERATE BDDEV -> RERATE RDEV->RERATEH= 1 0.601211 0.077472 0.240335
FEVD Italian lira/US dollar, 1952-1996 (typical year)horizon PRODDEV ^  REBATE BDDEV ^  REBATE RDEV^REBATEH= 1 0.984994 0.291946 0.681189
Finally, Figure 13 illustrates our findings when system estimates are computed 
over the two sub-samples for the sterling/lira model. During the Gold Standard (Panel a), 
productivity and fiscal policy shocks seem to impact on the real exchange rate according 
to the BSH, whereas the response to a real interest differential shock is somehow perverse. 
The picture is not much different for the second post-war period (Panel b), where
We have already detected a similar pattern with the UK sterling/US dollar rate.
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however shocks to fiscal policy appeal* to have more enduring -though smaller- 
appreciating effects on the real exchange rate. Panel c also shows that in the free-floating 
period following the breakdown of Bretton Woods, in some instances the initial real 
appreciation is subsequently reversed into a real depreciation, and that the overall response 
tends to be more persistent. Forecast error variance decomposition for selected years 
confirms this finding, with post-1971 innovations in relative fiscal policy stance 
accounting for a noticeable lar ger amount of variation in the exchange rate:
FEVD UK sterling/Italian lira, 1949-1995 (1968)horizon PRODDEV -> RERATE BDDEVRERATE RDEV->RERATE1 0.830231 0.125634 0.990171H = 2 0.830231 0.125634 0.990171H = 3 0.78362 0.179742 0.934102H = 4 0.757065 0.210565 0.902159H = 5 0.757064 0.210566 0.902158
FEVD UK sterling/Italian lira, 1949-1995 (1982)horizon PRODDEV -> BDDEV RDEV">RERATE RERATE RERATEH= 1 0.830231 0.125634 0.990171H = 2 0.830231 0.125634 0.990171H = 3 0.759194 0.208084 0.904721H = 4 0.72756 0.244802 0.866668H = 5 0.727559 0.244803 0.866667
Overall, the results we obtained using the sub-sample approach are interesting, 
because they tend to confirm that the response of the real exchange rate to shocks in 
productivity levels and the relative fiscal position is essentially sample-dependent. Again, 
such feature could have not been captured using a time-variant, fixed sample framework.
Moreover, it seems that such changing pattern is not strictly due to the exchange 
rate regime in place, as substantial differences emerge, within the post-war sample, in the 
responses obtained during and after the breakdown of Bretton Woods. Overall, we found 
relatively little evidence in favour of an appreciating effect of shocks to relative 
productivity levels. Real exchange rates’ response to such shocks, when having the sign 
predicted by the BSH, tends to be short-lived. On the contrary, in a number of occasions 
we find that fiscal shocks, especially those of a considerable size, like the prolonged fiscal 
deficits in Italy in recent years and during the interwar period, do have persistent effects 
on the real exchange rate^^. This is at odds with what generally expected, as one would
Such effects are line with the predictions of the theoretical model adopted here in the Hrst case, but not in the second, 
thus highlighting an important difference in the transmission of fiscal shocks.
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imagine the effects of demand-side shocks to be wiped-out by factor mobility in the 
medium to long-run. In the next section we briefly summarise our findings, and point to 
possible avenues for future research.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we aimed at providing some empirical evidence as to the origins 
of real exchange rate fluctuations over a long period of data. Time-varying VAR 
estimates, conducted within a Kalman filter perspective, in which stringent identifying 
restrictions need not to be imposed, sought to attribute those fluctuations to historical 
episodes of shocks to productivity levels and government spending. Overall, we found 
very weak evidence in favour of shocks of the first kind as having a persistent appreciating 
effect on the real exchange rate. Somehow, stronger support is found in favour of such an 
effect as produced by shocks to the relative fiscal position^^. Aside from this general 
conclusion, three points seem to emerge from the empirical exercise we performed in the 
previous section.
First, estimation over sub-samples that do not include the war and inter-war 
periods shows mixed results as regards the effect of divergences in productivity levels on 
the real exchange rate. Especially during the Gold Standard years, such divergences tend 
to yield a real depreciation, whereas the case for a real appreciation, confirming the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, appears marginally stronger in the post-war and post- 
Bretton Woods periods. Moreover, we have found some evidence supporting the idea that 
during the Gold Standard fiscal imbalances were producing real depreciation of the 
exchange rate, exactly the opposite than during the post-war period.
Second, estimates over the entire sample show that, for particular rates and 
specific episodes, like the lira/dollar* in very recent years, prolonged and sustained 
differences in government spending net of tax revenue appear to trigger persistent real 
appreciation. During the Gold Standard, and the early Bretton Woods years, however, the 
same shock seem leads to a diametrically opposite response of the real exchange rate. This 
can be readily interpreted as evidence of the fact that, beyond the exchange rate regime in 
place, which is indeed relevant, what matters in determining the persistence of shocks to
This result is broadly in line with what found by Clarida and Cali (1994) for the post-Bretton Woods period.
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the real exchange rate is the underlying economic structure. That is, there appears to be 
some evidence pointing to the underlying economic structure and the exchange rate 
regime as determining real exchange rate volatility, and the transmission of real shocks to 
the terms of trade.
It is then true, as we hinted, that the interactions between productivity levels, the 
fiscal balance and the real exchange rate be might strongly affected by the nature of the 
international arrangements^^ linking the monetary authorities. The sub-sample results we 
found, however, confirm that the exchange rate regime is not the unique determinant of 
the transmission of such interactions. Beyond the international monetaiy arrangements in 
place, one may wonder about the direction in which causality runs along such links, and 
along the interactions between the behavioural relationships in the economic system and 
policy’s institutional settings.
In the first chapter of this thesis, we have found some evidence that suggests how, 
in the context of monetary policy conduct, institutional reforms probably tend to somehow 
follow, rather than precede, changes in the collective preferences or in the basic structure 
of an economic system. In the same vein, one cannot therefore exclude that the exchange 
rate regime is relevant in accounting for differences in the transmission of fiscal and 
productivity shocks to the real exchange rate. However, changes in the monetary regime 
should be seen as an effect, not a cause, of changes in the behavioural relationships in the 
economy. Demographic and technological factors are likely to account for changes in 
relative price flexibility even to a greater extent than the exchange regime in place. 
Moreover, the apparent correlation between the fiscal stance and the behaviour of 
productivity, suggests that it is mainly through such linkages that the above factors affect 
the transmission of shocks. Accordingly, if the response of the real exchange rate to 
various shocks differs over time, this is likely to be due to all those factors. The response 
itself may be endogenous to the set of conditions that led to the adoption of the specific 
exchange rate regime in place. It then follows that whether real shocks tend to prevail on 
monetary shocks as to the generation of observed real exchange rate fluctuations, is a 
highly case-specific matter.
Though blurred by the lack of more precise measures of productivity and 
government spending for the early part of our sample, the results just summarised 
somehow help bridging the gap between theoretical predictions and observed real
Or, perhaps, by the absence o f such arrangements, as under free exchange rate floating regimes
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exchange rate behaviour. In particular, many of the long-run hypotheses some recent 
advances in intertemporal macroeconomics have recently developed, deserve further 
empirical investigation, perhaps along the historical lines we begun to tackle in this study. 
One possibility would be to extend our time-varying approach to a model explicitly 
allowing for discrete regime changes, so that the passages from Gold Standard, to Bretton 
Woods, and to the free-floating regime is directly accounted for by the statistical model. 
Another research priority would call for the construction of more refined indicators of the 
policy stance, especially for fiscal policy. As we have seen, the complex links between 
monetary and fiscal policy shocks often prevented exact identification of the underlying 
dynamics. In addition, the results of the existing literature, as we have seen, make us 
suspect that one major problem of these analyses is the identification of productivity 
measures that are not as strongly coiTelated to the fiscal stance as in our and other cases. 
However, we believe that our study has unveiled some important features of historical real 
exchange rate movements, and successfully addressed a number of relevant 
methodological issues.
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Data Appendix
Real GDP and government expenditure series were obtained by deflating the current price 
series using the GDP deflator.
The pre-1950 GDP, fiscal and price data were obtained from Flora (1983, 1987), State 
Economy and Society in Western Europe, 1815-1975. Vols. I and II, Campus: Frankfurt, 
and Mitchell (1992), International Historical Statistics -  Europe 1750-1988, New York: 
Stockton Press, and Mitchell (1993), International Historical Statistics -  The Americas 
1750-1988. New York: Stockton Press.
The pre-1950 data on interest rates were obtained from Spinelli and Fratianni (1991) 
Storia Monetaria d ’ltalia, Milano: Mondadori; Friedman and Schwartz (1982) Monetaiy 
Trends in the UK and the US , Chicago: Chicago University Press; and Homer and Sylla 
(1995) A History o f Interest Rates, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
The data for the post-1950 period was obtained from standard sources {IFS, WEFA), and 
spliced together to obtain continuous series for the whole sample period.
204
ITUS  "-UKUS
 UKIT
5.5
4.5
3.5
1960 19801900 1920 1940 20001880
Figure 1 -  Bilateral real exchange rates (CPI), 1867-1996 (scaled means and ranges). UKUS, UK sterling/US dollar; UKIT, UK sterling/Italian lira; ITUS, Italian lira/US dollar.
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Figure 2 -  Differentials in productivity levels (see the main text for details on the proxies used here), 1867-1996 (scaled means and ranges).
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Figure 3 -  Differentials in budget deficit /real gdp ratios, 1867-1996 (scaled means and ranges).
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Figure 4 -  Real interest rate differentials, 1867-1996 (scaled means and ranges).
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F ig u re  6 — Real exchange rate, and differentials in productivity levels and budget deficit/GDP ratios. Italy/US, 1867-1996 (scaled means and ranges)
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Figure 7 -  Real exchange rate, and differentials in productivity levels and budget deficit/GDP ratios. UK/Italy, 1871-1995 (scaled means and ranges)
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Conclusions
Summary of Findings for Each Chapter
The aim of this thesis was to bridge the substantial gap existing between some of 
the theoretical predictions elaborated by the literature on the political economy of 
monetary policymaking, and the apparent lack of empirical validation which has often 
accompanied their emergence as normative guidelines for policymakers. Part of this 
research was further motivated by the need to establish some empirical regularity as to the 
role of leading indicators for monetary policy, and of fiscal and productivity shocks for the 
behaviour of real exchange rates.
Overall, this empirical study has addressed a number of relevant methodological 
issues, and unveiled some important features concerning the role of structural and 
institutional changes on contemporary policymaking. What follows is a summary of the 
main results, articulated for each chapter.
Chapter One: Interest Rate Rules and Policy Shifts in OECD Economies
In this chapter, we have discussed and estimated forward-looking interest rate 
reaction functions for two groups of OECD economies. Our aim was twofold. First, we 
sought to envisage whether the recent emphasis placed by the existing empirical literature 
on the consistency of monetary regimes in the G-3 economies with an inflation-forecasting 
approach, was validated by the data. Second, we wanted to establish whether there was 
any systematic pattern between institutional change, in the form of the adoption of explicit 
inflation targets and central bank reforms, and the operational conduct of monetary 
strategies. A number of general conclusions emerge from our empirical results.
First, the evidence we gathered suggests that the monetary authorities in our 
sample did not follow stable simple forward-looking policy reaction functions based on 
output gaps and expected inflation (and, a fortiori, Taylor rules). In the US and Japan, 
countries where there have been no major institutional reforms, we find that policies 
underwent considerable evolutions in the 1980s and 1990s. However, it is only since the 
1990s that estimated interest rate rules in these countries begin to look like the ones the 
theoretical research on inflation-forecast targeting has recently illustrated.
Second, in countries where there were explicit intermediate targets (such as the 
growth of M3 in Germany), these appear mainly as a device to anchor expectations. In
addition, monetary policy is often found to follow a broad set of external objectives. Our
results confirm those of previous researches who have detected in the Bundesbank a I
marked “targeting” attitude regarding inflation, output, and some external conditions.
Third, with the exception of the UK, the recent switch to inflation targets in the 
countries we studied does not seem to have radically changed the way in which interest 
rate policy pursues its ultimate objectives. In practice, there is some evidence, particularly 
clear in Canada’s and New Zealand’s cases, that any major change in the responsiveness 
of interest rates to expected inflation took place well before the adoption of inflation 
targets. The same pattern seems to have been followed even when such institutional 
reforms have been accompanied by greater central bank independence. A possible 
interpretation is that the new regimes were brought in simply to consolidate gains in terms 
of lower inflation.
Finally, we detected some important differences in the behaviour of central banks 
as far as output stabilisation is concerned. On the one hand, we found some evidence 
suggesting that the Fed has been apparently exploiting its consolidated antinflationary 
reputation to focus on the cycle. At the other extreme, some monetary authorities 
apparently feel the need to build up such a reputation. .
Whether central banks that have only recently acquired their independence, such 
as the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, will find themselves into the first 
or the second category of experiences, remains, however, a fairly open question.
Chapter Two: Interest Rate Rules and Policy Credibility on the Road to EMU
Similarly to what we did in the previous chapter for other countries, we have 
examined the behaviour of interest rate policies in France, Italy, Belgium and Ireland, 
during the eighties and on their road to EMU. Estimated reaction functions for each 
country provided us with some evidence about the relative costs these countries faced in 
maintaining their exchange rate parities within the BRM, and in fulfilling the basic 
convergence criteria laid out in the Maastricht Treaty. The role of exchange rate risk, and 
the way in which long-term interest rate differentials reflected the overall credibility of 
fiscal policies in each country, has been analysed in relation to the trade-offs national 
policymakers faced between domestic and external objectives.
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Our findings highlight quite clearly that in some cases (France, Belgium) the 
process of convergence towards a stable exchange rate vis-à-vis Germany and a tight 
inflation control took place amidst sustained policy reforms over a medium- to long-term 
horizon. In addition, the ERM turbulence in 1992-93 does not appear to have impaired the 
largely achieved macroeconomic stability. On the contrary, Italy’s, and to a much lesser 
extent, Ireland’s monetary policies, seem to have been severely constrained, in their 
efforts to stabilise the economy, by the lack of credibility of their respective fiscal stances.
Overall, our results appear as a first empirical validation, with reference to 
European countries, of the idea that fiscal imbalances do impose some additional 
constraint on the manoeuvrability of monetary policies. This message appears even more 
relevant in the context of a unified European monetary policy process.
In the EMS context, the relationships between a country’s budgetary position and 
interest rate determination were somehow made more evident by the presence of a further 
binding constraint on economic policies -the ERM band. The adoption of exchange rate 
agreements made financial markets, and the public in general, more aware of the new 
trade-off faced by monetary authorities, by attaching extra penalties to departures of 
interest rate policies from an anti-inflationary stance. It is clear that financial markets and 
policy observers, for the very same reason, scrupulously and critically monitor the 
behaviour of the European Central Bank. Whether the interesting results found in this 
study are to be observed for the euro area as a whole and for other economies, is left as a 
direction for further research.
Chapter Three: Evaluatins the Information Content o f Euro Area Monetary Assresates
In this chapter, we provided some preliminary empirical evidence as to the 
usefulness of the growth of M3 for predicting future inflation in the euro area. First, we 
found little empirical support for rejecting at standard confidence levels Granger non­
causality of M3 on prices. This conclusion is found stable throughout the sample and 
robust to a number of robustness checks. Second, we investigated the leading indicator 
properties of M3, by looking at a Pstar-typ& model in which information about the 
cyclical state of the economy and a measure of authorities’ inflation target feed back onto 
the generation of inflation forecasts. Our results confirm that a significant positive 
association exists between the real money gap and future inflation up to five to six
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quarters ahead. Similar predictive ability is displayed by the output gap, the real interest 
rate and (to a lesser extent) by the term spread.
Third, we compared the forecasting properties of the model developed here to 
those of an alternative, non-monetary model for euro-area GDP. Overall, each model 
appears to have some strengths of its own: both of them incorporate some information that 
is relevant to explain GDP inflation. However, taken individually, none of the models 
seems to be able to provide a complete account of inflation developments in the euro area.
All this suggests quite clearly that information derived from both monetary and 
non-monetary models (and indicators) should be used to generate reliable forecasts for 
euro-area inflation.
Chapter Fourth: Real Exchange Rates, Productivity Levels and Government Spendins
In the final chapter, we aimed at providing some empirical evidence as to the 
origins of real exchange rate fluctuations over long historical datasets for the US, UK, and 
Italy. Time-varying VAR estimates, conducted within a Kalman filter perspective, in 
which stringent identifying restrictions need not to be imposed, sought to attribute those 
fluctuations to historical episodes of shocks to productivity levels and government 
spending.
Our main result is that there appears to be very weak evidence in favour of 
shocks of the first kind as having a persistent appreciating effect on the real exchange rate.
Somehow, stronger support is instead found in favour of such an effect as produced by 
shocks to the relative fiscal position. Additional points emerge from the empirical exercise 
we performed.
First, estimation over sub-samples that do not include the war and inter-war
periods shows mixed results as regards the effect of divergences in productivity levels on
the real exchange rate. Especially during the Gold Standard years, such divergences tend 
to trigger a real depreciation, whereas the case for a real appreciation, confirming the 
B alassa-S amuelson hypothesis, appears marginally stronger in the post-war and post- 
Bretton Woods periods. Moreover, we have found some evidence supporting the idea that, 
during the Gold Standard, fiscal imbalances were producing real depreciation of the 
exchange rate, exactly the opposite than during the post-war period.
Second, estimates over the entire sample show that, for particular rates and 4
specific episodes, like the lira/dollar in very recent years, prolonged and sustained :
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differences in government spending trigger persistent real appreciation. During the Gold 
Standard, and the early Bretton Woods years, however, the same shock leads to a 
diametrically opposite response of the real exchange rate. That is, there appears to be some 
evidence pointing to the underlying economic structure and the exchange rate regime as 
determining real exchange rate volatility, and the transmission of real shocks to the terms 
of trade. Moreover, the sub-sample results we found confinn that the exchange rate regime 
is not the unique determinant of the transmission of such interactions.
In the first chapter of this thesis, we have found some evidence suggesting how, 
in the context of monetary policy conduct, institutional reforms probably tend to follow, 
rather than precede, changes in collective preferences or in the basic structure of an 
economic system. In the same vein, one cannot exclude that the exchange rate regime is 
relevant in accounting for differences in the transmission of fiscal and productivity shocks 
to the real exchange rate. However, changes in the monetary regime should be seen as an 
effect, not a cause, of changes in the behavioural relationships in the economy. 
Demographic and technological factors are likely to account for changes in relative price 
flexibility even to a greater extent than the exchange regime in place. Moreover, the 
evident correlations between fiscal stance and productivity, suggests that it is mainly 
through such still unclear linkages that the above factors affect the transmission of shocks. 
The transmission mechanism itself may be endogenous to the set of conditions that led to 
the adoption of the particular exchange rate regimes in place.
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